



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

October 3, 2001

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.

b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply with the 20-day statutory time limit in processing your request.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request.

We have located the enclosed records pertaining to American Embassy Moscow USSR, ZF010164W. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order 12958. As a result of this review, it has been determined that the information no longer warrants security classification protection and is partially releasable to you. Fees for processing this request are waived.

Since the release of some of the information deleted from the records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6) of the FOIA.

The withholding of information by this office is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you filing litigation in the courts.


During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which originated with other government agencies. This office has no authority to release these records and they are being referred, along with your request for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.

We regret the quality of some of the pages within the enclosure; however, these are the best copies obtainable.

We are continuing to process your request for records regarding other titles you have requested and will respond to you by separate correspondence when our action is complete.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Mrs. Reilly at (301) 677-4742. Please refer to case 740F-01.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Russell A. Nichols". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

b

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. 2F01016470

As of SEP 14 1979 all material included
(Date)
in this file conforms with DA policies currently
in effect.

Loise Ward
(Signature)

SEP 14 1979
(Date Signed)

LOISE WARD
(Printed Name)

7
(Grade)

REVIEWED FOR PE
SEP 14 1979
REVIEWER A. Chle DATE 8 Dec 92

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s)

2-5

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 6-20



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

JEC 4

Case Control No. 20103999

Mr. John Young
Cryptome.org
251 W. 89th St., Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

I refer to your letter to the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command dated March 29, 2001, requesting the release of a number of documents under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552). The Intelligence and Security Command referred the attached two State Department documents to us for our concurrence in their release. We have reviewed both documents and have determined that they may be released.

Sincerely,

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director

Office of IRM Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

PP 3 20

STATE DEPARTMENT DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

☐ Retain Class'n ☐ Change to _____
☐ Declassify in part and excise as shown

EO 12958, 25X() () ()

☒ Declassify ☐ After _____ (not)(obtained)
☐ With concurrence _____

IPS by P. Valdes Date 6/27/01

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SY/FAS - Mr. Morton

ONE COPY ONLY
RECEIVED

DATE: September 15, 1972

FROM : INR/RES/SOV - Mark S. Ramee

SUBJECT: Surveillance in the Soviet Union

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
AMB	MIN	PCL	SEC	STATE	DEF	NAVY	DAO	SY	RES	SOV	SLT

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Introduction

This report summarizes the experiences of one Embassy Officer with Soviet security agents during trips to twenty Soviet cities in 1970-1972. It examines techniques employed, convenient methods of detection and coping, and regional differences noted throughout the Soviet Union. Experiences of other Embassy officers with different responsibilities during this same period will be different and often even contradictory. This paper does not purport to present an authoritative overall picture of Soviet surveillance techniques; rather, it seeks to convey one particular set of experiences in order to provide some general impressions of the type of surveillance which American diplomats may routinely expect throughout the Soviet Union.

Surveillants and Plants

It is a rare trip within the Soviet Union which transpires without rather clear evidence of surveillants and at least one plant. "Surveillants" follow travelers in order to keep tabs on them and, when necessary, to frighten or alert local Soviets as to the imminent dangers posed by the situation. "Plants" are security agents who represent themselves as legitimate local Soviet citizens. They contrive to meet or be met by the visitors and strike up an acquaintance. More often than not, the primary purpose of the plants encountered appeared to be simply occupying the visitors' time, while keeping close track of their activities. Such plants rarely probed, remaining content instead simply to make note of whatever interest the visitors themselves might express in particular areas. (More sophisticated or comprehensive security methods involving electronics, provocations and the like are beyond the purview of this paper).

Spotting a Surveillant

After a brief exposure in the Soviet Union, it is generally embarrassingly

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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easy to spot physical surveillants during trips to the various republics. On foot, they tended to follow behind at a distance appropriate to the circumstances -- closer in a crowd, farther back on an empty street, etc. Occasionally they walked ahead of their charges, turning off on a side street after a while only to resume surveillance from behind or to defer to partners. Although younger to middle-aged men comprised the majority of surveillants, women were also employed frequently. Most republics seemed to include a fair number of local non-Russian nationals in these efforts. Indeed, in those cases where Russians were used for surveillance in non-Russian environments, their presence was painfully obvious. Surveillance by automobile was employed often when covering walking targets (in support of surveillants on foot), frequently when covering targets on trolleybus, bus or streetcar, and always when covering a target automobile. Three males in an inconspicuous Volga comprised a typical automobile team. Dress generally was typically Soviet: an open shirt, often with a suitcoat, in summer; a fur hat and ordinary greatcoat in winter. One Soviet surveillant from the thick, concrete, double-doored Soviet Trade Mission in Helsinki followed the reporting officer into Stockmans Department Store wearing typical Soviet clothing with the utterly incongruous exception of a flashy blue Finnish scarf.

Skills at unobtrusive surveillance varied widely throughout the republics. As a general rule, the larger cities had more adept personnel in this regard than the smaller ones, with Kiev constituting a major exception. In addition, the less developed areas -- much of Central Asia, some of the Caucasus, and the more remote autonomous republics -- seemed to deploy less discreet surveillants, or to care less about possible detection. In general, maintaining contact definitely appeared more important than possible detection. However, the appearance of discretion remained an important principle, if not the reality. Even in cases where the surveillants must have realized that detection was unavoidable, they generally retained their composure and proceeded as if the circumstances were entirely normal.

Spotting a Plant

While there are few cases when one can be absolutely certain either way about the bona fides of a chance acquaintance, several tipoffs can greatly increase the odds in favor of a deliberate contact:

- a) If he meets you, rather than the reverse; on a street, at a restaurant table, in a store or public park. When the initial move is his, you may well have a live one.
- b) If he is placed where you can conveniently "meet" him; in an adjacent theater seat, at a restaurant table near one you have reserved, etc.

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c). If he feels free to call at your hotel room (i.e., is permitted to do so).

d) If local Soviets nearby suddenly clam up or become tense. While a good professional plant might be quite adept at playing his role, the elderly coat-check man, the non-Intourist waitress, the bookstore clerk, or other local inhabitant rarely can conceal the caution or "mixed" emotions generated by the presence of local Chekists. The agents may well be personally known to the locals. If not, years of experience have taught local residents how to sense their presence instantly.

Once contact is made, some additional telltale signs can give an indication of the acquaintance's true background:

a) His reaction upon learning that he is speaking with Americans. Normal Soviets invariably react with strong and genuine emotion; usually with wonderment or incredulity, sometimes blended with some fear; often with delight. For some reason, plants almost to a man seem to fear overplaying this particular scene. They pass it by with raised eyebrows and a quick "Oh?" and then proceed immediately to another topic. "Straight" Soviets simply are unable to react so evenly to such news.

b) A bland, passive friendliness. Virtually all legitimate Soviets cannot refrain from pumping Americans about life in the US, mainly about living conditions, wages and the like. An acquaintance who does not press on such matters, instead maintaining a friendly demeanor and permitting the foreigner to carry the conversation, should be treated with circumspection. This is particularly true if, when discussing any area of disagreement on international affairs or other subjects, he speaks calmly, with relative disinterest, and with no display of emotion. This is very un-Soviet behavior. Plants evidently are trained to keep their cool, even to an unrealistic extent.

c) Reaction when nonplussed. In response to questions or statements which for one reason or another are embarrassing to a plant or to his cover story, he curiously tends often to react by looking askance and simply not answering. Unless the American adds something to the conversation at this point the silence can proceed for several seconds. The reporting officer found this reaction from a plant in Alma-Ata to closely parallel those of an Intourist girl in Dushanbe and a Soviet diplomat (and identified security agent) in Washington, D.C. A straight Soviet in a similar position, having no different identity to conceal, would have no reason to feel caught off guard by any subtle imputation of his identity.

d) The "simple" Soviet with intelligent eyes. This admittedly is a most subjective criterion, but one which can be usefully applied in some cases.

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A plant can face great difficulty in concealing "intelligent eyes" when posing as a simple, dull-witted worker or peasant. Careful attention to his eyes may indicate that they simply do not jibe with the role being played. They can sometimes betray an intensity, activity, impatience, alertness, or "intelligence" which more likely belongs to someone else.

The following examples demonstrate some of the more common approaches encountered:

Dinner in Baku

After shooing other locals away from the Americans' dinner table, a waitress permitted an Azeri man to join them. As if this were not obvious enough, this new companion actually had been a member of a team which had followed the Americans on foot earlier the same day. He seemed utterly at a loss as to what he should say at the table. When asked what music he liked, he paused, smiled and replied: "I like English music." Further conversation clearly revealed that he knew nothing whatsoever about the subject. This feeble attempt, one of the weakest ever encountered, may have been decided as a result of local initiative on the spot at the last minute.

Strolling in Yakutsk

A passerby on Yakutsk's main street stopped the American visitors and requested a light(!) He then asked where the visitors were from, and immediately offered to show them the town. When they pleaded another engagement, he instantly and courteously said goodbye. This same good citizen had been spotted 30 minutes previously on another street toting a Soviet VEF shortwave radio, the identical model being carried by one of the Americans who had a professional interest in VOA reception.

In Flight

A more subtle approach occurred during a flight between two Soviet cities. The reporting officer's seatmate held back for some time before starting a low-key conversation. After a few minutes of idle chatter, the reporting officer leaned back deliberately as if to nap, whereupon his seatmate hastily renewed the discussion. In an otherwise virtually flawless performance, he

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made one rather forced attempt to casually elicit interest. Noting that the American Embassy was located on a "very noisy street," he added that it "was not at all quiet like the street of the Sudanese Embassy, for example." The Sudanese Embassy is relatively insignificant in Moscow, only one of scores, and the Soviet himself admitted that he had no connection with that Embassy nor acquaintances there. The reporting officer, however, had served previously in the Sudan, and the Soviet evidently knew this. Meanwhile, the Soviet seated next to the reporting officer's American travelling companion was busy inviting the latter to dinner at his home -- a rare event within the USSR for Western diplomats, especially when proffered by a sober Soviet in a public place abounding with stewardesses and other witnesses.

This particular flight was the reporting officer's first within the USSR and the Soviets may have wanted to check out a new member of the American Embassy. Subsequent internal flight "companions," if present, were too subtle for detection.

Possibilities for Contacts

Deliberate attempts to avoid surveillance are almost invariably counter-productive. Nevertheless, certain commonsense procedures during trips can enhance opportunities for meeting legitimate Soviets on a one-time basis, even given the presence of numerous security personnel.

Hiring a Cab

Intourist officials prefer that foreigners hire Intourist cars and drivers: it provides convenient close scrutiny, and it earns more money. Hotel personnel often discourage taxi orders, and when they accept them the visitor must often wait close to an hour while a suitable "taxi driver" is found. In some cases, truly legitimate cabbies probably are enlisted as "trusties" to keep tabs on the foreigners hiring them. One possible rule of thumb: if a cab driver complains about long waits at stops which earn him little money, he probably is a genuine cabbie; if he bears this loss in silence he is likely to be an agent or a taxi driver sufficiently compensated for or intimidated by the circumstances not to complain.

Strolling about "aimlessly" in town until finding a taxi stand can usually provide a legitimate taxi driver and some interesting comments about life in the area. An offer to pay whatever the meter registers plus a bonus of

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R 2.00 per hour usually relaxes and helps open up most drivers. Selecting a real taxi is not always so simple, however. In Kiev, for example, a city not noted for its subtle surveillance techniques, a "taxi" suddenly appeared from a side street, bulled its way into line at a taxi stand, and refused to take anyone but the two American diplomats standing there. A similar experience in Baku testified to a corresponding lack of sophistication there.

Choosing a Restaurant

Eating in local, non-Intourist restaurants provides one of the best opportunities for meeting local inhabitants. However, two approaches are virtually guaranteed to spell failure: reserving a table in advance, and mentioning in a hotel room where one plans to eat. Even walking into a restaurant unannounced will not always ensure success. Waitresses throughout the Soviet Union actively attempt to separate foreigners from locals, with varying degrees of determination largely depending on the location. Thus in Ashkhabad, two Turkmeni youths who had the tenuousness to sit with two Americans set the waitress off in a fit of rage. She screamed at them for five minutes nonstop, then refused service altogether. The young workers finally became intimidated and apologetically excused themselves. In Yakutsk, a shouting match of the same type resulted in a draw as the waitress refused to serve two similar upstarts, who remained seated regardless. By contrast, Tbilisi appeared more relaxed about such matters. A similar situation induced a waitress to politely suggest to a young Georgian that he might be more comfortable at a different table. When the youth declined, she quietly retreated.

The Airline Game, and How to Beat It

Local security officials seem to breathe much easier once Western diplomats have departed their turf. Thus, they routinely enlist the assistance of hotel personnel to attempt to hasten the departure. In one of the most common patterns, the security types ask hotel personnel to tell the visitors that a flight has been cancelled, is full, or will not land at the original destination. The often tremulous expressions and manners of the hotel personnel as they play their roles belie the validity of such claims. Independent checks such as direct dial telephone calls to the airport invariably confirm the feeble duplicity involved.

The simplest means of countering such ploys is to politely state that it is impossible to depart earlier than planned, and that a subsequent flight will be taken, no matter how long a wait is required. The reporting officer has employed this approach many times, and in every instance, the original

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travel plans subsequently worked out as the Soviets "found" extra seats or otherwise recanted their statements in various face-saving manners. In Kazan', the elderly hotel clerk caught in the middle of this game was petrified with fear throughout. In Alma-Ata, by contrast, a younger In-tourist employee who well knew the score actually smiled sardonically when a nervous hotel official reported that additional seats had been found "with great difficulty."

Provincial Breakdown

The following chart indicates the relative degree of surveillance noted in 20 Soviet cities during the period 1970-1972. • Duplicate entries reflect more than one visit.

<u>Area</u>	<u>Surveillance Noted</u>				
	None	Light 1/	Moderate 2/	Heavy 3/	Very Heavy 4/
Central Asia			Frunze Alma-Tashkent Ata	Dushanbe	Ashkhabad
Baltics				Vilnius Riga	
North	Leningrad	Leningrad	Leningrad		
Ukraine			Kiev Donetsk	Kiev	
Caucasus		Tbilisi		Baku Yerevan	
Siberia	Irkutsk	Novosibirsk	Yakutsk		
Other		Kazan' Kishinev	Ufa Bel'tsi		

1. Intermittent coverage; perhaps one or two on foot; sometimes one car.
2. Full-time coverage; one or two cars.
3. Persistent and close full-time coverage.
4. Blanket coverage; no attempt at discretion.

(Plants also included in each of above 4 categories.)

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Central Asia

Ashkhabad clearly takes first prize for vigilance. Surveillants blanketed the streets and lacked the ability, the desire, or both to take elementary steps at discretion. No other Soviet city visited during a two-year period could match such a performance. As Turkmenistan often is considered the most backward of the USSR's constituent republics, this perhaps is not too surprising. Ashkhabad's relative proximity to the Iranian border and some sensitive military installations nearby also render this town less than hospitable to Western diplomats. Elsewhere in Central Asia, Dushanbe (the former Stalinabad) contributed moderate to heavy coverage, and Tadzhikistan also is generally rated a less developed Soviet area. Attention paid by security personnel in Alma-Ata, Frunze and Tashkent appeared more moderate, although substantial in comparison with some other parts of the Soviet Union. A relatively greater professionalism among surveillance cadres in these latter three cities, perhaps developed in part from a higher frequency of Western visitors, may help to explain the differences.

Baltic States

Vilnius and Riga both turned out moderate to heavy coverage. These rather unfriendly receptions stood in marked contrast to the warm welcome afforded by almost all local residents as soon as they learned that their guests were Americans. This very warmth, demonstrated by Western-oriented, non-Russian nationalities under Soviet control for only three decades, may well have been reflected in the concern of local security officials. Moreover, there appeared to be room for some local initiative in deciding the extent any means of coverage afforded. In Riga, for example, only one detectable car followed at a discreet distance while the travelers visited various bookstores. After they had called at a cybernetics institute, however, noticeable surveillance immediately increased. At the second scientific office visited, security officials entered the same establishment and stationed themselves prominently at major office entrances in an obvious and successful attempt to intimidate institute officials.

Leningrad

Like their Baltic neighbors, Leningraders displayed a friendly curiosity in their encounters with the American visitors. But Leningrad security

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officials, unlike their colleagues in the Baltics, seemed largely unconcerned at the threat posed by the Western diplomats during 1970 and 1971. Either that, or their methods of surveillance were far more discreet than those applied throughout the rest of the country. In 1972, however, coverage became apparent beyond doubt. Explanation of this shift is difficult; the new permanent presence of Americans at the American Consulate General Designate, the particular travelers on each trip, and the pre-summit internal vigilance of early 1972 all are possibilities.

Ukraine

Surveillance in the Ukraine tended to be heavy, obvious, and sometimes crude. In Kiev, local authorities appeared more ready to commit resources to routinely monitor visiting American diplomats than in other large Soviet cities. The atmosphere seemed somehow more controlled than usual, and as a result many citizens were intimidated from contacts. On the other hand, a distinct friendliness was evident toward Americans among many Ukrainians of lower social station: petty clerks, laborers, peasants; in short, those with little or nothing to lose from such contact. Concern over Ukrainian nationalism and possible harmful contact with Westerners, plus a hard-line local KGB Chief, do not render Kiev a hospitable town. Donetsk reflected similar conditions.

Caucasus

In the Caucasus, Tbilisi, capital of Stalin's native Georgian Republic, where thousands rioted in 1956 over Khrushchev's denigration of their native son, paradoxically offered the least surveillance. Baku and Yerevan boasted far more "Stalinist" proclivities in this respect. Coverage in Tbilisi was provided, to be sure, including the use of plants, but it was all done in a gentlemanly and most discreet manner. In Baku and Yerevan, tails were much more obvious. In Baku, one middle-aged Russian with a most distinctive paunch never strayed more than 30 feet from his charges. In Yerevan, a young girl who kept appearing in front of or behind her assignments followed them to the top floor of a hotel. When learning to her dismay that her quarry had decided against stopping to eat there she blurted out: "Don't you want to visit the cafe?" Her cover convincingly blown, she finally disappeared, to be replaced by a somewhat more discreet young man. Also in Yerevan, coordination among security, airport and Intourist officials appeared incredibly weak. Inefficiency was most pronounced at the airport, where airline officials

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repeatedly changed their "guidance" for the visitors. Obviously due to conflicting instructions. Fear of assuming responsibility was so strong there that for 30 minutes no airport official would even change baggage tickets, necessary for a change in flights, without guidance from above. Instead, they shouted at each other demanding written instructions, all in the presence of the American diplomats.

Siberia

Irkutsk provided a most unusual surprise: no surveillance whatsoever was noted there. In Novosibirsk, coverage was light in town and very light in the academic city nearby. The latter, however, apparently protects itself with rather secure procedures within the various institutes themselves. In the much smaller city of Yakutsk, with a substantial non-Russian population, coverage predictably was moderate to heavy.

Other

The remaining cities visited -- Kishinev and Bel'tsy in Moldavia, Kazan in the Tatar ASSR, and Ufa in the Bashkir-ASSR -- generally held true to form, with light to moderate surveillance.

Postscript

Almost inevitably, there arises a temptation to spend some extra time and effort in order to determine whether and to what extent surveillance is present in a given location. Such efforts can take time away from the purposes for which the trip is made, however, and can also arouse the suspicions and anxieties of local security personnel. The reporting officer decided very early in the game to avoid any special effort to make such determinations. Consequently, the observations noted above may only tell part of the story. It seems fair to conclude that, under normal circumstances, the U.S. interest can better be served concentrating efforts on the pursuit of one's various objectives during such trips, with the awareness that one is very seldom if ever alone and to adapt one's approaches accordingly.

cc - Embassy Moscow (SY)
INR/OIL
INR/RES
EUR/SOV

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
☐ Retain Class'n ☐ Change to
☐ Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X() () ()
☒ Declassify ☐ After
☐ With concurrence (not)(obtained)
IPS by P. Valdes Date 11/27/91

TO : The Files

DATE: October 26, 1971

FROM : W.N. Harbo, First Secretary and Science Officer, American Embassy MOSCOW

SUBJECT: The Recognition of KGB Surveillants in Moscow

For reasons best known to the Soviet State Committee for State Security (KGB) I was subjected to intense surveillance throughout most of my two-year tour in the Soviet capital. Most embassy officers tend to ignore it. Out of boredom I studied my surveillance carefully and began to find that surveillance of the surveillance both informative and useful. It often provides clues to primary Soviet concerns, reveals surveillance of others, and illuminates certain weaknesses of this powerful organ of the Soviet bureaucracy. The sudden disappearance of the "tails" of myself and another closely watched Embassy officer while we were on an excursion to Podol'sk on "election" day, suggests, for example, that KGB manpower was engaged heavily at the "polls". Occasionally one recognizes an erstwhile "tail" of one's own following an important visitor, to whom this fact may prove useful and educational.

During one general period of intense surveillance my surveillance inexplicably all but vanished (in August 1971, when heavy tourism, surveillance of scientific delegates in Moscow, and possibly heavy attention to the British in anticipation of the later trouble with them may have overburdened the KGB). During this three-week period, however, I was followed on three occasions, on which they apparently felt they could not afford to leave me alone. I was followed back from, but not to, functions at which I actually rubbed shoulders with Soviet scientists and officials of scientific institutions. On two of these occasions I was followed only to the Embassy, and not from there to my apartment, as though they merely wanted to verify a suspicion that I had brought something from these functions to the Embassy for safekeeping. To me it indicated that a major concern was that I may have received some document or other information from a Soviet scientist encountered at these functions. They were more distrustful of their own people than of me.

To make any deductions from surveillance one must become adept at spotting it. It is not difficult, particularly since it largely involves automobiles. Russians, new to automotive transport, do not seem to be aware of the "sixth sense" of Americans regarding traffic.

Surveillance by Car

Vehicles: About 85 percent of the surveillance cars were white Volgas. A poor second were blue Volgas. Others were quite rare. In good weather surveillance cars are always clean and shiny, as if straight from the KGB motor pool garage. Usual "family car" trash such as little dolls

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dangling from the rear-vision mirror, toys on the back shelf, etc. I never saw a surveillance car with a crumpled fender. One hears remarks from time to time that they carry double tailpipes to accommodate a larger motor, but on the numerous occasions when I managed to get behind my surveillance car I did not observe this.

Occupants: Surveillance cars never contain old people or children. None of the men wear glasses or sport unusual coiffures (no beards, mustaches, sideburns rarely). The women are generally better-looking than the average. The chauffeurs are often obvious thugs, but the others usually fairly presentable. Nearly all appear to be ethnic Slavs (in Moscow at least -- my experience with surveillance in Central Asia was slight).

Detection: Russian drivers are fast, careless, and impatient. Drive slowly and look in the rear vision mirror and note whether a car behind you, particularly any clean white Volga, is also going slowly and maintaining a distance making it difficult for you to read his plates. (Before starting to drive, clean off your rear window and side-view mirror to make legibility of their plates easier).

Unaware of the natural alertness of Americans to minute idiosyncrasies of driving, surveillance cars will indulge in pathetically obvious attempts to conceal themselves -- hiding behind busses, emerging for a brief, reassuring look, and then darting back again.

Some are more sophisticated, but are still easy to detect if you watch closely. If the suspect car turns off onto a side street, do not draw the conclusion that you must have been wrong and cease watching. Keep watching the rear vision mirror for a few moments and you may see the same or an identical car reemerge from the same street after having executed a quick U-turn out of sight. The car might even come out of another side street further along, having traveled along a parallel street for a few blocks. The Shevchenko and Kerezhkovskaya Naberezhnaya leading from near the Embassy to a number of Embassy "ghettos" is a typical spot for these maneuvers. Tail cars here often turn off on Dorogomilovskaya going south and pass in front of the Kievskiy Vokzal, returning to the Naberezhnaya south of the Kievskiy Vokzal. Here, if you are held up by a traffic light, he will even come out in front of you. He will speed up to get away. If you speed up he will turn off again to get behind you -- usually at the gasoline station just before reaching the railroad bridge.

If you pull over suddenly to the curb, as if to visit a store, watch the movement of the cars behind as you do so. If one pulls to the curb behind, or in front, he is your man. If you are stopped by a long traffic light in light traffic, so that there is no place for the surveillance car to hide, he will usually stop behind you but slightly to the right, so that you will be unable to see his license plates or the faces of the occupants.

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SECRET

If you are going to make a U-turn on a long avenue at the authorized U-turn spot (razvorot), wait until the last moment before using your turn signal, looking in your rear-vision mirror to see which car behind follows suit. This is not a sure test, since Embassy officers are often followed by two and even three cars. The first may pass by the razvorot and leave you to his henchman behind. Such occasions are an excellent opportunity to note the plate numbers clearly, however.

When turning a corner slow to a creep. The surveillance car, suddenly finding himself a mere 25 yards from his quarry as he rounds the corner, will often panic. He will stop, back up out of sight, or, if pressed by traffic behind, will take another street, hoping to make a quick U-turn in time, or he will pull over to the curb and one of the occupants will get out as if making a purchase.

During some periods their ability to stay on one's trail in a maze of streets while you are out of their sight for as much as a mile, is clear proof to me that Embassy cars are sometimes fitted with small transmitters concealed somewhere on the car which permit the surveillant to spot his approximate location with a simple ~~unexplicated~~ direction-finding device such as are sold with certain radios.

Second and Third Surveillance Cars: These are evidence of a serious attempt to catch you in some impermissible activity and should put you on your guard to avoid any action upon which the KGB can embroider for one of their periodic "exposés" of "imperialist spies". Each car will follow for a time and will then be replaced by another, often of a different color under such circumstances. The rapid alternation of vehicles makes it somewhat more difficult to identify all of them, but with increasing experience one develops a "sixth sense". It is an amusing pastime, reminiscent of Prof. J.B. Rhine's famous experiments on extrasensory perception, to write down the plate number of a car which your sixth sense tells you is a surveillance car, and then check later on or on the following days to see if it crops up behind again.

Plate Nos. Carry a 3 x 5 card in the breast pocket and note down plate numbers and brief description (WV : white Volga, BV : blue Volga, WM: white Moskvitch, etc.) of those cars positively identified. The KGB motor pool is vast, but the same numbers will reappear from time to time.

Cooperation of the Police (Militia): I have frequently seen traffic policemen lift their portable radio transmitters and speak into them while looking at my diplomatic plates. This and other circumstantial evidence points to the fact that they regularly report the location of certain diplomatic vehicles.

SECRET

- 4 -

SECRET

Surveillance Afoot

Surveillants: Much more difficult to detect in crowds; pedestrian surveillants are nevertheless conspicuous by their inconspicuousness. Usually young; seldom very short and never very tall, they are chosen for the absence of distinguishing facial features, clothed in new-looking standard clothes -- a black suit and quiet tie in summer, brown beaver hat and dark blue, imitation-fur lined and fur collared coats in winter. There are some departures from this, however. I once had one with an orange shirt -- but he had been the driver of a surveillance car seen earlier and perhaps some brief shortage of men prompted his use. The women are equally "standard".

Detection: They can be "smoked out" in crowded streets by entering several stores and examining the surrounding shoppers each time. In art galleries change your pace or even go back to a gallery hall already passed and note the occupants each time.

On less frequented streets detection is easy. Turn a few corners, take a few short-cut alleys and they are forced to follow. Go into a cul-de-sac and then reverse direction. Also usually unfamiliar with the neighborhood, the "tail" will duck into a doorway. If none is open, he will turn to a locked door and fumble for a non-existent key until you have passed, or he will hide behind a kiosk or other handy object. Look at his hiding place for a moment and when he takes his peek he will pop back again.

Carry a magazine and throw it in a street trash can. Look around suddenly after going 50-100 yards and you may see a "tail" retrieving it or hiding it under his coat. He or his superiors will probably scrutinize every page for "secret messages", so make sure your magazine is well-illustrated with the luxuries of the decadent West -- The New Yorker, House and Garden. They love them.

Surveillants sometimes carry cameras -- particularly if you carry one. Pretend to take a picture of some street scene. Walk on, then look back. Your "tail" may be photographing the same scene -- apparently they examine such photos for secret signs of "agents" or some such.

Peculiarities. Older and more experienced "tails" will sometimes walk along with a non-surveillant pedestrian, engaging him or her in conversation -- probably asking dummy questions about busses, etc. -- in order to throw off suspicion by appearing to be in obviously innocent company. Some surveillants carry briefcases and or small suitcases. In old sections of town where they stand out, and know it, they walk briskly to and fro in directions in which you are not going. They must walk fast in order to keep up with you in a general sense, however. The very briskness of their gait is a telltale sign.

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

- 5 -
SECRET

Accompanying Vehicles: Pedestrian surveillants (and there are usually at least two following a single Embassy officer who is under surveillance) operate from one or two accompanying vehicles, which drop them off and pick them up in order to change the faces of the surveillants before they become too familiar to you and also in order to take away for questioning any Russians who have innocently engaged the Embassy officer in conversation (to ask for a light, to exchange a ten-ruble note for ten singles, to propose back market deals etc. -- to cite a few actual cases). Accompanying vehicles also carry extra surveillants around a block into which the quarry has disappeared (a block in the old sections of Moscow bears a certain resemblance to an ant maze), so as to be able to intercept him wherever he may emerge or to follow busses which the quarry has entered.

At the opera: Usually one or two rows behind the quarry; sometimes even alongside. They stand out because they do not resemble normal theater goers, do not chatter gregariously, and keep the quarry in sight during intermissions.

In The Restaurant: Surveillants will usually secure seats nearby, if possible. Some restaurants are so crowded, however, that this is impossible. In one such restaurant I was twice seated by the headwaiter at the same table, near the window -- conspicuously vacant on one occasion and containing only one young man on the other. On the second occasion I noticed a familiar surveillant peer briefly through the window at me. I suspect that this is the table reserved for Western diplomats.

In the Hotel. Surveillants suffer maximum exposure at hotels. Not only must their vehicle(s) park in a restricted space, where they are easily identified (like the Hotel Rossiya), but they must get into the same elevator with the quarry in order not to lose him from sight. Where possible they will station themselves at outside vantage points where they can look into a room in order to identify visitors. This, I believe, is usually a sign that the hotel guest whom you are visiting is also under surveillance.

In the Subway: Get out of your car suddenly, just before the doors close at a station, looking sidewise to see who else makes the sudden break. Or fail to get on a train, pretending insufficient alacrity, after having surveyed the others waiting for the train. Your "tail" will also display a suspicious sluggishness.

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISIONB
Spr Act
012829PRIORITY
SECRETGROUP - 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

FROM: USARMA MOSCOW RUSSIA

TO: ACSI DA

NR: C 131

131026Z JUL 63

PASS TO AFNIN

Ref my C 129

At OVS request Urban and Murphy attended meeting with Capt First Rank Pasko and Col Yelistratov. Subject was 11 July incident in ref. OVS returned Nikon camera with empty film cassette. Capt Pasko stated Liewer and Smith photographed mil objects and requested Urban to warn asst attaches against taking photos of mil objects. Urban responded with statement that his officers understood and complied with Soviet instructions covering photography and refuted that mil objects were taken by the officers. In addition, verbal protest lodged (A) against action of Soviet militiaman who permitted Sov civilian to remove camera from car against the resistance of attaches, and (B) violation of diplomatic immunity and detention by Sov authorities.

Pasko refused answer question on propriety of militiamans conduct for reason investigation still in progress. He promised to answer Urban's question after completed investigation. ARMA still contemplating formal written protest.

Coord: DCM.

GP-3

21

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOVPO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

NOTE: 129 is DA IN 66324 (121429Z Jul 63) ACSI

ACTION: ACSI

DISTR: AF

DA IN 66623

Excluded from General Declassification Schedule~~SECRET~~

Log In No.

63-702

65 131 2084

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

MESSAGE

Secret *B*
012829

PRIORITY
SECRET

GROUP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

FROM: USARMA MOSCOW RUSSIA

TO : ACSI DA

NR : C 129

121429Z JUL 63

ACSI DA PASS TO AFCIN

1. Maj John A. Smith and Lt Col Karl R. Liewer were accused by Sov mil per of photographing mil equip fr US Emb auto with dipl plates on the Moscow-Minsk hwy at approx 1800 hrs 11 Jul. An "AKT" was written. After 30 minutes travellers were allowed to proceed.

2. Offs were returning to Moscow fr Smolensk and using Leica photographed mil instal, ser 6, TFP 657-62 fr roadway as they drove past. Approx 600 meters further travellers were signalled by one uniformed militia to halt. The Leica camera was immed hidden under front seat. 2 (tank) soldiers came up and accused Maj Smith of photography. 3 civ, one with camera and one tank Capt came up and said they had observed photography.

3. Sovs demanded to see camera and were refused. A second Nikon camera was lying exposed on rear seat. All car doors were locked and US travellers remained inside. During exchange of identification documents, with 7 persons milling around a civilian, unnoticed, reached inside front left window and unlocked rear door. Then grabbed Nikon camera.

4. An AKT was written up accusing Americans of unauth photo of equip, witnessed by soldiers, that camera confiscated, and that Attaches refused to sign the AKT. After detention of 30 mins travellers allowed to proceed Moscow.

5. The confiscated Nikon Camera had 6 exposed frames taken earlier in same day in Smolensk. These not repeat not particularly incriminating. 4 tourist shots of city were taken from Gorki Park on high ground in center of city. Col Liewer and Sofiski monument appears in foreground and FORKREST antenna in background 1 km away. At this distance with 50 MM lens, antennae could not be prominent subj. Other 2 shots were taken from bank of Dnepr River of constr 2 kms away.

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ON MAY 2 1987
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

Excluded from General Declassification Schedule

DA IN 66324

22

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

NR : C129

6. Leica camera under front seat with exposed film of mil objects safely returned to Emb.

Comment: A. This incident was a staged trap. Follow up action by Sovs may be: Press publicity with possible pictures, protest note and PNG declaration, or no action at all. Inclined expect latter.

B. ARMA plans, subj to approval by ACSI, send ltr to Sovs protesting illegal detention, violation diplomatic immunity and demanding return of confiscated camera. Recommend no rpt no publicity.

Fld coord: AMB Kohler

SCP-3

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

ACTION: ACSI

23

DISTR : AF

DA IN 66324

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 000
2

TELLIGENCE REPORT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

NOTE: Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited, if secret or top secret, except with permission of the issuing office. All requests for authority to reproduce will be directed to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

(Classification)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

COUNTRY USSR 66 182 900

REPORT NO. ID 2214501

SUBJECT Soviet Employees in the American House, Moscow (U)

DATE OF REPORT 24 September 1962

NO. OF PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO Prior to December 1961

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D.C., August 1962

FROM AG-1 CX

EVALUATION F-6

PREPARED BY T D Fox, D Vincent

SOURCE DS-2137

R-SERIES NO. R-325-62

SUMMARY

(UNCLASSIFIED) The following information was obtained from DS-2137. (UNCLASSIFIED)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN

NATIONALS Except NONE, By

Authority of OACofS for

Intel, Date: 25 Sept 62

Signed Dorothe K. Matlack

DOROTHE K. MATLACK

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR 5200.10

DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: None

Source was shown pictures of the following Soviet employees at the American House in Moscow; but he was unable to physically identify any of the individuals as KGB agents or informants. However, based on the geographics supplied concerning the individuals, Source was convinced that each was a KGB employee.

Mariya ERMAROVA (laundress)

Tamara BOGARYREVA (first floor maid)

Svetana IVANOVA (waitress)

Elena SHIRNINA (second floor maid)

Lyubov TISHKINA (laundress)

Eleonora UMANETZ (waitress)

Zinaida KERONOVA (barmaid)

COMMENTS: (of Preparing Officer)

24

The circumstances prescribed by the US agency controlling Source, under which the debriefing was accomplished, precluded exhaustive questioning of him. In addition, Source's attitude during the interviews limited clarification of

(Classification)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

CX-454-62

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

FROM

NO.

2

ACSI-CX

(Classification)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

:100805

discrepancies furnished by him during various interviews, as well as discrepancies noted with information furnished from other sources.

APPROVED:

Thomas H. Sullivan
DOROTHE K. MATLACK

Chief, Exploitation Branch
Collection Division, OACSI

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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ON MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

25

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

SECURITY CLASS

UNCLASSIFIED

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

51

24/15552

PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (CLASS)		ACCOUNTING	OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ROUTINE	ROUTINE	ROUTINE	ROUTINE	ROUTINE	ROUTINE	UNCLASSIFIED

FROM:

CO 66TH CIC GP BAD CANNSTATT

TO: CO CIC RGN III OFFENBACH

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

✓ 06142 OPR FOR CICOE FROM CICOE

SUBJ IS MOSCOW CITY MAP REF OUR MSG ZERO FIVE FIVE ZERO NINE AND YOUR ZERO NINE TWO PD PROCUREMENT OF COPY OF TWO AUG CURR ISSUE OF HERALD TRIBUNE SHOULD BE AVAL THROUGH STARS AND STRIPES DISTRIBUTING OFFICES WHICH HANDLE SALE OF HERALD TRIBUNE AS WELL AS ANY NR OF REF LIBRARIES BOTH ARMY COM STATE DEPT AND GER PD EXACT IDENT OF ENTI SOV ORG WAS NOT CITED IN ART PD MSG THIS HQ CITED ABOVE CONSTITUTES YOUR AUTH TO PURCHASE MAP PD DESIRE COMPLIANCE WITH ABOVE MSG THIS HQ PD IF YOUR RGN IS NOT ABLE TO FULFILL THIS MSG DESIRE THIS HQ BE NOTIFIED SO THAT CRM/ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO PROCURE DESIRED MAPS THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS PD

M/R: 2 Aug issue of Herald Tribune on sale at all Stars & Stripes book stands and on sale at German news stands carried article about issuance of a map of the City of MOSCOW to assist travellers to USSR to avoid Sov police and security agencies. Loc these agencies cited on the map. Rgn was given Herald Tribune ref cited above and instr to procure two copies of map for this Hq. Rgn stated no copy of 2 Aug Herald Tribune issue available and req further ident of and Sov org. Also req auth to purchase map. Inasmuch as art not only

AC-PARTIAL RELEASE IF CITED IN REF. EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION. PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION. NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

DATE

TIME

MONTH

YEAR

2-4 AUG 1956

SYMBOL

CICOE

SIGNATURE

(Typed, or stamped NAME AND TITLE)

W. L. BURNSTER, Major MI (MPC)

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if read)

R. BENJAMIN, DAS

PHONE

8244

PAGE

NR

NR OF

PAGES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED

26

SP

appeared in Herald Tribune but also subsequently carried by Stars & Stripes, action by Rgn to fulfill our req can be considered dilatory.

24 Aug 56 DE/gb/CE

0220003

1. The purpose of this report is to provide information regarding the activities of the American Overseas Service, Inc. (AOS) in the field of international relations and the promotion of American interests abroad. The report is based on a review of the company's records and a series of interviews with its personnel.

2. The American Overseas Service, Inc. was organized in 1945 and has since that time been engaged in a variety of activities designed to promote the interests of the United States in the world. These activities include the publication of a monthly magazine, the organization of cultural and educational programs, and the provision of information and advice to foreign governments and individuals.

3. The company's primary source of income is the subscription fees paid by individuals and organizations for the magazine. In addition, the company receives grants from the United States Government and other sources for the support of its various programs.

4. The American Overseas Service, Inc. has a long and distinguished record of service to the United States. Its activities have been widely recognized and praised by the government and the public alike. The company's commitment to the promotion of American interests abroad is a source of pride and inspiration for all who are associated with it.

5. The report concludes that the American Overseas Service, Inc. is a highly effective and efficient organization. Its activities have been of great benefit to the United States and its people, and its continued existence and success are strongly recommended.

6. The report also contains a number of recommendations for the improvement of the company's operations and the furtherance of its goals. These recommendations are based on the findings of the review and are intended to provide a guide for the company's future activities.

7. The report is intended to provide a comprehensive and accurate account of the activities of the American Overseas Service, Inc. and to serve as a basis for the formulation of policy and the allocation of resources.

8. The report is the property of the American Overseas Service, Inc. and is to be kept confidential and not distributed outside the organization.

NAME	TITLE	ORGANIZATION	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE
JAMES	DIRECTOR	AOS	1000	NEW YORK	NY
JOHN	MANAGER	AOS	1000	NEW YORK	NY
JOHN	MANAGER	AOS	1000	NEW YORK	NY
JOHN	MANAGER	AOS	1000	NEW YORK	NY

8FB 02

RR UUFPF

DE UUFPF 04J

R 230945Z

ROUTINE

FM CO CIC RGN III OFFENBACH

TO CO 66TH CIC GP BAD CANNSTATT

DA GRNC

BT

REFNR 092 OPR FROM CICOE FOR CICOE PD SUBJ IS MOSCOW CITY MAP CMM REF
YOUR UNCL MSG 05509 PD AS NO COPY OF 2 AUG HERALD TRIBUNE CMM PARIS
EDITION IS AVAILABLE CMM REQ FURTHER IDENTIFICATION OF ANTI-SOVIET
ORGANIZATION PD ALSO REQUIRE AUTHORIZATION TO PURCHASE MAPS PD

BT

CFN 092 05509

23/0947Z

Answered to Reg III

file

D-567003

Benjamin / O'Brien

CE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

RECD 23 AUG 56/1022Z

28

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- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):
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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 29-55

SPECIAL HANDLING

Sec & Tng/SMI Br
Lt. L. Clarke/rae/73934

SD-20205-3

TOP SECRET-CONTROL
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, GSUSA

CSGID-SMI 918.1

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Suspected espionage activity

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C.

29 MAR 1950

TO: Army Attache, American Embassy, Moscow, USSR

1. With the assistance of the Office, Chief of Ordnance, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 has determined that only 13 tanks, M7, Medium were built. None of these is believed to have left the United States and only one is known to be in existence at the present time, in the Ordnance Museum at Aberdeen, Maryland. The others were either scrapped, or used for engineering experiments with the exception of one listed in the record as "expended" disposition of which is unknown.

2. No record could be found of any official release of information on the Medium Tank M7 to the USSR. Records searched included those of the International Division of Army Service Forces which controlled all War Department items furnished to the USSR under lend lease and which are now in the custody of the Historical Section, AGO.

3. Interviews of several field grade officers who were on duty at the Detroit Tank Arsenal in 1942-3 produced the information that the M7, Medium was declassified after its production was abandoned and that a Russian liaison officer who was present at Detroit Tank Arsenal might have had access to the drawings. No officer interviewed was of the opinion that the Russian had been furnished this data but it is possible that he could have picked up such unclassified material either legitimately or otherwise. All officers who examined the Work Order furnished by you, and who expressed an opinion, stated that it was similar in type to forms in use at the time and appeared to be genuine. No laboratory tests or attempts to identify the typewriter have been made as it appears highly improbable that it is of other than U.S. origin. One officer stated that a copy of a draftsman's work order would normally be wrapped around a roll of drawings to which the changes thereon pertained.

4. Check of Navy records on 1 born 1 indicates that no background investigation has been made of his adult life. A "limited background" investigation in 1948 covered the period from birth to age 20, and was confined to interviews with persons whose names were furnished by He has been in either the Army or Navy since age 20. Nothing derogatory is contained in the intelligence files of either Service.

Classification Changed to:

Reason Decreased sensitivity

Date 15 NOV 1958

Date

**EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE**

1 Incl
n/c

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

(sgd.) A. R. BOLLING

A. R. BOLLING
Major General, GSC
Deputy A. C. of S., G-2

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON 2 May 1997

BY CDR USN COM FOC

AUTH P

Signature of Officer

BENJAMIN M. DAVIS

Colonel, GS

Chief, Operations

Rank and Title

56

SECRET

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

~~SECRET~~

FOR RECORD: Lend lease files of Hist Div checked for M7, Medium Tank with negative results. These files are all that were retained from International Div of ASF which controlled all US participation in Lend Lease. Files include

a. Requisition Control Cards which list items and quantities of each furnished USSR, as well as cancelled and unfilled requirements (Period 1941-45, both incl).

b. "Protocol Files" which contain all requests made by USSR and US replies thereto through 1945.

2. G-4, R&D, negative.

3. Ordnance: Mr. H. W. Evans, Ex 6432, who is tank research expert and was familiar with and has files on all tank production in World War II, stated that his files show that only 28 M7s were built, these all in 1942. Builder was International Harvester Co. Contract No. was 849. No indication that USSR received M7s nor is it logical that they would have. Other records in office of Lt. Col. J. E. Engler, Ord Field Service Div, of the 28 M7s were ordered scrapped and six others were designated for experimental purposes. No record of whether these instructions were carried out or what happened to the remainder. The records are very sketchy and no one could state with assurance that the other tanks were even built.

4. Ordnance records show tank now carried as UNCLASSIFIED and obsolete but no information as to whether this was the classification at the time of mfg.

5. Lt. Col. George V. Campbell, Ord, 71653 had old Ord salvage records checked to attempt to find what happened to the M7 tanks. These records, which appeared to be more accurate than the others in Ord Dept (which are mere consolidations - not orig records) have been used as basis for records under para 1 of 1st ind. Col. Campbell firmly believes his records are accurate and that no M7s went to the USSR. All were in the US on 20 Nov 45. Five ordered scrapped on 7 June 46. Declared obsolete 18 Jan 44.

6. On 24 Feb 50 Lt. Col. F. R. Young, G-3, who worked on tank design and production at Detroit Tank Arsenal during period when M7s were built, stated that the form which was forwarded by the MA Moscow appears to be an authentic, locally designed one, similar to those in use at the time. He said it would normally be attached to a roll of drawings on which changes had been made. There was a Russian Liaison Officer present in Detroit who was not given free run of the plant but who had, as a representative of an ally, considerable opportunity to see unclassified matter plus any other material in which USSR had an interest under Lend Lease. Lt. Col. Young was very familiar with the production of the M7. He thought all had been scrapped but could not state positively.

7. Col. E. L. Cummings, G-4, who was also on duty at Detroit Tank Arsenal while M7s were being designed and produced, stated that he knew the Russian Liaison Officer but dealt with him as little as possible. The Liaison Officer had a personality which caused most people to dislike him. He pretended to not understand English very well but

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ON MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USANSCOM EJP/PO
AUSA 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

people around him believed that he was quite fluent. His usual reply to questions was "NO." The Russian was not normally given access to design material or to anything classified. Col. Cummings stated, however, in reply to a direct question by Lt. Col. Clarke, that this Lt Officer might possibly have gotten the subject form at Detroit. Once the tank had been declassified and declared obsolete there, would not have been any particular reason for keeping information on the M7 from him.

8. Numerous persons interviewed by Lt. Col. Clarke stated that the M7 was something of a "lemon" and that whether the Russians got the plans legitimately or otherwise, they did not get very much. No one was able to state with certainty that the USSR did not get these papers legally. No record appears to exist in Washington which shows any Russian access to the subject form having been granted by US personnel.

9. File check (G-2 and ONI) revealed the following concerning L

() US Navy, ()

a. Navy 'limited background' investigation Aug 1948, resulted in ND finding.

b. Navy's invest. consisted of interviews with father of subject, neighbors and () of Dutchtown Mo. and () Chafee, Mo.

No interviews with military personnel were included, no interviews with anyone who has ~~known~~ known subject since age of 20. He is now 39 (born ())

No throw-off interviews. All of above were listed by subject.

c. Navy record of military service as follows:

Enlisted Army 30 Jan 31, discharged (hon) 24 Jan 34.

Enlisted Navy 23 Apr 34, reenlisted Apr 38.

Warrant, Navy, electrician, temporary Mar 44, reenlisted 1946.

10. Detroit Tank Arsenal files: Negative.

11. K. C. Records Center, AGO - negative.

12. Following action was not taken:

a. Lab tests of paper, ink, typing etc to prove US origin.

b. Reinvestigation of L

COORDINATION: Survey Section, Intelligence Div, G-2. Maj. R.E. Boynton 23460, 75368

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON 2 May 97

BY CDR [redacted] FOI/PO

AUTH [redacted] DoD 5200.1-R

58

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Survey covered B

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

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- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 59-59a.

O-TP35 68679

WAR DEPARTMENT--OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ORDNANCE
DRAFTSMAN'S WORK ORDER AND TEXT OF REVISION

Drawing number: B195457H Date: Nov. 12, 1942

Subject: Medium Tank, M7

File number: _____

Brief of reason for change:

To comply with changes made in electrical installation.

Text of revision:

- Line 2: "7" changed to "4". "21" changed to "22".
Line 3: "5" changed to "6".
Line 4: "9" changed to "12".
Line 5: "3" changed to "2". "10" changed to "5".
Line 6: "7" changed to "3".
Line 8: "A213567", "A213567E", "D40732B", "Nut Lock", "Br.",
"Com.", "1" added.
Line 13: "16" changed to "25"; "20" changed to "29".
Line 15: "6" changed to "4".
Line 16: "2" changed to "4".
Line 17: "12" changed to "10".
Line 19: "4" changed to "2".
Line 20: "BBSX4", "BBSX4AB", "D40732B", "Nut Safety 3/8 - 24 NF - 2",
"S", "Com.", "1" removed.
Line 24: "2" changed to "1". Column 3: "(1)" removed.
Line 25: "A231139(1)" removed.

Revision date Nov. 11, 1942 added.

Approved: By order of Chief of Ordnance

Last revision date 8-1-42 Tr.; D.W.O.;-TP;c

Print of latest revision date in file: _____

Draw. who comp. rev.: W. E. Gibson Print and O-T

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James F. Powers
JAMES F. POWERS
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HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
(4304 CIC Directive)
UNITED STATES FORCES IN AUSTRIA
APO 771 U.S. Army

MAR 2 1951

Holmes

A2001067

Very Honorable
Viktor G. Borkin
15 June 1947
Case No. V-2130

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: Irregularities in Internal Mail Communications with the
Office of the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow.

RE : Summary of Investigation.

Reasons for Investigation:

1. Owing to numerous violations of AD 380-5 in the past (see Cases No. V-2123, dated 14 January 1947, Subject: Improper Transmission of Classified Material Addressed to U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow; No. V-2124, dated 24 January and 26 February 1947, Subject: Improper Transmission of Classified Material Addressed to U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow; No. V-2127, dated 21 February 1947, Subject: Improper Transmission of Fourth Grade Material; No. V-2130, dated 13 March 1947, Subject: Careless Handling of U.S. Official Mail; and No. V-2131, dated 9 June 1947, Subject: Improper Transmission of Classified Documents Addressed to Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff, Washington, D.C.); and the immediate action letter 4340-0 311-13, War Department, the Adjutant General's Office, dated 10 March 1947, Subject: Irregularities in Internal Mail Communications with Office of the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, (see exhibit III) a conference was called on 3 April 1947 by the then Acting AG of S, G-2, USA, Lt. Colonel John T. Burns, and attended by Lt. Colonel Rodman, Chief of CIB, Lt. Colonel Frank Smith, Chief of CIB, Colonel T. R. Burns, Deputy Chief Signal Officer, Major G. R. Harris, Communications Officer, Signal Section, Lt. Colonel, Chief of Staff (S-1), Lt. Colonel, G-2-S Signal Center, and Special Agents Harry J. Stalings and Frank J. Stalings, CIB.

It was decided at the conference that a complete investigation covering every point at which irregularities in internal mail communications could possibly occur, should be instituted and that Special Agents Harry J. Stalings and Frank J. Stalings should conduct the investigation. A plan for the investigation was drawn up by Special Agent Stalings and submitted to G-2 by Lt. Colonel Rodman. (See Appendix I.)

Summary of Results:

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This report is the result of the investigation planned on the

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Auth Para 1-603 DGD 5290-11P

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MEMO, Subject: Irregularities in Internal Mail Communications with the Office of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, 25 June 1957.

Contents. It consists of the following parts:

I. Summary of Investigation.

- II. Memorandum A, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Budapest, Hungary.**
- III. Memorandum B, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Bucharest, Rumania.**
- IV. Memorandum C, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Sofia, Bulgaria.**
- V. Memorandum D, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Vienna, Austria.**
- VI. Memorandum E, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Munich, Germany.**
- VII. Memorandum F, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Frankfurt, Germany.**
- VIII. Memorandum G, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Berlin, Germany.**
- IX. Memorandum H, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Paris, France.**

I. Appendixes:

- 1. Investigative Plan, dated 4 April 1957, Subject: Irregularities in Internal Mail Communications with Office of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow.**
- 2. List of U.S. Postal Agencies Visited.**
- 3. List of Mailmen.**

II. Mailmen:

Summary of Investigation:

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The investigation disclosed that considerable quantities of official mail, classified as well as unclassified, have been, and presumably still are, passing through foreign postal channels as ordinary mail. That is, international mail, and as a matter of routine. (See Memo F, pages 5 and 6; Memo G, page 7; and Memo H, pages 1 and 2.) The bulk of this mail has fallen into foreign

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NOTE, subject: Interruptions in Internal Mail Communications with the Office of the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, 25 June 1947

postal channels by the following routes: classified mail from the U.S. Mission of the British Allied Control Commission and addressed to U.S. Army units in foreign countries, such as Moscow, has reached AS H and S in Vienna, from which it has been brought to APO 777, Vienna, for onward routing (See Memo 2, para 2); from APO 777 this mail has been sent to the 26th Base Post Office, Frankfurt (See Memo 2, para 1), where it has been placed into the Reichspost (See Memo 2, para 5 and 6); from the Reichspost the mail has been eventually dropped into open Soviet mail channels. Occasionally such mail was brought directly to APO 777 by representatives of the Russian missions (See Memo 2, para 1) or to another APO by various Army units located in Europe (See Exhibit XXII), but it is important to note that wherever and no matter how this mail reached an APO focal point for international mail, such as APO 38, Paris, but principally the 26th Base Post Office, Frankfurt, it was treated as international mail and therefore placed into international mail channels. (See Memo 2, para 1; Memo 2, para 5).

Furthermore, official mail originating in Vienna, or some other point of origin, and destined for any of the missions in the Balkan countries, has not been forwarded by APO 777 to those missions, which APO 777 is listed as serving, but has been sent to the 26th Base Post Office in Frankfurt, where, again, it has been delivered to the Reichspost for transmission. (See Memo 2, para 1; Memo 2, para 5).

Reasons and Conclusions

The situation described above is the result, primarily, of two fundamental misconceptions entertained by Army personnel stationed in Europe. Each misconception will be discussed in turn.

The first misconception is that secret documents destined for U.S. agencies located in foreign capitals, such as Warsaw and Moscow, may be transmitted through APO channels (See Memo 2, para 2 and 3). The latter was stated by Colonel J. Farrell Stumm, Jr., of the Allied Control Commission, Berlin, dated 25 February 1947, and inquiring whether a breach of regulations occurred when APO Bulgaria registered on item as APO 777-0 for transmission to the Military Attaché, Moscow (See Exhibit XXII) is an example of this misconception, which has prevailed ever since the U.S. occupation forces entered Europe. AR 300-5, para 24, states that secret documents may be transmitted, outside the continental United States, by "United States Post Office registered mail through Army or Navy postal facilities, provided the documents are sent under a special routing slip." Since there are no APO facilities in capitals such as Warsaw and Moscow it is obvious that secret documents destined for U.S. agencies in those capitals will pass through a foreign postal system if submitted to the registry section of an APO unit. Consequently, classified material submitted to such locations should never be placed into APO channels.

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Note 2) is entirely clear to those Agents that the statements which have appeared as a result of classified mail having been placed into

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**NOTE, Subject: Investigation in Internal Mail Communications with the
Office of the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, 25 June 1947.**

APO channels, and not directly into diplomatic channels, for transmission to Moscow, etc. First and foremost, the responsibility of the originator of the classified material, the Postal Branch in Frankfurt seems not wholly without some degree of culpability. Official mail, bearing the penalty clause, destined for the Balkans, and properly addressed to APO 777 has not been delivered by APO 777 to the Balkan missions but has been given to the Postage in Frankfurt for transmission. (See Memo 2, para 1; Memo 7, para 5). And official mail, addressed to Moscow or the Balkans, bearing the penalty clause but not an APO address, has likewise been forwarded to the Postage. (See Memo 7, para 5; Exhibit XIII) While the APOs have with certain countries, namely, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, a free exchange of mail (See Memo 2, para 1), the Balkan countries and Russia are not included within this category. Official Army mail to U.S. units in these countries should, therefore, bear postage if it is to be treated as international mail (See Memo 7, para 6). Yet, in fact, this mail, without postage, has been handled as international mail. It is difficult for these Agents to concur with the opinion advanced by the Postal Branch, Adjutant General, HUGH, (See Exhibit XIII) to the effect that the Postal APO was without any responsibility whatsoever in placing a registered item into the international mail since the item, addressed to the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, bore no postage. The item should have been returned to the originator. It is believed by these Agents that had all the classified mail, erroneously placed in APO channels by the Balkan missions, been returned to the missions for postage, the personnel at the missions would have passed to sender before returning such mail to APO channels.

As far as official Army correspondence destined for the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, is concerned, the 24th and 26th Post Zone Offices in Frankfurt no longer transmit such mail through international mail channels but, according to a recent directive forwarded to these Agents (See Exhibit XIII) deliver it to PZAD, HUGH, for transmission through State Department channels. The recent directive, however, does not prevent official mail destined for the Allied Control Commissions in the Balkan countries from being delivered to the Postage.

It should also be pointed out that classified correspondence destined for U.S. units in the United Kingdom has not been transmitted through Royal postal facilities, as directed in HUGH's Staff Memo of 20 March 1947 but has, instead, been forwarded to the British Post. (See Memo 7, para 1 and 5).

These Agents cannot avoid the conclusion that a proper and standardized procedure for the handling of international mail has never been established and for the postal agencies under the jurisdiction of the Postal Branch, HUGH, (See Memo 2, para 1).

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The postal agency which has actually placed most of the classified material into APO channels has been the AG II and II, Vienna. (See Memo 2, para 2.) The personnel for the erroneous delivery of this mail to APO 777 have

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MEMO, subject: Irregularities in Internal Mail Communications with the
Office of the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, 25 June 47.

Explanation. Once the mail reached AS H and B the personnel handling it
knew they had no means, other than the mail registry system, of knowing
the nature of the contents within the envelope. The originator, Major
McDonald has stated, failed to comply with the plan of mail & letter
notifying AS H and B that the mail was classified or to place on the outer
envelope a stamp indicating the classified nature of the contents. Only
AOC Hungary now uses a stamp on the outer cover of classified mail. How-
ever, even though the mail originating in Hungary bore such a stamp, the
personnel at AS H and B were insensitive of its significance. Mail
stamped "Via Security Service" or "Safe Mail" strongly was brought to
APO 777 for transmission. (See Memo B, para 2) In one case, even top
secret mail stamped "Officer Courier" was brought to APO 777, where it
was not even registered. (See Case No. V-2151) These Agents believe that
the mail registry number alone should have been sufficient indication to
the personnel at AS H and B that the mail should not have been dropped
into ordinary mail channels.

The second basic misconception commonly held by military per-
sonnel is that classified matter simply dropped into State Department
mail channels, that is, into diplomatic channels, will be treated by the
State Department mail rooms all along the line of transit as classified
correspondence, will, in other words, be given safe handling. (See Memo
A, Com. and Rec.; Memo C, Com. and Rec.; Memo G, para 7; Memo H, para 2)

There is a fundamental conflict between State and War Department
regulations over the handling of classified material. The State Depart-
ment requires classification to be placed on the outer cover (See Memo C,
para 7; Memo H, para 2; Exhibit XIX; Exhibit XX); the War Department for-
bids this practice and requires the classification to be placed only on
the inner envelope (AR 300-5). Mail that does not bear a classification
on the outer envelope is treated by the State Department as nonclassified
correspondence. (See Memo C, para 7; Memo H, para 2). Consequently,
considerable classified Army mail delivered to State Department mail rooms
has been treated as ordinary mail. (See Memo C, para 7; Memo H, para 2;
Exhibit XX).

AR 300-5 is inadequate on this point; it is not sufficiently
adaptable to cover the needs of the AGMs in the Soviet countries. It gives
no instructions concerning the processing of classified mail for transmission
via diplomatic channels to insure that that mail will not be placed into
international or APO channels by the State Department. (See Memo C, para
7; Memo H, para 2)

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In view of the inadequacy of AR 300-5 to fill the needs of U.S.
missions in the Balkans the question now is raised as to who is responsible
for issuing to the AGMs instructions to cover the inadequacies of AR 300-5
and who is charged with the duty of insuring that such postal facilities
are available within the European theater for the transmission of their
mail. Thus far, the AGMs have not been put on the distribution list for

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MEMO, Subject: Irregularities in Lateral Mail Communications with the Office of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, 25 June 1947.

USMT letters such as AG J11.4, dated 27 December 1946 (See Exhibit VIII), and, consequently, they have been unaware as to what facilities were available or what procedures to follow. Various officers contacted by these Agents have declared that USMT delegated to USPA the responsibility only of supporting administratively the Balkan missions. It was explained that "administrative support" is to be construed as support concerning problems such as supply, not the issuance of postal directives to the ACOs. For directives on mailing procedure, it was stated, the ACOs must depend directly on the War Department.

On 14 April 1947 the Adjutant General's Office, USPA, sent to the Commander in Chief, EUCOM, a letter pointing out the need for the issuance of a directive covering the handling of message traffic to and from the various Balkan Allied Control Commissions. (See Exhibit XLIV). No reply to this letter has yet been received from EUCOM.

If USPA or EUCOM are not to be charged with the promulgation of mailing instructions to the Balkan missions, and if AR 300-5 is not adapted for circumstances existing at these missions, the War Department itself must share in the responsibility for the violations which have occurred. It is to be wondered why no action has been taken by the War and State Departments on the suggestions contained in the letter from the Office of the United States Political Advisor for Germany, dated 1 February 1947 (See Exhibit XIX; Memo C, para 7) and on the suggestion contained in the letter from the U.S. Embassy, Paris, dated 9 April 1947 (See Exhibit XX).

In the opinion of these Agents the responsibility for past breaches of security in the handling of classified material falls in varying degrees upon the following agencies:

1. Originators in the Balkan missions, for dropping classified mail destined for Moscow directly into ACO channels, or forwarding it to AG H and D, Vienna, through diplomatic channels, or otherwise, without specific indication that the contents of the mail were classified (See Memo A, para 2; Memo C, paras 2 and 3); and, in one instance, for placing material classified secret into a single, unregistered envelope. (See Memo C, para 3).
2. One, or more, of the following agencies, for not having placed the ACOs in the Balkan countries on the distribution lists for such important directives as Letter AG J11.4 AGO, dated 27 December 1946, Subject: Security Courier Service, which describes the method to be followed for transmitting "classified material originating in the occupied zones destined for military attaches of countries within or adjacent to this theater";

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a) Office of the Adjutant General, EUCOM.

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**MILG, Subject: Irregularities in Lateral Mail Communications with the
Office of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, 25 June 1947.**

- b) Office of the Adjutant General, USA:
- c) Signal Office, USA: (Lt. Barker, O-in-C, EIS Step 6900, enveloped copies of this directive and addressed them to the AGO. He was unable to obtain, however, from the USA Signal Office approval for a letter of transmission to accompany the directive).
3. War Department, Washington, D.C., for not having taken action to remedy the inadequacies of AF 310-5, concerning classified Army mail deposited into State Department channels, in spite of the fact that these inadequacies had, apparently, been called to the attention of the War Department and suggestions made to alleviate them.
4. AG M and D, USA, for having placed in APO ordinary mail channels mail so stamped that ordinary mail channels were indicated as not being sufficient.
5. APO 771 for consistently misrouting mail destined for the Balkan missions to Frankfurt.
6. AG Postal Branch, EUCOM, for not having issued instructions to the APOs under its jurisdiction to the effect that official Army mail, not bearing postage and destined for units such as the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, should be returned to the sender instead of being placed into international mail channels.

Recommendations:

These Agents cannot make recommendations without first considering the three directives on the handling of classified correspondence, prepared for distribution to the AGOs by the Adjutant General's Office, USA, while this investigation was in progress:

USMA Letter AG 311.37 STD, dated 11 April 1947, Subject: Inter-
Electrical Traffic to and from AGO Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania; and the
U.S. Legation, Belgrade, directs that "Items addressed to State Department
agencies, including Military Attaches, will be forwarded by the State Depart-
ment Courier Service." But the question immediately to be raised is: In
view of the fact that the State Department requires classification on the
outer envelope, what markings or stamp should the AGOs employ to insure that
Army correspondence classified as Secret or Confidential, is not treated by
the State Department as ordinary mail?

The same question must be asked upon reading paragraph 3c of this
letter. Furthermore, how can EIS Step 6900 know that an envelope contains
secret or confidential material if that envelope bears only a routing number,
as required by para 3b? If the routing number alone is sufficient indication

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MEMO, Subject: Reorganization in National Mail Communications with the
Office of the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, 25 June 1947.

For MSB Stop 6949 why hasn't it also been subjected to inspection for AG M and D, USA? The reply may be made that personnel at MSB Stop 6949 and AG M and D do not have to know the classification of the contents, but it is precisely because AG M and D and the State Department have been unaware of the classified nature of Army mail handled by them in the past that this mail has not been given the proper transmission.

AG USA's proposed directive of 28 May 1947, Subject: Forwarding Classified Correspondence via Postal Registered Mail, informs the Balkan missions how they should process material intended for transmission via APO registered mail, and while it is the opinion of these Agents that any official Army mail bearing a unit registration number received by AG M and D, Vienna, should automatically have been taken by AG M and D to APO 777 and registered, this directive should serve to insure that such mail will, in fact, be registered at the APO 777 by AG M and D and not dispatched as ordinary mail. This directive, however, does not resolve the difficulties the AGOs have in transmitting classified mail to Moscow; it was not intended to solve those difficulties. But there is a conflict between the directive on non-electrical traffic to and from the AGOs and the proposed directive to the AGOs on the forwarding of classified correspondence. The former specifically limits AG M and D to the handling of mail destined for or originating at Headquarters USAF while the latter established AG M and D as an agency for processing mail originating in the Balkans and destined for the XI.

These Agents lament the rash of directives produced by AG M and D since this investigation began (three thus far, and presumably a fourth to come), none of which, or all three together, adequately solve the problem the AGOs have in sending classified mail to Moscow. It must be remembered that the people ultimately charged with following these directives are the enlisted men who actually handle the mail. The greater the number of directives, the greater the confusion.

The solution to the problem need not be confusing. It is believed by these Agents that one simple directive, adequately covering all the needs of the AGOs could be promulgated. This directive should order the Balkan missions to transmit all classified material through State Department channels from the point of origin to the point of destination, no matter what that destination is. An understanding to this effect would have to be reached with the State Department in view of the fact that Capt. H. W. of AG Hungary has made a contrary agreement with the American Legation in Budapest (see exhibit XI) and that Colonel Mark, Deputy Chief Signal Officer, USA, has pushed through completion a different arrangement with Miss Mary Jane Porter, Communications Officer of the American Legation, Vienna; but these Agents feel confident that the mail needs of the State Department would not become complicated by the mail traffic as a result of their handling all classified material coming from the Balkans.

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MEMO, Subject: Irregularities in Lateral Mail Communications with the
Office of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, 25 June 1947.

stating that diplomatic channels not be used by the AGOs for the transmission of newspapers, magazines, Christmas cards, and other nonclassified material, as has been done in the past. (See Memo B, para 3; Memo D, para 4; Exhibit III). The AGOs, in the directive, should be strictly prohibited from abusing their privileges. Furthermore, the AGOs should be directed to place on secret and confidential material deposited in diplomatic channels some kind of stamp, such as "Sec's Stamp", or an equivalent stamp, to indicate that this mail should not be handled as ordinary mail by the State Department. The directive should advise the AGOs to use APO channels for all nonclassified mail.

The directive proposed by these Agents seems eminently advisable and necessary. There are at the present time no satisfactory means established for the transmission of mail classified secret or confidential from the Balkans to Moscow; the situation in this regard is one of utter confusion. It is imperative that something be done at the earliest possible date; until the problem is resolved secret and confidential correspondence may continue to fall into the Soviet open mails.

Any should mail, originating in the Balkans and destined for Washington, D.C., for example, be taken out of the State Department pouch in Vienna when the mail could remain in a State Department pouch labelled, "Washington, D.C.", (See Exhibit X) and transmitted unopened to Washington via Paris? (See Memo B, para 4; Exhibit X). According to the arrangement recently made by Colonel Horn with the State Department and some time ago by Captain Norton with the American Legation in Budapest (See Exhibit II) secret mail originating in the Balkans and destined for Washington is invoiced in the Balkans and transmitted by State Department courier to Vienna. In Vienna that mail must be listed on a receipt form by Miss Porter and carried to SPS by a State Department messenger. The SPS then takes the mail to APO 777 and registers it. Various APOs then transmit it to the States. It can be seen that under this arrangement there is more work involved for the American Legation in Vienna as well as for the Army. The arrangement is cumbersome, and the transmission slow, and the additional agencies handling the pieces of mail increase the risk of mishandling.

It is recommended, therefore, that all classified mail originating in the Balkans be handled by State Department personnel from the point of origin to the point of destination and that a directive incorporating this recommendation be issued to the AGOs.

It is recommended that the authority responsible for the issuance of postal directives to the AGOs be determined and that the attention of that authority be called to past negligence in fulfilling this responsibility.

It is recommended that the War Department study in AR 900-5 adequate instructions for transmitting classified Army mail through State

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**MEMO, Subject: Irregularities in Aerial Mail Communications with the
Office of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, Moscow,
15 June 1949.**

Department channels. It is believed that the State Department marking, "Safe Hand", should be placed on the outer envelope containing secret and confidential correspondence.

It is recommended that the AGOs in the Balkans be informed that under AM 900-5, para 24, they are forbidden to transmit through APO channels classified mail addressed to Moscow, or any other capital to which APO mail must pass through a foreign postal system.

It is recommended that the personnel of AS M and S, Vienna, be informed that all mail bearing an originator's registry number, or a stamp of any kind indicating special handling, be, in fact, given special handling and not sent through APO channels as ordinary mail.

It is recommended that Mr. Ferdinand Stix, the Czechoslovakian D.F. of APO 777 who handles local outgoing nonregistered mail and who lives in the Russian occupation zone, be transferred to a less sensitive position, if not removed entirely from the roster of APO 777 indigenous employees.

It is recommended that AS Postal Branch, HECOM, issue to all APOs under its jurisdiction instructions that all official Army mail not bearing postage and destined for countries with which the APOs have no free exchange of mail be returned to the sender. It is also recommended that the AS Postal Branch, HECOM, direct its postal inspectors to be more alert to faulty procedures within APO channels, such as APO 777's reported misrouting of mail, addressed to the Balkan missions, to Frankfurt and the 26th HCO's forwarding official Army mail, destined for units in the United Kingdom, to the British Post rather than to a U.S. Naval postal agency.

It is recommended that the findings in this report be forwarded to: the War Department, Washington, D.C.; the State Department, Washington, D.C.; Mr. S. R. Lunge, Communications Officer, American Embassy, Paris; Mr. R. G. Abraham, Communications Officer, U.S. Political Mission, Berlin; the Adjutant General's Office, USA, and HECOM; Colonel Page, Theater Postal Officer, HECOM; the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow; and the AGOs in the Balkans.

In conclusion, these Agents recommend that the AS of S, G-5, USA, consider the advisability of calling a second conference to discuss the findings of this report and to insure that remedial action be taken. It is believed that in addition to the members present at the first conference the Staff Postal Officer, USA, and representatives from the Adjutant General's Office, USA, and the State Department should also be invited to attend.

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MEMO, Subject: Investigation in Internal Mail Communications with the
Office of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, 25 June 1947.

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Exhibits and Appendix I for this case are attached to the original
copy only.

Only Memoranda "A", "B", and "C" contain Conclusions and Recommendations
applying to the individual memoranda. This procedure was followed
owing to the fact that these memoranda are concerned with the offices of origin
in cases relative to mail arriving in Moscow via Soviet mail channels.
Utilizing this procedure will facilitate sending to the various AOCs concerned
report copies presenting the discrepancies applying to each AOC. The indi-
vidual Conclusions and Recommendations are also incorporated in the Summary
of Investigation for the entire case.

Concerning proposed directives relating to the USSR, AOC Hungary,
USSR, and Romania, and U.S. Delegation, AOC Bulgaria, consideration should be
given to the fact that these organizations will be disbanded in the near
future and that all U.S. Army personnel stationed in these countries will be
attached to the U.S. State Department.

HENRY F. FRATTONARY
Special Agent, CIG

FRANK P. WISENBERG
Special Agent, CIG

APPROVED:

GEORGE H. CORRIJN
Deputy Chief, CIG

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C-2, USA

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Wol Snowden

Vienne City Section
25 June 1947

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Irregularities in Aerial Mail Communications with
Office of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow.

RE : Investigation at Office of the U.S. Military Repre-
sentation on the Allied Control Commission for
Hungary, Budapest, Hungary.

1. Pursuant to instructions from the Officer in Charge, and in compliance with letter request from the Adjutant General's Office Washington, D.C., Subject as above, dated 18 March 1947 (Exhibit XXI), an investigation was initiated by this Agent on 12 April 1947 at the Office of the U.S. Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, Budapest, Hungary for the purpose of determining the past and present methods used for the transmission of official, classified mail and also to fix the responsibility for previously occurred violations of paragraphs 26 and 27, AR 360-5 as described in cable No. MX-51838, dated 29 February 1947 (Exhibit XXI Inc. 2) and cable No. MX-51885, dated 12 February 1947 (Exhibit XXI Inc. 3). Both violations resulted in the receipt of classified correspondence by the Military Attache, Moscow, Russia through the open Soviet mail.

2. In reference to cable No. MX-51835 (Exhibit XXI Inc. 3), investigation revealed that the document in question, confidential notes of AGC Hungary meeting, dated 17 October 1946, originated from the office of Brigadier General George Weiss, U.S. Military Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, where it was prepared for dispatch under the direction of 1st Lt. Charles E. Valerio, ASN 5117754. The document was delivered to the AG Section by either Valerio or a messenger where it was turned over to 1st Lt. Herbert L. Lambert, ASN 1464491. Investigation further revealed that when document in question was received by the AG Section it was contained in a sealed envelope which bore no outer markings to indicate safe handling. Since the AG Section had no knowledge of the classification of the document contained in the sealed envelope, it was mailed through APO channels to APO 777, Vienna, Austria. Since there was no registration number on the envelope, it is impossible to trace the document further than APO 777. However, the last APO stamp appearing on the envelope should indicate the place where the document was placed in the civilian mail. Photostatic copies of the envelope were requested by this office in March 1947 but have not been forthcoming.

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**Item A, Re: Investigation of Office of the U.S. Military Representation
on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, Budapest, Hungary.**

3. Since the above-described incident, which occurred at a time when individual offices were responsible for the preparation of classified documents prior to transmission, a new system of handling mail has been inaugurated by Captain H. W. Horton, Adjutant General, AGC 8-43668. This new system, which is outlined in a directive dated 1 March 1947 (Exhibit XIV), seems to eliminate entirely the possibilities of mail being misclassified at Budapest. Under the new system, AG Section assumes all responsibility for the dispatching and receiving of mail.

All official outgoing letters and documents, classified or unclassified, are delivered to the AG Message Center in an open condition. Here the letters are examined. If the material contained therein is unclassified, a broken red circle (Exhibit XVI) is stamped on the back of the envelope and the letter dispatched through APO channels. When mail is delivered to the APO clerk (APO office is located in same building as the AG Section), he closely examines every letter and, if the broken red circle is not on every envelope, the unstamped letters are returned to the AG Section.

If material to be dispatched is classified, the letter is delivered to the AG Section in an open condition where file copies are withdrawn, a registry number assigned, and the envelope marked to indicate the method of handling (Exhibit XVI). When the preparing section desires to keep all the file copies of outgoing, classified documents, the AG Section is contacted and a registry number assigned. This number is placed on both the file copy and the outer envelope containing the document. The envelope, in a sealed condition, is then delivered to the AG Message Center where it is marked to indicate the method of handling.

All classified mail, after it has been received by the AG Message Center, is placed in the State Department box which is located in the same office. This mail is in charge of T/Sgt Robert J. Brock, AGC 18007359, who is responsible for the delivering of the mail to the State Department courier, Mr. Gaston P. Nigge, who visits the AG Message Center four times daily. Registry numbers of letters being dispatched by this method are recorded individually in a daily mail log and a State Department receipt book. Receipts are signed by the State Department courier each time the mail is received. If it becomes necessary to keep classified mail in the AG Message Center overnight, it is placed in a safe located in that office.

Incoming, classified mail is received via State Department courier who makes the journey from Vienna to Budapest weekly. A double receipt system is employed with both the AG Section and the State Department receiving signed invoices for the mail delivered.

Until a short time ago incoming mail was also delivered by AGC courier from Vienna who would travel to Budapest via AGC aircraft.

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Item A, Re: Investigation at office of the U.S. Military Representation
on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, Budapest, Hungary.

This courier would be met at the Budapest airport by a courier from the AG
Section, Sgt. Arthur E. Enaley, ASN 19212762. Mail delivered in this manner
was also protected by a double receipt system.

Mail sent through APO channels, which includes official, un-
classified mail and personal letters, is transported to and from Vienna via
BHS aircraft and the UNR ration truck. Aircraft flights are made twice
weekly; ration truck trips are made weekly. The only receipts employed in
these methods of transmission are manifests in the case of transport by
aircraft and mail invoices in the case of transport by ration truck. Out-
going mail bags are never sealed or locked as APO 777 officials have stated
that this safeguard is unnecessary. Mail bags coming from APO 777 are
sometimes sealed but more often are unsealed.

4. Investigation revealed that it would be impossible for out-
going mail of any type to fall in civilian mail channels in Budapest. The
civilian post is never used and there is no civilian mail drop located in
the UNR building. Mail going directly from the U.S. Military Representation
to the Russian element in Budapest is always addressed to the Chairman of the
Allied Control Commission for Hungary and delivered by hand by a representa-
tive of the UNR Liaison Section.

5. During the course of this investigation Captain Horton stated
that, on many occasions in the past, official mail addressed to Bucharest,
Pamonia, Belgrade, Yugoslavia and Sofia, Bulgaria had been misrouted to
Budapest. In these instances it was not possible to determine if classified
material was involved. This would indicate improper handling at either
APO 777 or Tulsa Air Base.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The violation described in cable No. HX-1025 (Exhibit XII, Inc.
3) was brought about due to the fact that the letter in question, being un-
marked as to method of handling, was sent, via APO channels to APO 777,
Vienna, Austria. At APO 777 the letter was either placed in the civilian
mail or forwarded to another APO where it was placed in the civilian mail.

At the time of the violation it was the responsibility of W/pt.
Charles E. Valerio to properly prepare all outgoing, classified material
emanating from the office of Brig. Gen. Vonn. In this particular case
the document was not properly prepared for dispatch and, therefore, Valerio
is at fault in the matter.

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**MEMO A, AGO Investigation at office of the U.S. Military Representation
on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, Budapest, Hungary.**

It should be pointed out that the document in question, although classified CONFIDENTIAL, contained notes taken at a meeting which was also attended by Russian representatives. The Russians were also in possession of the same set of notes and gained nothing by securing access to the CONFIDENTIAL letter.

The present system for handling USMH, Budapest mail seems to be foolproof and, if carried out properly, should result in the proper transmission and receipt of classified material originating from USMH, Budapest. Accordingly, no recommendations, pertaining to a change or changes in the system of handling mail, as outlined in paragraph 3 above, are made.

A change in the type of stamp used to designate the method of transporting registered mail (Exhibit XVI) has been made prior to the preparation of this report (See Case No. V-2151).

Since personnel of the USMH, AGO Hungary are of the opinion that mail placed in State Department channels stays in those channels until the mail reaches the point of destination, it is recommended that steps be taken to insure that mail placed in diplomatic pouch remain in diplomatic pouch until final delivery.

AGENCY ACTION:

Any changes in mail handling procedures, as applies to the USMH, AGO Hungary, should be made bearing in mind the fact that this organization will be disbanded in the near future and all U.S. Army personnel, stationed in Budapest, will be attached to the U.S. State Department.

HARRY J. FALTEGHAFF
Special Agent, CIG

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Alfred S. Snowden

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

TOP SECRET
15 June 1957

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Investigation in Lateral Mail Communications with Office of the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow.

RE : Investigation of office of the U.S. Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Russia, Eastward, Russia.

1. Pursuant to instructions from the officer in charge, based on a letter from the Adjutant General's Office, Washington, D.C., Subject as above, dated 15 March 1947 (initials III), an investigation was conducted by this Agent on 4 and 5 June 1947 at the office of the U.S. Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Russia, Eastward, Russia for the purpose of determining the present methods used for the transmission of official, classified mail.

2. Investigation revealed that, at present, there are two office buildings occupied by U.S. military personnel in Eastward. One building is occupied by the remaining members of the U.S. Military Representation and the other by personnel, although still under the jurisdiction of the USSR, who are to be attached to the State Department in Eastward when the USSR declares neutrality. Both of these buildings contain a mail room and incoming and outgoing mail is handled separately, there being very little connection existing between the two offices.

3. Inquiry at the building occupied by personnel who are, in the future, to be attached to the State Department, disclosed that Col. John R. Merrill (to be Military Attaché) is the officer in charge. All mail handling at this building is under the supervision of 1st Lt. Mary V. Williams, AM 109772, who is in charge of the message center.

All outgoing, official mail is brought to the message center in an open condition with no accompanying envelope. Mailings consist of Director of Intelligence, USSR, mail handling forms (DO 104-1010), correspondence in individually marked, listing including correspondence marking classification, dispatch number, subject, and date. A separate mail handling sheet is used for each mailing. Furthermore, for all mail going to the Director of Intelligence, USSR, is marked on the handling all mail going to Headquarters, Moscow, is marked on another handling, etc. Mail handling

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**Annex B, Sec Investigation of Office of the U.S. Military Representation
on the Allied Control Commission for Romania, Bucharest,
Romania.**

One prepared in quadruplicating one copy is retained by the message center and three go forward with the documents. When a signed copy comes back to the message center from the point of destination, the original copy is removed from the files and the received copy substituted. All official mail, regardless of whether it is classified or unclassified, is prepared for pouch transmission. After the outgoing correspondence has been properly listed, it is placed in individual envelopes bearing the classification of the document and listing the addressee. All correspondence, listed on any one invoice, is then placed in a common outer envelope together with the three copies of the invoice going forward. This outer envelope, in addition to listing the addressee and the pouch registration number, bears the writing "VIA STATE DEPARTMENT POUCH". Only dispatch numbers--not the registration numbers--are placed on file copies of outgoing correspondence. Sgt. Williams records all mail in a log prior to dispatch. When the message center is notified that the State Department courier is in town, Sgt. Williams delivers the pouches to the State Department office, Bucharest, for transportation, and receives a signed receipt for the mail. State Department couriers visit Bucharest weekly. Colonel Lovell has stated that, due to various mail handling irregularities occurring in the past, only personal mail will be sent through APO channels.

Incoming, classified and unclassified mail is received both through State Department and APO channels. Mail received through diplomatic pouch is picked up at the State Department office in Bucharest and a receipt given. Classified mail, received through APO channels, contains only the usual return receipt. An AEC courier system which was in effect for a short time has been discontinued and, at present, all mail coming through APO channels is transported via AEC aircraft which fly weekly from Tullis Airfield, Austria to Bucharest and return. The aircraft and crew remain overnight in Bucharest. Sgt. Williams stated that he had never received TOP SECRET mail through APO channels although SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL mail is received by that method of transmission.

1. Inquiry of the building occupied by the remaining members of the U.S. Military Representation, All Romania, disclosed that N/Sgt. Kenneth J. Invalence, AMN 315744, is in charge of the message center.

All outgoing, classified mail is delivered to the message center in an open condition. The classified letters are listed individually on a War Department, Signal Corps, U.S. Army, Route Delivery List (Vols. Signal, Form No. 154, Revised January 1944). This listing includes message identification, signature in full, and time received. The form itself contains blank spaces for "Time dispatched" and "Time returned". This form is prepared in quadruplicating one is signed by the State Department representative in Bucharest and returned to the message center; one is retained by the State Department, Bucharest; and the go forward with the pouch. Letters listed on the Route Delivery List are destined for different locations but

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POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

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Item B, No Investigation at Office of the U.S. Military Representation
on the Allied Control Commission for Germany, Eastward,
Bonn.

only records one registry number - that assigned to the pouch. There is no listing of the classifications of the various documents being dispatched. After the outgoing letters have been listed they are placed in a common outer envelope which lists the addressee (in all cases SW, Vienna) and the registration number assigned. There is no code handling designation on the outer envelope. After the envelope or pouch has been prepared, Sgt. Kuchman takes it to the State Department office, Eastward where a signed receipt is obtained. All outgoing mail, classified higher than RESTRICTED is dispatched in this manner. All other outgoing mail is sent through APO channels, via SAC aircraft, in which case the aircraft pilot signs for the mail received.

Incoming, classified mail is received through both State Department and APO channels. Mail received via diplomatic courier is called for and a receipt given. Sgt. Kuchman meets with incoming SAC aircraft containing APO mail at which time he receives the mail manifest and obtains the mail. Mail delivered in this manner is both classified and unclassified. Classified and registered mail arrives in a separate, lead sealed mail bag. There are no return receipts other than those contained in the individual envelopes. Incoming mail is taken down at the message center and delivered to the various individuals concerned.

Incoming mail bags are sometimes sealed and sometimes unsealed. Incoming, registered mail is always contained in sealed mail bags. Outgoing mail bags are unsealed.

COMMUNICATIONS AND MESSAGE CENTER

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

The handling of classified mail at the building housing the personnel who are to be attached to the State Department seems to be in order and in accordance with existing directives with two exceptions: (1) Official, RESTRICTED, and unclassified mail is being sent through diplomatic pouch when transmission via APO channels is available. (2) Mail invoice listings, designed only for use in transmitting mail to Director of Intelligence, CIA, are being used in transmitting mail to other addressees. This procedure is obviously working smoothly at present but should the situation arise where one or more letters, contained in a common envelope, do not reach their destination, it would be difficult in tracing the last letter due to the one registration number common to all letters in the envelope.

The handling of classified mail at the building occupied by the remaining members of the U.S. Military Representation, APO Bonn, presents a number of discrepancies: (1) The Bonn Railway List used in recording outgoing, classified mail is inadequate. There is no listing of the classifications of the documents. (2) An individual registration number should be assigned to each outgoing, classified letter. Under the present system, which requires recording in Vienna, it would be difficult to trace a lost

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**MEMO 3, FOR Investigation at Office of the U.S. Military Representation
on the Allied Control Commission for Romania, Bucharest,
Romania.**

letters. (3) Outgoing letters, classified higher than RESTRICTED, since they are destined for various locations, should be contained in double envelopes rather than in the common envelope now being used. (4) A registry log should be maintained in the message center. Merely filing the Route Delivery Lists is not sufficient to trace lost correspondence.

It is, therefore, recommended that steps be taken to eliminate the discrepancies outlined above.

It is recommended that, if possible, the two message centers now in operation in Bucharest be consolidated and a directive, outlining the procedures in handling mail, be prepared.

It is further recommended that steps be taken to insure that mail placed in diplomatic channels remain in those channels until the point of destination is reached.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

Any changes in mail handling procedures, as applies to the USAR, ACD Romania, should be made bearing in mind the fact that this organization will be disbanded in the near future and all U.S. Army personnel stationed in Bucharest will be attached to the U.S. State Department.

HARVEY J. FALKENHAFF
Special Agent, GDS

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POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

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x. Col Snowden

Worms City Section
25 June 1947

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SUBJECT: Irregularities in Internal Mail Communications with Office of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow.

RE : Investigation at Office of U.S. Delegation, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, Sofia, Bulgaria.

1. Pursuant to instructions from the officer in charge and in compliance with letter request from the Adjutant General's Office, Washington, D.C., Subject as above, dated 18 March 1947 (Exhibit XXI), an investigation was initiated by this Agent on 7 May 1947 at the Office of the U.S. Delegation, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, Sofia, Bulgaria for the purpose of determining the past and present methods used for the transmission of official, classified mail and also to fix the responsibility for previously occurred violations of paragraphs 26 and 27, AR 300-5 as described in cable No. HX-51828, dated 20 February 1947 (Exhibit XII, Inc. 2), cable No. HX-51828, dated 6 February 1947 (Exhibit XII, Inc. 4), and cable No. HX-50943, dated 11 January 1947 (Exhibit XII, Inc. 5). All violations resulted in the receipt of classified correspondence by the Military Attache, Moscow, Russia, through the open Soviet mail.

2. In reference to cable No. HX 51828 (Exhibit XII, Inc. 4), investigation revealed that the document in question, classified SECRET and originating in the Office of the Military and Economic Section, was dispatched from Sofia, Bulgaria to Naples, Italy on 24 December 1946. The document was placed in the custody of Lt 11, Robert F. Richards, AG, the pilot of the aircraft making the Sofia-Naples flight on that particular day, and a receipt for the document obtained. Upon arrival at Capodichino Airport, Italy, Lt. Richards presented the letter to APO 770-S for registry as classified material. The registration was accomplished and Registry No. 2099 assigned the letter. Lt. Richards received the receipt for this registration which was later forwarded to the U.S. Delegation, AGS Bulgaria and is on file at that office (Exhibit XIII).

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At the time of the above-described incident all mail received at APO 770-S was forwarded to APO 524, NYC. The letter was either placed in civilian mail channels at APO 524 or forwarded to another APO where it was placed in the civilian mail. The last APO stamp appearing on the envelope should indicate where the document was placed in the civilian mail. Photostatic copies of the envelope in question were requested by this office in March but have not been forthcoming.

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Item 6, Re: Investigation of Office of U.S. Delegation, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, Sofia, Bulgaria

When the above-described incident took place courier carrying the documents, other than those classified TOP SECRET, had been discontinued in accordance with letter, Headquarters, WFOA, File # 922/112-2, dated 29 November 1944, Subject: Discontinuance of Army Courier Service. Thus, the method of transmission used was the only Army channel available and was in accordance with AR 380-5 as mail could not possibly reach Moscow, Russia through APO channels. Therefore, the responsibility for the violation should be charged primarily to the persons selecting APO channels as the method of transmission, namely the personnel of the Military and Economic Section. Secondary responsibility should be charged to the APO responsible for placing the document in the civilian mail.

3. In reference to cable No. MXI 50948 (Exhibit XII, Inc. 5), wherein two violations are described, investigation disclosed that the facts surrounding the case of registered item No. 3064 were substantially the same as those in the above-described case.

In the case of secret invoice M-441-46 (cable No. MXI 50948) being received in a single, unregistered envelope, Lt. Col. Gratian K. Yatskevich, Chief of the Military and Economic Section, stated that Sgt. Billy E. Baker, ASN 19213312, was responsible for the violation. Baker had told Lt. Col. Yatskevich that he was not aware of the fact that receipts for SECRET documents were also classified SECRET and, therefore, he had mailed the receipt in question in an unclassified condition. Baker has since been transferred for his carelessness in handling classified material and is now assigned to G-1, WFOA, Frankfurt, Germany.

4. The present system of handling mail, in force at the Office of the U.S. Delegation, AOC Bulgaria, is based more or less on a verbal agreement between the various officers. There are no written directives in existence pertaining to the local handling of official mail.

There are two office buildings, approximately one mile apart, which house the activities of U.S. Military personnel in Sofia. One building houses the offices of personnel who will be attached to the U.S. State Department when the U.S. Delegation disbands; this group is headed by Col. J. Donnell Sherman, Jr. (to be Military Attache), Chief of the Military Section. The other building contains the offices of all other U.S. Military personnel in Sofia. The office of the Military and Economic Section is located in the first described building while the Adjutant's office is located in the other.

Since the Military and Economic Section (Intelligence) prepared the great majority of the classified documents originating in Sofia, it was verbally decided that this office should handle all outgoing, classified mail. Each individual office prepares official classified and unclassified mail for dispatch. Each office has its own registry book and is assigned a block of registration numbers to be used. This numbering system is made from the office of the Military and Economic Section, directed by Lt. Col. Yatskevich.

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memo 6, re: Investigation at Office of U.S. Delegation, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, Sofia, Bulgaria.

Subject: James H. Altier, ASN 139412, in charge of registry number assignments and subsequent procedures in connection with classified documents.

All classified mail dispatched from Sofia is prepared by the office of origin, an assigned registry number is placed on the outer envelope containing the document, and the document and envelope delivered in an unsealed condition to the Military and Economic Section. This registry number is recorded in the log kept by the office of origin and, in some cases, an office registry number is also assigned and recorded. No registration numbers are placed on file copies. After the letters arrive at the Military and Economic Section a pouch and pouch content listing is prepared. This pouch listing is prepared in four copies; one copy is retained by the office; one copy is retained by the State Department, Sofia; and two copies go forward with the pouch, one of which is withdrawn at the redistribution center in Cairo, Egypt and the other is intended for any other redistribution centers enroute. All classified material, including TOP SECRET documents, are contained in outer envelopes on which appears in red crayon the writing "SAFE HANDLING" together with the registry number. There are no rubber stamps available. After the pouch has been prepared, it is delivered to the office of the U.S. Political Mission in Sofia (State Department) where a receipt is obtained. The pouch is then transported, weekly, by State Department courier to Cairo, Egypt. Lt. Col. Yatsavitch had no knowledge as to the method of transmission used from Cairo to the point of destination. Utilizing this method of mail transmission takes approximately one month for a letter sent from Sofia to Czechoslovakia, France or London, England (Exhibit XVII).

Incoming, official, classified and unclassified mail is received in two ways: Approximately 50 percent arrives through diplomatic pouch, the other 50 percent arrives through APO channels, via MATS aircraft, in which case the pilot of the plane acts as courier. This mail is delivered to a representative of the U.S. Delegation who meets each plane and who signs the pilot's receipt for the mail. There is one scheduled flight per week from Pullia Airport, Austria to Sofia, Bulgaria and returns the plane and crew remaining in Sofia overnight.

Incoming mail, arriving via diplomatic pouch, is picked up at the office of the U.S. Political Mission by a representative of the Military and Economic Section who signs for the mail received, takes it to his office, and makes final distribution. Incoming mail if classified is recorded individually.

Incoming mail, arriving via MATS aircraft, is received at the Sofia Airport by T/Sgt John H. Shore, ASN 139412, who is under the supervision of Captain Robert Dallen, Adjutant and Finance Officer. Shore carries the mail to the Adjutant's office (Mail Room), where it is sorted and taken to the individuals concerned. Classified mail is recorded individually. As previously stated, the mail room is located in a building which is approximately

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Item C, re: Investigation of Office of U.S. Delegation, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, Sofia, Bulgaria.

One mile from the building housing the Military and Economic Section office.

Outgoing mail, other than that being sent via diplomatic pouch, is sent by messenger from the various offices to the mail room where it is broken down into official and non-official mail, stamped, tied, and placed in the mailbags for delivery to Vienna. Official mail is tied separately but is placed in the same pouch as the personal mail. These pouches are taken to the Sofia Airport and placed on the LTB aircraft immediately prior to take off. A pilot's receipt is obtained.

Incoming mail sacks are sometimes sealed but more often unsealed, outgoing mail sacks are never sealed.

Correspondence to be transmitted to the Russian or Bulgarian element in Sofia is prepared by the individual offices concerned and sent by messenger to the destination. There is no civilian mail drop, Russian mail drop, or Bulgarian mail drop located in any of the offices of the U.S. Delegation and, therefore, no possibility of official mail being placed in civilian mail channels.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Responsibility for the violations described in cable No. MXI 51889 (Exhibit XXI, Inc. 4) and cable No. 50948, re: registered item No. 3864 (Exhibit XXI, Inc. 5) is placed primarily on the personnel of the Military and Economic Section for placing mail destined for Moscow, Russia in APO channels, and secondarily on the APO responsible for placing the letters in the civilian mail.

Responsibility for the violation described in cable No. MXI 50948, re: secret invoice M-411-46 (Exhibit XXI, Inc. 5) is placed on Sgt. Billy E. Baker, who has since been transferred, for placing a document classified CONFIDENTIAL in a single envelope and mailing through APO channels.

Investigation in the above case revealed that there is no set plan in existence at the office of the U.S. Delegation, AEC Bulgaria, for the handling of mail. Outgoing, classified mail is handled by the Military and Economic Section. Outgoing, unclassified mail is handled by the Adjutant's Office. Some incoming, classified mail is handled by the Military and Economic Section; all other incoming mail is handled by the Adjutant's office. There is no local directive in existence outlining the procedures to be followed in the handling of mail.

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All personnel interviewed, during the course of this investigation, were under the impression that when mail was forwarded via diplomatic pouch the mail thus sent would remain in State Department channels until the final destination was reached. This belief, in most cases, is false.

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BY CDR USAINSCOM FOWPO

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Item 6, Re Investigation of Office of U.S. Delegation, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, Sofia, Bulgaria.

Investigation also revealed that, although there is a weekly EAME aircraft flight from Vienna to Sofia and return, State Department couriers come to Sofia, via train, from Cairo, Egypt. Thus, the EAME flights are not being utilized for one of the purposes for which they were inaugurated namely, the transporting of diplomatic couriers. Under the present courier system, mail being sent from Sofia to Vienna, via State Department channels, is in transit over 30 days. The aircraft flight averages four hours.

It is recommended that the U.S. Delegation, AOC Bulgaria, draw up a directive for the proper handling of mail by members of that organization and that one office be designated as responsible for the receipt and transmission of all mail.

It is further recommended that geographical locations of mail destination points be taken into consideration when using State Department channels. In the case of classified mail destined for Austria, Germany, the Balkans, and other European countries it is recommended that the U.S. Delegation, AOC Bulgaria either (1) appoint one of their officers as courier and deliver the pouch to the State Department, Vienna, (2) request the State Department to inaugurate a courier service between Vienna and Sofia, utilizing the EAME aircraft flights, (3) or designate the pilot of the EAME aircraft as officer courier and have him deliver the pouch to the State Department, Vienna.

Finally, it is recommended that steps be taken to insure that mail placed in diplomatic pouch will remain in State Department channels to the point of destination.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Any changes in mail handling procedures, as applies to the U.S. Delegation, AOC Bulgaria, should be made bearing in mind the fact that this organization will be disbanded in the near future and all U.S. military personnel stationed in Sofia will be attached to the U.S. State Department.

ELMER J. STANTON
Special Agent, G-2

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ON MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOVPO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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Atol Snowden

Vietnam City Section
19 June 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Investigations in Internal Mail Communications with Office of the U.S. Military Attaché, Hanoi.

RE : Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in VIETNAM.

1. APO 777

On 2 April 1967 this Agent interviewed Second Lieutenant Turren M. Ray, postal officer at APO 777, concerning mailing procedures followed at APO 777.

1a. Ray stated that incoming mail reaches APO 777 by the following means:

A. The Smart Train. Mail arrives on the Smart, daily, from the 29th Base Post Office in Munich. This mail is accompanied by two armed guards, one from the Munich BPO and a South N.V. guard, who boards the train at Salzburg. The train arrives about five a.m. in Vienna. The guards stay on the mail car until it is "gutted", that is, until it is put on a side track. Then an armed guard from Vienna, driven in a U.S.-Army vehicle by an American driver, meets this train around 0730 hours and brings the mail to the A.P.O. If there is more than one load, the train guards stay in the mail car until all mail is loaded. Registered mail is kept for the last load and is brought by the 29th BPO guard to the APO, where the registry check signs for it.

B. The Tain Airports. Mail arrives at Tain, guarded by the pilots of the planes. It is placed in the Freight Warehouse, under the charge of Staff Sgt. John Webster, Chief of Cargo and Mail at the Tain Air Freight Warehouse. The mail is kept under Sgt. Webster's care until an agent of the Tain plane picks it up and delivers it to APO 777 in Vienna. A daily run is made to Vienna.

C. Local mailings. Mailings from various local agencies daily being made by hand to APO 777. Once a week the section truck from Hanoi post arrives in Vienna, and personnel from the Hanoi section collect and deliver mail at the APO. Sometimes the mail which is delivered is official Army mail bearing no postage.

D. Austrian Post. With the exception of Saturday and Sunday, mail is exchanged daily with an Austrian postal representative. Incoming mail is International mail; outgoing mail is mail addressed to a civilian address in Vienna or within Austria.

Outgoing mail. 1b. Ray stated, is brought to the APO by representatives from various local offices. It leaves every night on the Smart, or, if

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Case 2, New Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Vienna, 29 June 1947.

It's going to the Balkans, it is taken to the Balkan Airport by the same guard who delivered the mail to 270 777 when this guard returns to Berlin. He will see the station, and official mail for the station is taken to the Airport daily.

The paragraphs which follow were obtained from Mr. Day by this Agent's questions, and are repeated verbatim:

"Registered mail from the Balkans has an originator's number on the outside envelope. To register it and get a post office registry number on it, mail addressed to Moscow and requiring registration is registered and put in an ordinary pouch with a railway lock. It is labeled 'Spishkova Post Office'. At Moscow it is opened, and the pouch is checked. It comes with the pouch a receipt containing the number of the railway lock. The train guard signs one copy of the pouch receipt at 270 777. Three copies of the pouch receipt are made out. To keep one signed by the guard, and the guard takes two. He turns one in at the 27th BPO, which is signed and given back to the guard. The 27th BPO keeps the others. Then the pouch must likely go to BPO 25 and on to Berlin.

"We also handle state department pouch mail. We don't know what kind of mail is in the pouches verbatim. These pouches come in on the train and also by plane from the Balkans. There is a tag on them which states 'State Dept., Vienna'. The pouch may come in by train and be addressed to the State Department, Budapest. We send it on to Berlin. We handle it as ordinary mail. In Vienna's state department a receipt is made out and given to us. That is a mere formality.

"Registered mail going to the Balkans is put in a mail pouch, is locked and wrapped. The Agent in charge of the Berlin machine signs a pouch and a receipt for it. The receipt then signs it over to the post. (The receipt I saw authority to forward registered mail to Budapest was the regular photo). That mail is addressed to the destination indicated on the receipt. We don't lock it. The receipt has no tags for the lock. At the Balkan we have bags in the Balkans. They can't get bags to open the pouches if there they are as hard to get. This kind of bag will open my railway bag and also the ability to have these bags in the Balkans. My pouch will be addressed to have bags, and in the Balkans there are no pouches with a lock without a receipt. On the pouch, the Balkan station have returned to 270 777 every mail pouches with their railway lock stamp out, giving this to the station that these mail pouches had been picked up. Investigation revealed that the machines, contrary to 'Postal and Telegraph', station 270, were opening the railway stamps, instead of cutting the stitching of the pouches for lack of bags with which to open the locks. (See also Mr. Pugh). The regularity of this practice was called to the attention of the station by a letter, dated 11 April 1947, from Major Nelson (see Exhibit 2).

"We have an intelligence mail envelope sent to Moscow in the post office mail. This is his name. To send him a check on it. Every time any intelligence envelope leaves the building for Moscow or for Berlin is in

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MEMO 2, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in VIENNA, 29 June 1947.
Questioned. The interrogator emphasizes that he handles registered mail - only that class mail and non-registered official outgoing mail.

On 29 May, this Agent visited ASD 777 and asked Mr. May the following questions:

"Do you ever place official Army registered mail of any kind in to the Austrian postal channels?"

MR: "No. Anything that is official and registered would never go into the Austrian Post. It all has to be handled through our channels. There might be a case of official mail going through the Austrian Post, but it would probably be a letter of condoleance or something of that nature. For example, funeral check would and something like that without postage."

"Do you ever place official Army mail bearing no postage, and destined for foreign countries, into the Austrian post, that is, into international mail channels?"

MR: "No. That all goes to the 24th AF. All mail that goes to foreign countries, other than Austria, goes to the 24th AF."

"Why?"

MR: "Because the only contacts with the Austrians is mail for Austria."

"Do you have stated that mail destined for U.S. missions in the Balkan countries goes out to Berlin for transmission by plane?"

MR: "Yes. I forget the Balkans. The Balkan missions are considered as being physically located in Vienna. They are just like WDC, C-1, etc., as far as we are concerned. That is the reason they have no tags from there."

"Do official Army mail destined for the Balkans is not placed in the international mail, and it is not sent to the 24th AF but is sent out to Berlin for further transmission?"

MR: "Yes, that is, military mail."

"Yes, as a matter of fact, official Army mail, that is, military mail, without postage and destined for military missions in the Balkans, is sent by ASD 777 to the 24th AF. Why?"

MR: "I don't know. Any mail sent at ASD 777. Interrogator: "Do not mix things about that a week ago with Capt. Ward, who said that we have 20 quadratically less 'mail frequency' with the ASD number on, it will be dispatched to the 24th AF." 87

"Do you have been consistently sending official Army mail, bearing the priority device and the ASD 777 number, mail destined for the military missions in the Balkans, to Frankfurt. Why have you been doing that?"

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June 2, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Vienna, 20 June 1947.

Q: "I didn't know that so late. In fact, we have not been to my knowledge. There would be no progress in sending it there."

A: "Right. 'Captain' said that mail bearing an address like 'American Embassy, Budapest, Hungary' should be sent to the 24th St. in Vienna."

Q: "Do you handle mail bearing the address, 'American Embassy, Budapest, Hungary' and bearing no postage?"

A: "We would send that on down to the Postman, according to regulations, etc. It would be sent through the international mail. But in order to expedite the transmission of that mail we would send it to him for further transmission to the American Embassy."

Q: "According to regulations international mail to Budapest must bear postage, even official mail?"

A: "There are some countries to which we can send mail free of postage."

Q: "What are those countries?"

A: "My country, Austria, Poland, Germany No. 1 and Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom."

Q: "Those countries do not include any of the Balkan countries?"

A: "You're right. If mail going to the Balkans bears no post age, we can't put it in the international mail."

Q: "I want to tell you the man who actually handles mail destined for the Balkans and who sends that mail to the 24th St. in Budapest. Who is he?"

A: "Mr. Stiller."

Q: "I want to talk to Stiller."

A: "I think there's an interpreter around here."

Q: "Doesn't he speak English?"

A: "No, he's a Czechoslovakian S.S."

Q: "The agency cleared Mr. Stiller for employment at this APO?"

A: "He has been cleared through G-2. G-2 sent me a letter (see exhibit III), stating that we had to get rid of this Czechoslovakian. Stiller said pretty bad about Stiller, so I sent Stiller down to talk with the letter and told him to agree to get out with them. I believe it was the next day I received a phone call stating that we could keep him."

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Item 2, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Vienna, 20 June 1947.

"Do you know who made the telephone call to you from G-2?"

ME: "No, I don't. It was an American."

Subsequent investigation revealed that this, mentioned, filled out a questionnaire, dated 25 June 1946, in which he stated, among other things, that he served as Captain in the Wehrmacht from 1936 until 1945, that he is a subordinate from Alameda (SW), that he has resided in Austria since August 1945, that he was never a member of the NSDAP, and that his present address is Schmarzberg, 22, 1110, in the "Freiburger Stadt", under the heading "Information from Counter-Intelligence Service" is stated "No additional information".

It is pointed out because of the paucity of information on this person's background, Capt. E.A. Shanks of the Employment Office, Headquarters Vienna Area Command, sent to Lt. Ray on 2 December 1946 the form letter stating the necessity of transferring the employment of this man as he could not be furnished. (See Exhibit III). An appeal was forwarded on 7 December 1946 by Lt. Ray, and on the same date the records of the VAC Employment Office show that the "Action Taken by Supervising Officer" was changed from "Employee Removed" to "Employee Retained". This, therefore, continued working at APC TTT.

An interrogation of this, conducted in the German language, on his duties at the APC disclosed that all mail outgoing mail, with the exception of registered mail, is sorted and posted by this himself. The top secret documents continuously taken to APC TTT by AB 1 and 2, which failed to register these documents (see Case No. V-4251), therefore passed through the hands of this. This stated that about fourteen days ago Captain Ray told him that all official mail going to the Embassy should be deposited to him and that non-official mail should be sent to the 10th St., before that time, this went on to say, all mail addressed to him continued to be sent to the 10th St.

When asked who told him to send all mail addressed to the Embassy to 10th St., this replied that there was a written order directing him to do so. (Exhibit IV). This was referring to Postal Memorandum No. 4. (See Exhibit IV). This was then asked whether he could read English. He answered no, but that he could read "German", "Czechoslovakian", "Hungary", and the things.

At this point, Sgt. Shanks stated, "I tried to explain to him Memorandum No. 4, but he could not have understood".

2. Additional Personal Data and Information (AB 1 and 2)

Reginald A. Thompson, Chief Clerk at AB 1 and 2 since 22 November 1946 was interviewed on 2 April 1947.

Sgt. Shanks, questioned by this Agent, made the following statement:

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MEMO 2, The Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in VIETNAM, 19 June 1967.

"I've extended coming from the APO in the letters considered for classification. The APO will put it in a State Department pouch. The State Department then brings it home. Mr. Hansen has been bringing it home twice a day and also picking up mail here twice a day.

"A new system started this week. If the material is unclassified but important enough to be registered we put a '24' number on it. '24' is the code symbol for this headquarters. If it is a classified document we use the following code symbols: '24,1' and a number.

"We bring official mail going outside the theatre to APO 777 for registration. Official mail within the theatre we send to SAC. Official mail from the military countries addressed to houses we register here and send it to APO 777. We would not put it in a State Department pouch. Anything coming to us for the State Department goes to the SAC, and the State Department picks it up there. The Operations Officer, Major Macdonald, issued an order that we would not handle anything going to the State Department. The State Department brings mail going to the staff sections here.

"APO Registry sometimes puts its mail in a State Department pouch. It is registered with the State Department. Then the State Department brings it home. To receipt for it, register it, and bring it to the APO for an APO registration. Under the new arrangement, Mr. Hansen should bring such mail to the SAC. The SAC will then have to bring it to APO 777.

"When registering mail we use a 'Receiving Stamp', along side of which we write in a '24' registration number. If there is an originator's number in the lower left hand corner of the envelope, the APO and 2 number is placed in the lower left hand corner; otherwise, it is placed on the back of the envelope. On the APO and 2 tag back the originator's registration number and APO's registration number are entered.

On 26 May 1967 this Agent reviewed APO and 2 and further interviewed Sgt. Hansen.

"We authorized you to bring official mail, from the military and addressed to houses, to the APO."

Hansen: "We don't do that anymore. When I came here it was the custom. There is originated I don't know."

"How did you think the APO would transmit mail destined for houses?"

Hansen: "I don't know. I'm not at all familiar with APO procedures. Of course, at that time classified material was going through the Army Department."

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June 1, 1967 Investigation of U.S. Postal Activities in Vietnam, 10 June 1967.

Q: Now, but when the State Department brought mail here for further examination to Boston you brought it to the APO?

A: Yes, that is true if the State Department brought it here. That system has been changed here because as we have nothing to do with the State Department any more. They bring nothing here any more, and they pick up nothing here. If there is mail coming here for the State Department we send it to the APO. If the State Department has anything coming for the State Department they take it to the APO, and the APO delivers it to us.

Q: If, in the past, mail destined for Hanoi had on the outer envelope a stamp such as 'The Security Service', 'State Dept', or 'By Hand' did you also bring it to the APO?

A: Yes, "Unless it was stamped 'By State Dept. Route' or 'State Dept. Courier' we sent it to the APO."

Q: Then if it were stamped only 'Courier Service' what would you do with it?

A: "I don't recall whether we took it to the APO or to the APO."

Q: But you told us that the APO handles mail only for addresses within the theater, not for Hanoi."

A: "Yes, it would go to the APO. But if it were marked 'Officer Courier' we would have taken it to Mr. Carter."

Q: As a letter for Hanoi, bearing only the stamp, 'The Courier Service' or 'State Dept' would have been brought to the APO."

A: "Yes."

Q: Therefore a letter like this (Hanoi was shown a photostatic copy of APO Hanoi's letter to Hanoi (see case T-413)) would have been brought to APO TTG?

A: "Yes."

Q: Am I right in believing, then, that the only official mail, destined for foreign countries, which you brought to Mr. Carter was mail stamped 'Officer Courier', 'By State Dept. Route' or 'State Dept. Courier' and that all other official mail you took to the APO?

A: "Well, there is one exception to that. Sometimes, if someone might have brought some mail here and requested that it go by officer courier, in that case we brought it to Mr. Carter and let him decide whether it would go that way."

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Case 3, For Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in VIENNA, 29 June 1947.

"That is the only exception?"

SHAW: "That is the only exception."

Major Macmillan, USA Operations Officer, was interviewed, concerning present procedures of handling mail by AS H and B. Major Macmillan referred to USA Letter AS XII-13 XII, dated 24 April 1947, Subject: "Inter-Allied Traffic to and from ASB Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania and the U.S. Legation, Budapest" (See Exhibit V) and stated:

"The present procedure for handling the outgoing mail in AS H and B is that the letter goes to a clerk who handles outgoing registered material. He affixes the postage to cover the registry cost, logs the material in a book, and puts it in a separate pouch in which nothing but this mail to be registered goes in. The messenger takes that pouch down to the post office. Down in the post office the pouch is emptied, each one of the documents registered, and the messenger brings back a post office registry slip, which he returns to the registry clerk in H and B. The registry clerk in H and B immediately enters on the same log in which he has logged the document in the first place the ASB registry receipt number, thereby having a permanent check on whether the document actually was registered at the ASB and whether any documents are outstanding that should be registered. Then he makes a permanent file of the registry receipt.

"The problem that wish to send out mail through ASB registered mail channels will propose that mail for dispatch through ASB channels and put it in an outside wrapper addressed to AS H and B. The registry clerk will then process it in the same way as mail which originated in this Headquarters is processed, with the exception that the ASB registry receipt, after the number has been entered on the log, will be returned to the originating office in the Embassy.

"This procedure began about three weeks ago. The second phase is now being published but hasn't gone into effect yet. We completed the final draft yesterday and sent it to Sigis." (See Exhibit VI).

3. Signal Bureau Service (SBS). Case 622.

Cpt. Samuel J. Kane, ASB-AS-5 at SBS Stop 690 since 25 June 1944, was interviewed on 3 April 1947.

Cpt. Kane described the means by which mail arrives at SBS Stop 690.

A) By plane. An SBS messenger, who leaves Vienna with outgoing mail at seven every morning for Zurich, stops at the Airport until three in the afternoon, at which time he picks up the plane from Frankfurt, collects SBS mail, and returns to Vienna.

B) By train (Bavaria). When the messenger arrives, on SBS

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Annex B, For Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Vienna, 19 June 1947.

Messages to and by truck to the stations, where he picks up the mail from the "bus car" and then the courier in the city. The day (1947) has the stations travelling by truck between Vienna and Munich. In Munich the courier also picks up receipts for the various portions of mail and brings two copies of each receipt to the SAC in Vienna, where one copy is signed and returned to Munich, the other is filed. For registered mail, such receipts are also made out and signed.

C) By motor messengers. A motor messenger collects mail at AS H and A, UNH, AS H and B Vally and Vienna, Lang Michelson.

D) By local messengers from agencies other than those listed in C above.

The above four means by which incoming mail arrives at SAC day 6900, etc. Here continued, are also utilized for the transmission of outgoing mail, that is, whenever a collection of mail is made by such means a delivery is also made.

In addition to the above means for the transmission of outgoing mail, however, further means are utilized for transmitting mail to the Berlin countries. They are:

1) Budapest mail. Mail is delivered weekly to Budapest by an SAC plane courier. A messenger from the ASH meets the courier and signs for the package; the courier does not leave the airport. No mail is collected at Budapest. Mail from the Budapest mission arrives at SAC day 6900 through AS H and B or AS 777.

2) Bucharest mail. An SAC plane courier delivers and collects mail once a week in Bucharest. The courier is met in Bucharest by a representative of the ASH and taken to the mission, where either the duty officer or the sergeant in charge of the signal center signs for the mail. Mail from this Berlin country may also arrive at SAC 6900 through AS H and B or AS 777.

3) Belgrade mail. Mail for Belgrade is taken to Mr. Frank of the State Department in Vienna. Mail from Belgrade arrives at SAC day 6900 through AS H and B or AS 777.

4) Sofia mail. Mail destined for Sofia is given to the pilot of the plane leaving Vienna for Sofia. A pouch receipt is signed by the pilot. No mail has been received from Sofia, etc. Here included.

For collected mail day 6900 alternate as per to the above four cities.

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Official military mail addressed to Moscow is sent to the Adjutant General's Department, Moscow. Any military official mail, registered or unregistered, goes to the Adjutant General in Frankfurt.

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Item 2, Re Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Vienna, 29 June 1947.

Sgt. Euse officiated. "We have things done that".

Then asked whether it is still the practice of the SAC stop (SAC) to send out duplicate press contacts receipts and marked "bureau" (see Item 7, Vol. 1, 21 February 1947, Subject: Bureau Transmission of Press Contacts Receipts). Sgt. Euse replied that it is not, that the duplicate receipt is marked "bureau" and sent to the addressee together with a telegraphed form letter. (See Exhibit VII).

Second Lieutenant Nathan B. Bishop, Chief of the SAC stop (SAC) since 9 April 1947, showed this Agent his file of SAC directives. The following excerpts, culled from this file, are particularly applicable to this case:

Mem. 15 January 1947. "Absolutely no traffic will be passed to the President or any other foreign power until it has been checked and cleared by a confidential officer of the signal center".

Mem. 3 March 1947. "Effective immediately a special law will be arranged in the section for inspecting all military oceanic traffic. This traffic will be prepared daily and in conformity with paragraph 4, letter AS 311.4, 100 March, dated 27 December 1945 for delivery to AS 307.10.

"This traffic will be checked by the SAC before being forwarded".

Mem. 2 March 1947. "Effective immediately all SAC traffic marked 'Air Service required', 'Info Mail', 'Highway Route', 'Army Service Service', or any other term indicating courier service or special handling is required, will be delivered to Mr. Carter (SAC) with AS 307.10.

"Until new arrangements are completed, SAC traffic addressed to Belgium, Luxembourg, will be delivered to Mr. Frank of the U.S. Consulate for final delivery via the State Department courier service".

Mr. Bishop made a significant statement to this Agent: "I want to see all of January to make to send a copy of the AS 311.4 letter (see Exhibit VII), to all the SACs. To let them (the copies) circulate, and checked the approval for a letter of transmittal to accompany the courier letter. To send it to the Signal Station, but we never got the approval, and it was never sent."

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On 29 May 1947 this Agent presented SAC stop (SAC) and asked Sgt. Euse whether any changes in the mailing procedures had taken place since the first visit. Sgt. Euse replied that the SAC courier runs to the Belgian Consulate and from Luxembourg and that all registered mail destined for the Belgian Consulate is delivered to the State Department and that all SAC-registered mail destined for the Belgian Consulate is taken to AS 307.10. The change was made, Sgt. Euse stated, in conformity with a memorandum dated 14 April 1947, written by Mr. Bishop, and a memorandum from Major Bishop, dated 29 May 1947 (see Exhibit VIII).

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Item 2, The Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in VIETNAM, 29 June 1947.

1. American Legation

On 26 May 1947 Miss Mary Jane Porter, Communications Officer at the American Legation, was interviewed regarding mailing procedures followed by the mail room of the American Legation, Vietnam.

Miss Porter declared that mail arrived at and left the American Legation by the following means:

- A) Diplomatic pouch.
- B) APO 777.
- C) International mail.
- D) JMS Ship 6900.
- E) Pan American Airways.

Miss Porter stated that the usual State Department methods of handling incoming and outgoing mail were followed by her, namely, those described in Item 1, paragraph 7 and Item 2, paragraph 2 of this report.

This Agent asked Miss Porter a number of specific questions:

"How do you handle official Army mail, registered or non-registered, which you receive here and which is destined for Hanoi?"

PORTER: "If it is destined for Hanoi we send it by pouch to Hanoi, and they handle it from there on out."

"If that mail is not registered, do you handle it the same way?"

PORTER: "Functionally everything we get from the Army is registered. Anything we have for any place west, except for freight, goes directly to Hanoi by pouch."

"How do you handle official Army mail destined for U.S. military agencies in the South?"

PORTER: "That goes by pouch to Saigon, Bangkok, Singapore, and the other places."

"How would you handle a piece of mail like this?" (Miss Porter was shown a photostatic copy of the envelope sent by APO Hanoi to the U.S. Military Attache, Saigon. (See also Doc. V-4124).)

PORTER: "It would be registered on a pouch invoice here and then it would go to Hanoi by registered mail."

"Why by registered mail? There is nothing on the outside cover to indicate the contents are classified."

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June 2, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Vienna, 19 June 1947.

FOURTH: "We send all the stuff by courier express."

"But the State Department requires the classification to be on the outer cover."

FIFTH: "I haven't required it on the Army stuff because I know it is against Army regulations to put it on the outside. If they send it here registered we register it and send it on out."

"What kind of mail do you take for transmission to the AFM?"

SIXTH: "Just personal stuff and second class mail."

"Do you ever take to the AFM official Army non-registered mail?"

SEVENTH: "That goes to the AFM."

"Why is official Army officer courier mail arriving at this mail room and destined for Washington taken out of State Department channels and given back to the Army for transmission? Why don't you send this mail all the way to Washington by diplomatic pouch?"

EIGHTH: "Well, I have got a letter here some place from Budapest which says this stuff was given to them, and all we have to do is give it to the Army. I complained to Budapest about all this Army stuff that was addressed to Washington, to London, and to Paris, and I said that stuff should not be involved to us (see Exhibit I), and they said (see Exhibit XI) we should turn it over to the Army. Up to that time I used to send it all to Washington."

Miss Porter declared that all she wanted the legations in the Balkan countries to do is invoice mail going to Paris for further transmission to Paris itself and not to Vienna, where the mail would simply have to be re-invoiced and then sent on to Paris. She complained she registers in her letter of 19 December 1946 is directed not at Army postal agencies but at the Legation in Budapest for handling her unnecessary work. The chief fault Miss Porter found with Army agencies utilizing diplomatic courier facilities is that these agencies frequently send to the State Department for further transmission material, such as magazines, which is obviously of no classified nature. (See Exhibit XII).

Speaking of the letters sent by the U.S. Military Representation, AFM for Hungary, to the Director of Intelligence, Washington, D.C. (see Case No. 7-4212), Miss Porter stated, "If the legation in Budapest would have included these pieces of mail in a pouch addressed to Paris or in a pouch addressed to Washington they would never have gotten out of here."

Miss Porter described an incident which occurred on 29 March 1947: "Mail came down from Moscow via Berlin and Paris. My courier came in Saturday morning, and since we don't work Saturday mornings I made no attempt to deliver

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Page 3, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in VIETNAM, 29 June 1967.

to the Army until Monday.

"I was at a dinner on the 24th of March, and the Army called Mr. Frank and said they understood some mail came in from Hanoi, which they were anxious to get ahead of because they had to telephone Hanoi. So Mr. Frank and I came down here and got the two envelopes and delivered them to the post building to the officer of the day. Then last week, I guess, a printed receipt slip came back from Hanoi to the Commanding General, and they sent it to me. They said they had received the slip, and nobody signed for it. The Army on its note to me said they had no record of anybody receiving it.

"I checked up and saw the Major's signature on the receipt for it (see Exhibit XIII), informed the Army, and haven't heard anything from them since."

Miss Parker also described another incident:

"Last week there was an envelope from the State Department to General Clark and marked 'Secret'. They wouldn't accept it because it was marked on the outside. Mr. Hansen ran around two or three days to get somebody to accept it, and then Colonel Horn came over to talk about it. Colonel Horn finally accepted it, but he told me the next day he couldn't accept such things because they were marked secret on the outside.

"The letter was taken first to Mr. Carter, and he said it wasn't secret enough, and then Mr. Hansen took it to somebody else, and they said it was too secret. Major Harris wouldn't make any decision until he talked to Colonel Horn. So Parker got ahead of Major Harris, and finally they went to Colonel Horn, who accepted it very reluctantly."

PAGE 3, AIRMAIL
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Vienna City Section
23 June 1947

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Investigation in interest mail communications with offices of the U.S. Military Attache, Vienna.

RE : Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the RUSSIAN zone.

1. General Situation (RUSSIAN Zone Mail)

On 26 April 1947 this Agent interviewed Staff Sgt. King, who for the past two months has been Chief of the Signal Exchange Service, Step 24th.

King stated that incoming and outgoing registered and non-registered official mail arrives at and leaves the SPS daily by the following means:

A) By train.

- a) Frankfurt run. Frankfurt sends twice daily its mail to Munich in the custody of an agent Frankfurt has assigned, who returns from Munich with mail destined for Frankfurt and points beyond.
- b) Regensburg run. A Munich SPS agent goes daily and picks up mail at Regensburg.
- c) Innsbruck run. A Munich SPS agent goes also daily and picks up mail at Innsbruck.
- d) Vienna run. Vienna SPS sends its own agent goes to deliver and collect mail at Munich.

B) By plane.

- a) Vienna run. Vienna delivers and collects mail at the Munich SPS by air courier.
- b) Frankfurt run. Frankfurt, like Vienna, also delivers and collects mail at the Munich SPS by means of air courier.

C) By motor vehicle.

- a) Bad Reichenh. Mail from the Munich SPS is brought to Bad Reichenh. by motor, and mail is brought back to the SPS on the return trip.
- b) Garmisch. A Munich SPS vehicle delivers and collects mail at Garmisch.

D) Mail delivery and collection.

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Item 2, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the USSR, 25 June 1946.

Mail from Soviet Union is brought to and collected at the Russian SFS by various mailboxes within the Union.

Sgt. King explained that there are two daily train routes from Leningrad to Russia and return. The first, in the morning, passes through Rostov, Stalingrad, and Khabarovsk the second, in the evening, passes through Moscow, Leningrad, and Khabarovsk. The countries between that mail at the Russian SFS office, stay in Russian overnight, and return the next day with mail destined for the President SFS.

The Vienna train connects center on the Soviet in the morning and leave at 5 PM in the afternoon, bringing with them mail for Russia and returning with mail for Vienna. The same kind of arrangement is followed by the plane company, that is, the plane connects from Leningrad and Vienna into both destinations and collections of mail at Russia.

This Agent inspected the mail boxes in the Russian SFS mail room and observed that these boxes were divided into two sections, one for registered mail and the other for non-registered mail. Both sections contained boxes for the various signal message service steps in the theater as well as boxes for local Russian units. There were no boxes for foreign elements.

King declared that the usual method of filling out post office receipts is followed by the Russian SFS for outgoing registered mail. Three post office receipts are made only one receipt is retained by the SFS office, and two receipts are sent to the addressee within the post. One of these two receipts is signed by the addressee and returned to SFS May 1946 as proof that the registered mail reached the addressee. The other receipt is retained in the files of the addressee. King stated that all post office receipts are not signed and returned by the addressee within two or three weeks the Russian SFS sends to the addressee a duplicate of the unreturned and unsigned receipt, said duplicate being stamped "Transit". It is not, stated King, that returned post office receipts be kept on file for many days, after which time they may be destroyed.

Sgt. King stated that no intelligence dispatches went at the Russian SFS.

When asked how mail addressed to the military officials in Russia is handled, Sgt. King, as well as Corporal Robert Taylor (who has worked in the Russian SFS since November 1944) answered that no registered or non-registered mail for Russia has been sent passing through the Russian SFS. "It can't mail would never leave," King stated. "We would put it in a registered post and send it to the President SFS." 99

King stated that SFS May 1946 handled no State Department mail and transferred no official mail to the Russian SFS. He stated, however, that the Russian SFS received a small amount of official mail from the Russian SFS.

This Agent inspected the Russian SFS registration book, which is used only for outgoing mail in form outgoing registered mail. This book contained

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Item 2. See Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the HANSEN case,
dated 23 June 1947.

Witnesses include "Registration Officer", "Chief", "Chief", "Chief", and "Chief".
They explained that the incoming registered mail the post contents revealed
were kept as a record.

Captain F.A. Walker, the C-in-C of AM 540, was also interviewed.
Captain Walker corroborated the statements of Sgt. King and stated that upon
them at AM 540 they were guided by AM No. 70, WFM, by WFM Chapter No.
2, dated 20 March 1947, and by an AM 540 internal safety for the guidance of personnel
working at AM 540. (See Exhibit XIV).

Before the departure of this Agent from AM 540 Captain Walker
showed this Agent an interesting envelope, on which were the following markings:

From Office of Military Gov't Intelligence
Historical & Reports Branch
APO 540

To : Lt. Col. Sub-Region Danish
Harris-Thorsen-Danish.

"Official" was stamped in one corner, and "Official Business" typewritten in
another corner. The envelope also bore the stamped notation, "Despatched 20
April 1947" and a German postal stamp. Captain Walker explained that this
envelope and its contents were delivered to the addressee through the German
postal system. Since no American postal markings were on the envelope, Captain
Walker assumed that the originator had placed it and its contents in the
German postal system for delivery. Captain Walker stated that the AM in
Danish had brought the envelope to him and that an investigation of the matter
was being made.

2. ~~AM 540~~

This Agent on 27 April 1947 proceeded to APO 540, where he inter-
viewed Lt. Colonel F. Hansen, in charge of APO 540 since last September.
Hansen stated that APO 540, a sub-section of the Housing APO 540, handles
only local unclassified APO mail for American personnel residing in Danish and
that all such mail received from or was sent to the main APO. Further investiga-
tion of this postal agency was considered unnecessary by this Agent.

3. ~~Distribution Center for the Danish Military Post Headquarters~~

Lt. Col. Hansen, C-in-C of the Distribution Center at Danish was
interviewed also on 27 April 1947. Lt. Hansen, who had received his duties only
two days previously, stated that his postal agency handles only mail for the
headquarters of the Danish Military Post. All this mail, Lt. Hansen explained,
passes through the Military Post Housing Center, which was set up in the Dan-
ish Housing Building one week previously. Before the establishment of the Military
Post Housing Center, official mail designated for the Headquarters had come
directly from the Danish AM, No. 2. Lt. Hansen, continued, it is obtained from

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MEMO 2, FOR Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the HUNGARY Area,
dated 23 June 1946

The Hungary Center, which is a branch of the Spanish SAC and used as a receiving point for official mail passing from the Spanish SAC to the Spanish Headquarters Building. All the mail which arrives at the postoffice center is delivered only to offices within this Headquarters Building, i.e. State Hall, and only those people in this Headquarters are authorized to sign outgoing official mail. The Adjutant, the Deputy Community Commission, and General Hallway. All official outgoing and incoming registered mail is received in registry books containing columns with the following headings: "registration number", "date", "time received and cleared", "to", "from", "subject", "registration number", "procedure", and "how sent".

1. Spanish Military Post Message Center

Commander David Brown, in charge of the Spanish Military Post Message Center since its establishment one week earlier, was next interviewed.

Brown stated he handles all mail going in and out of the Headquarters Building, and that the Message Center is a part of SAC SAC. Brown's records consist of a folder divided into two parts, one part containing postcard contents receipts for incoming registered mail, and the other part containing receipts for outgoing registered mail.

Brown stated that although he had never handled mail destined for the Embassy or for Moscow, should such mail come to him he would send it to SAC SAC.

2. Spanish Post Office and APO 107, Madrid, HUNGARY

This Agent went by streetcar to Madrid, a city located about six miles outside of Spanish, where he interviewed Sgt. Albert L. Tufel, who has worked at APO 107 since November 1945.

Sgt. Tufel explained that the Spanish Post Office services a number of APOs within a prescribed area and that APO 107 is only one of the APOs under the jurisdiction of the Spanish SAC. Since, however, APO 107 and the Spanish SAC are located in the same building, the two agencies can be considered combined into one.

Sgt. Tufel stated that mail daily arrives and departs from APO 107 by the following means:

A) By train.

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a) From Frankfurt to Spanish and return.

b) From Vienna to Spanish and return.

c) From Budapest to Spanish and return. APO 107 at Budapest has the one open car on the Budapest train, used by mail personnel from APO 107.

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Item 2, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Activities in the USSR area,
dated 23 June 1947.

(1) From Budapest, APO 545, to Munich and return. Airtel
one, protected by a security guard.

(2) By truck.

Various APOs in the area being mail to APO 407 by truck.

Tafel stated no mail reaches the Munich APO 407 by plane.

Outgoing mail, destined for Vienna, leaves on the Night train,
which has a 50th U.S. guard from Munich to Salzburg, where a 52nd APO guard
joins the Munich guard for the remainder of the journey to Vienna and for the
return trip to Salzburg. There is also one guard from the Munich APO who ac-
companied the mail to its destination.

Incoming registered mail is brought into the Munich APO registered
mail room by indigenous personnel, who are under the supervision of military
personnel.

Tafel declared that from the Munich APO registered mail, addressed
to the APO in the Balkans, is sent to the Vienna APO 777, and that mail ad-
dressed to the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, is sent to the 24th Post Box
office in Frankfurt, which in turn sends it to APO 742 at Berlin. This Agent
was shown the publication, "U.S. Army Postal Service Mail Distribution Chart",
which confirmed Tafel's verbal routing. Tafel went on to say that registered
mail addressed to Moscow would be routed in a "Manifest Registry Dispatch
Book", placed with a Manifest Registry list in a pouch secured by a rotary
lock, and despatched to the Frankfurt APO. As a receipt for this mail,
the Munich APO would receive from the Frankfurt APO a card detached from the
Manifest Registry list and would receive also from the latter personnel a
receipt for the registered pouch. Tafel stated that official mail, addressed
to the Balkans or to Russia and not registered previously by an APO, would go
to Frankfurt as ordinary mail.

Tafel stated he could not understand why APO 777 in Vienna registered
official mail from the Balkans simply because this mail had been given all
registration numbers, numbers which, Tafel stated, are merely for the record
of the APO and make no one responsible for the safe delivery of the mail.

This Agent observed that the only books in the registry mail room
were books for Post Box offices and Army Post offices in the European theater.

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WILLIAM F. HENSON
Special Agent, G-2

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Col Snowden

Waco City Station
29 June 1967

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SUBJECT: Investigations in Internal Mail Communications with Office
of the U.S. Military Attache, Bonn.

RE : Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the FRG/FRG area.

1. Frankfurt/Main Air Courier

On 25 April 1967 this Agent contacted the Frankfurt, and courtesy
interviewed Mr. Thomas L. Matlin, a Frankfurt AIR air courier returning to
Frankfurt from Munich with registered mail. Matlin said he had been working
for the Frankfurt AIR stop since last November.

Matlin stated that about sixteen air courier elements on plane
runs to Munich, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, and Frankfurt. When Matlin arrives
at Munich he calls by plane the AGO, which sends a truck out to the airport
to meet him. In that truck is the AGO office in Munich, where
he delivers his pouches and pouch receipts to the Truck Chief, who signs the
pouch receipts and returns them to Matlin. Matlin stays in Munich overnight
and returns the next day with mail going to Frankfurt. At the Rhein-Main Air
port in Frankfurt, Matlin takes his mail to the Air Dispatch Letter Service,
a subunit of the Frankfurt AIR stop, and is met by an AIR truck which takes
him and his pouches to the AIR stop office, located in the U.S. Post Office Building.
On this particular run, Matlin was carrying two registered pouches, one
properly sealed but the other, from AIR stop 7000 at 2nd Main registered as
No. 1424, sealed only with a piece of string. This Agent accompanied Matlin
to the Air Dispatch Letter Service, located in a trailer on the Rhein-Main
Airport.

2. The Air Dispatch Letter Service (AGL)

Mr. Thomas Matlin, in charge of the AGL, has been working for AIR
since October of 1964. Matlin explained that AGL was set up in the
airport for the principal reason of organizing the delivery of mail destined
for points beyond Frankfurt. Formerly, when Matlin was at the Rhein-Main
airport but to be transported to the AIR stop in Frankfurt,
even though it was destined for Berlin or other German stations. Now,
Matlin went on to say, mail destined for stations outside is checked in at
AGL and routed directly, without being transported first to the AIR. The AGL
also routes the pouches and pouches from the AIR to the stations. A Frankfurt
AIR courier accompanied mail leaving the AIR for other points along the
route. Matlin stated this procedure has been in effect since
that time and as it would be necessary for the AIR stop to take out mail

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Item 7, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the FRANKFURT area,
dated 23 June 1947.

post receipts for a registered post packet of items as formerly was
this case. The entire post receipt is to be retained by Bureau for its
records.

3. Postal Routes Between New York

This Agent accompanied Herbert Hoffman to New York City in Frankfurt,
where Captain Royal Greenlee, the Chief of New York City, was
interviewed. Captain Greenlee has been working at New York City since 25
October 1944. He stated that New York City covered the following points:

- A) By plane.
 - a) Berlin (direct).
 - b) Bremen via Rotterdam.
 - c) Vienna via Munich.
 - d) Munich via Stuttgart.
 - e) Hamburg (direct).
- B) By train.
 - a) Berlin (direct).
 - b) Berlin via Warsaw.
 - c) Brunswick.
 - d) Zurich.
 - e) Munich (two runs per day).
 - f) Stuttgart.
- C) By motor.
 - a) Berlin.
 - b) Wiesbaden.
 - c) Luxembourg.
 - d) Local runs.

Greenlee stated that on the above runs several Frankfurt couriers accompanied
the mail to its destination and brought mail back to the FBI.

Greenlee described the methods of handling registered mail as

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Item 7, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Service in the HANFORD case,
dated 25 June 1947.

Granville stated that when he has any letters about registered mail addressed to foreign countries he always sends it to the U.S. Post for relay to the American Embassy because he is sure the postman in Paris knew the most expeditious method of forwarding such mail. However, mail going to Moscow is always taken to P.L.A., where it is picked up by the Soviet diplomatic courier, taken to M.L.A. in Berlin, and finally carried by a State Department courier to Moscow.

This Agent asked Granville why mail destined for Moscow or Moscow is not taken to the Adjutant General, H.Q.M., according to clerical letter 48 J.L.A. 400, D.C.M., subject: "Security Courier Service", dated 27 December 1944. (See Exhibit VIII). Granville answered that since such mail is eventually taken by the Adjutant General's office to P.L.A., it is unnecessary for him to bring it first to the Adjutant General's office for delivery to P.L.A.--in other words that it is better to bring the mail directly to P.L.A. without having it go through an intermediary point.

When Granville was asked what he would do with unregistered mail addressed to the Military Attaché, Moscow, he said he would take all registered and unregistered mail addressed to Moscow to P.L.A.

In answer to a question concerning the means of handling registered traffic addressed to units in the Zone of Interest, Granville submitted to this Agent a copy of "Messenger Service Instruction No. 27", dated 26 December 1944. (See Exhibit IX).

Granville concluded by saying that the 4th Step (400) had nothing directly to do with State Department mail.

Captain Lawrence V. Ash, 1-400 of the 4th Step, who has worked at the 4th Step for approximately one month and who before working in Frankfurt was 1-400 of the 4th Step in Paris, corroborated the statements of Granville and offered a suggestion concerning mail addressed to the Embassy or Moscow. He said, "I would suggest that all such mail, including classified documents, be kept either in diplomatic State Department courier channels or in the 4th Step". He added that since he has never met and confidential traffic was passing through the 4th Step simply as registered mail, without any indication as to classification of contents, all registered mail is handled at the 4th Step as though it were classified mail.

Captain Ash then mentioned that the daily plane run to Moscow had been discontinued on 25 April 1947, and for this reason the following staff memo was promulgated on 29 March 1947 by the Adjutant General, H.Q.M.

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STAFF MEMO No. 25

MAIL SERVICE

29 March 1947

1. Effective 25 April 1947, any Postal Service in the United

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Item 7, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the HAMBURG area,
dated 29 June 1946.

Kingdom will cover.

2. Except as indicated in Item 2, below, mail to United Kingdom and personnel in the United Kingdom will be processed by Army Postal Service for delivery through international mail channels. The first class letter rate to the United Kingdom is five cents for the first ounce and three cents for each additional ounce. Rates for other classes of mail vary and the local APO should be contacted for the information.

3. Classified correspondence (Confidential or Secret) may be sent through Army Postal channels addressed to Naval Fleet Post Office No 104.

When this Agent inquired how classified correspondence going to the United Kingdom could be recognized as meeting such mailing it such correspondence is simply registered at an APO, and that postal regulations would prevent such registered mail from going to the United Kingdom through international mail channels, Captain Ash replied, "I don't know. I would rather send all registered traffic for London to Paris in packets addressed to 'The American Embassy, Military Attache, Attention Mail Room' for transmission by diplomatic pouch to London twice a week. But I don't know the regulations".

4. ~~Mail Room 104 Office and APO 104~~

Apt. Thomas Swellman, who identified ^{himself} as "Chief Clerk" of APO 104, was interviewed on 22 April 1947. Swellman stated he had been working at APO 104 for one year.

When asked what APOs the 24th APO serviced, Swellman replied, "None". Persistent questioning by this Agent elicited no reason why APO 104 should also be known as the 24th APO. (Agent's notes this Agent was later told that the reason for establishing, on paper, a new Post Office at APO 104 was that the complement of men at APO 104 could thereby be increased.)

Swellman advised that APO 104's incoming mail is collected at and outgoing mail delivered to, the 24th Base Post Office, located near the South Station in Frankfurt. Last week, however, APO 104 began to deliver its outgoing air mail by truck directly to the "in transit" mail room of the Rhein-Main Air Base.

Official mail, originating in the Headquarters Building, is brought for registration to the registry desk of APO 104, signed for, and placed up daily at the registry station by mail collection of the various Headquarters offices.

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Swellman stated that all mail addressed to American personnel in the Embassy or to the Military Attache in Berlin, whether such mail is registered or unregistered, is treated as 24th APO.

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MEMO F. Doc Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the FRANKFURT area,
dated 23 June 1947.

Mr. William LeBlanc, in charge of the registry section of APO 777 since 1 January 1947, was also interviewed. Mr. LeBlanc declared that if he received mail addressed to the U.S. Military Attache in Budapest or in London, he would place it in a pouch addressed to APO 58, Paris, and send that pouch to Mr. St. Official registered mail addressed to a U.S. military agency in London, LeBlanc went on to say, is placed in a pouch addressed, "British Civilian, 26th St."

5. Mr. St. Office, APO 58.

On 12 April this Agent went to Mr. St., where he interviewed Mr. Robert Pittman, who has worked at Mr. St. for two months and who is now "Section Chief, International Mail".

Mr. Pittman was asked, "What do you do with official registered mail addressed to the Balkans--say to the U.S. Representative, APO Hungary?"

He replied, "We tried to send it to APO 777 in Austria because since APOs have the address, APO 777, but the mail came back."

"Then what did you do with that mail?"

"We put it in a pouch labeled, 'Budapest, Hungary', and sent it through the postoffice. We bill such mail to the Frankfurt-Main Do, 2 Post Office. It is both registered and unregistered mail."

Mr. Pittman showed this Agent several bundles of registered and unregistered mail addressed to the Balkans. Among these bundles were individual pieces bearing no postage and addressed as follows:

- a) From: 10 Essential Official Mail
Re: US Air Forces in Europe
APO 635
US Army

The Military Attache
American Embassy
Ankara, Turkey

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- b) From: War Dept.
c/o U.S. Military Attache
American Embassy
Belgrade, Yugoslavia
APO 777
c/o Postmaster, Belgrade, S.Y.

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Office of the Military Attache
American Embassy
Ankara, Turkey

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dated 13 June 1947.

c) From War Dept., OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Signal Message Service
Stop 6900
APO 777, U.S. Army

(APO 777 stamp,
dated 14 April 1947).

Allied Control Commission
Budapest, Hungary
APO 777, U.S. Army

(Attention: Message Center officers)

d) War Dept.
WFO, WFO
APO 777, U.S. Army
Official Business

(APO 777 stamp,
dated 14 April 1947)

U.S. Representative
Allied Control Commission
Hungary

e) Signal Message Service
Stop 6900 File Clerk
APO 777, U.S. Army

A.C.C. Bulgaria (U.S.)
APO 777, U.S. Army
Attention: Message Service
Office

Sgt. Pittman went on to explain: "This mail was placed in a pouch of mixed foreign mail and was given to the postoffice in Frankfurt. I don't know how it got back into APC channels, but it must have been put back in Munich by the German Post and sent back to us by the APC in Munich. We are going to inquire at the postoffice this afternoon why it was sent back to us. Mr. Burgrave of the AG Postal Division talked to officials of the postoffice, and the postoffice agreed to include mail amounts of U.S. mail for foreign countries into their own daily shipments of mail to those countries. Just recently all such mail addressed to the address to APO 777, but it came back. We then deposited it to the postoffice. It wasn't registered mail, but we'd include registered mail the same way except that it wouldn't be included in a mixed pouch of foreign mail but would be put in a pouch addressed to a specific foreign country. Official Army registered mail addressed to the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, would be placed in a

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Annex 7, Doc: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the FRANKFURT area,
dated 23 June 1947.

subject "U.S. Postal Registered Mail". If the pieces of mail were very large we'd put it in a mail sack addressed, "Russia". The sack would be given to the Postmaster here in Frankfurt. Registered mail going to a U.S. organization in London is dispatched to Berlin, a British APO in Frankfurt. The British come here daily to exchange mail with us."

Second Lt. William Koch, operations officer for five weeks at APO 26 had been returning to Sgt. Pittman. At this point, Lt. Koch interrupted, "We have here the final point for all international mail. We were sending mail addressed to U.S. activities in London to the Fleet Post Office, Navy 100, in London. However, Navy 940 at the Rhein Main Airfield sent some mail back to us last week, so now we give it to the British. Before APO 26 was deactivated we sent it to Berlin."

Captain Har. Seliger, assistant to the C-in-C of APO 26 stated: "On 1 March 1947 the AFM started using this installation as a clearing house for international mail. We can send registered mail to foreign countries through international postal channels according to the postal laws, but we are not responsible for it other than normal billing of it."

This agent then exhibited a photostatic copy of the registered pieces of mail from L.D.O. Russia to the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, which fell into Soviet mail channels. (See Doc No. V-2194, dated 24 January 1947.) Upon seeing this photostatic copy, Lt. Koch explained, "There is actually a State Department courier at each APO. That mail should be given to the State Department in the country for transmission via State Department couriers." Sgt. Pittman stated, "To receive mail like this. When such mail comes here it is put in international mail channels."

Lt. Koch went on to say, "Since this letter has only a geographic address and not an APO address it is international mail. There is no regulation which says we can't put this mail into international mail channels. We have only APOs at this installation and handle mail in bulk. When mail addressed to APO 26 comes to us we just sort it out."

Captain Robert Silverstein, C-in-C of APO 26 since December of 1946, arrived and after returning to the discussion for a time interrupted: "We have been handling international mail since the eighteenth of March. Before that time it all went to the AFM APO in Berlin. But in view of the fact that we have no such international mail at this headquarters, the Postal Division designated this unit as an exchange point for international mail service, and we are at the present time in the process of setting it up. According to instructions any mail going to a foreign country which doesn't bear an APO address goes through international mail channels. Any mail has no authority to register at an APO mail addressed to the AFM and to Berlin. Incoming according to the U.S. Army Postal Service Mail Distribution Manual these pieces have to go. And, furthermore, the postal office says that mail going to these places cannot be registered."

Captain Silverstein then mentioned that he had received a few weeks ago verbal instructions from Major Hoffman of the AF Postal Branch to deliver mail destined for the British Consulate or for Russia to the State

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June 2, 1944 Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the HAMBURG area,
dated 23 June 1944.

Department (Political Advisor) in Frankfurt or to Berlin. When asked why these instructions had not been carried out he replied, "It's my fault the AG. (1-2-44) hasn't been informed, but we are preparing an AG memo." (Agent's notes show this Agent the next day visited the office of the Political Advisor in Frankfurt and Silverstein had informed of the State Department that any matter he would handle would be handled for Berlin and the Berlin Committee.)

Before this Agent left HFO 26 he received from Captain Silverstein a photostatic copy of HFO 26's "Mail Operation Chart", a diagram showing the means by which all mail arrives at HFO 26 and the means by which it is dispatched. (See Exhibit III). A few slight changes have not been incorporated on this chart.

6. Office of the Adjutant General, Postal Branch.

This Agent, in the company of Captain Silverstein, went to the office of the Adjutant General, Postal Branch, and interviewed Major Marion L. Bodine, who has been a theatre postal officer since June or July of 1944.

Major Bodine submitted the following opinions: "If official Army registered mail going to a foreign country doesn't have postage it should be returned to the originator. However, there is nothing which forbids the dropping of such mail into international mail channels. In spite of the originator's address and the addresses there is no way of knowing what is inside the envelope. In fact, the people who handle such mail would have the logical assumption that it is not classified since nature of classified material are not supposed to use AFO channels."

"Suppose you had secret material to send to Berlin. In order to comply with this paragraph (para 26 of AG 30-4) you would consult with the authorities to learn whether it would pass through a foreign postal system before you would put it in AFO channels. The decision of the matter of transmission rests with the originator because he is the only one who actually knows the contents."

"A letter addressed to AGS Stuttgart, AFO 777, will not go to the Reichspost. An AFO has no authority to put it in international mail channels because it is addressed to the proper address. Postal personnel must deliver mail as addressed. Mail addressed to the Berlin but not bearing an AFO address will come to the American Legation here or to the American Embassy in Berlin. Mail without postage and without an AFO address should not pass through AFO channels; it should be returned for postage. If it has an AFO address but no postage then it can be dropped into AFO channels and transmitted to our exchange point here." When asked whether a written memorandum, to the effect that mail addressed to the Berlin but not bearing an AFO address should be sent to the American Legation in Frankfurt or to the American Embassy in Berlin, had ever been issued to the S-4-4 of HFO 26, Major Bodine replied, "No."

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June 7, 1947 Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the FRANKFURT area,
dated 23 June 1947.

This Agent then asked, "What should APC TTT do with mail addressed to the military attaché in the Embassy?"

Major Berlin replied, "It should deliver it to the authorized mail clerk of the agency to whom the mail is addressed. Each of the APCs should have an authorized mail clerk to pick up mail. In the (U.S. Army Postal Service Mail) distribution scheme you will see that the APCs in Budapest, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia are served by APC TTT. You wouldn't find this in the distribution scheme if those APCs hadn't stated that APC TTT was their nearest APC and that they'd like to be served by APC TTT. As far as we are concerned, the APCs are physically located in Vienna. To expedite the APCs were sending a weekly courier into Vienna. This courier can be signed the APC designated."

This Agent in conclusion asked the question, "What should APC TTT do with mail addressed to the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow?"

Major Berlin replied, "The only outlet for such mail is the international mail. It must be mailed as international mail because there are no APC channels in Moscow."

On 9 May this Agent returned to Frankfurt and again discussed international mail with personnel in the office of the Adjutant General, Postal Branch. This Agent asked Captain Cuckley, G-124 of the Postal Services Section, the following questions:

"Do you consider the British Postal system safe for the transmission of confidential or secret correspondence destined for Army units in the United Kingdom?"

Captain Cuckley replied, "It is not allowed by JPOG. It goes to JPOG for according to our instructions."

This Agent then read a statement made by Lt. Rank of the 24th IWO to the effect that mail addressed to U.S. activities in London is transmitted via British APC channels. (See Memorandum 2, paragraph 1).

In a discussion of official Army mail addressed to U.S. military attachés and American Embassies in foreign countries, Captain Cuckley stated, "They (the personnel at the 24th IWO) have verbal instructions which are now being confirmed by G-4. We make an arrangement with the office of the political adviser to take all official mail addressed to military attachés and embassies in foreign countries for transmission by courier service. We called the 24th IWO on 20 April and had them put it into effect. (See Exhibit XVII). Lt. Cuckley also being in. In order to confirm these instructions I sent a letter to JPOG and G-4."

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This Agent then asked the following question: "Postal Memorandum No. 4, dated 24 March 1947, states that all outgoing mail originating in APCs in the European Command for the countries listed below will be forwarded to the 24th IWO for delivery to the postoffice. APC TTT is one of the countries listed below. It seems to me that this memo therefore directs the APC in

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Page 2, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the HUNGARY case,
dated 23 June 1974.

Wanted to relay mail destined for Eastern countries to Westport. Is that correct?

Captain Gaskley: "That is correct for countries outside of Austria. If the mail is addressed to the U.S. Representative APO Fugentstein, APO 777, that should not come here but should be turned over to the courier of the mission. If it has a geographical address it should be sent to the 24th BCo. Mail addressed to an APO is not international mail."

Captain Gaskley stated his office would write a letter, addressed to the 24th BCo and APO 777, instructing the personnel of those two postal agencies when working international mail to withdraw mail addressed to military attaches in foreign countries and deliver it to POLAB, labeled 'POLAB', 'Buses', APO 777 and would be given instructions that any such mail reaching APO 777 should be turned over directly to POLAB and not to BCo 24. (On 4 June this Agent received a copy of this letter by mail - See Exhibit VIII).

Captain Gaskley was at a loss to explain why official Army mail, originating in Vienna and addressed to "Allied Central Commission, Budapest, Hungary, APO 777, U.S. Army" and stamped with APO 777's stamp was arriving at the 24th BCo. "If APO 777 can't deliver such mail," Captain Gaskley declared, "they should notify us immediately."

Concerning mail destined for Moscow, Mr. Hargrove, who had been present during the conversation with Captain Gaskley, made the following statement: "With certain countries we have free exchange of mail--without postage--such as with Great Britain and the Netherlands. Mail not bearing postage, addressed to other countries, should be returned to the sender. The only mail that can go through to Russia properly under the present clause is mail relating to the postal service."

When this Agent again referred to the 24th BCo's practice of delivering an official Army piece of mail destined for the "Allied Central Commission Budapest, Hungary, APO 777, U.S. Army" to the Netherlands, Captain Gaskley explained, "We only told them letters addressed to military attaches in foreign countries were to go to POLAB, so he (Sgt. Fittman) was delivering it right."

Mr. Hargrove took exception: "No, he wasn't, if it didn't have postage. It perhaps didn't occur to Fittman that it shouldn't be dispatched without postage."

7. Allied Central Mail and Messenger (ACM and M)

On 23 April this Agent interviewed Staff Sgt. Rodney Swartz, Central L-44, of the ACM and M for the past two months.

Sgt. Swartz described the operations of ACM and M as follows:

A) Issues by which incoming mail operates

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Item 1, No. Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the HAMBURG area,
dated 23 June 1947.

- a) Registered pouches from AM 6000 are signed for and collected by an AS H and H messenger.
 - b) Messengers pick up official mail from the various staff sections.
 - c) Messengers collect registered and unregistered mail at AM 750.
 - d) Messengers from local units deliver mail to AS H and H.
- 2) Means by which outgoing mail departs:
- a) Mail is brought in pouches to AM 6000.
 - b) Mail is delivered for transmission to AM 750.
 - c) Mail is delivered to couriers of the various staff sections.

Sgt. Jurisch was asked, "How would you handle official registered mail going to the Balkans, say to ASJ Hungary?" He replied, "I would send it to the Political Advisor, who would send it out in a political pouch. A representative of the Political Advisor would sign an AS H and H registry form, which would be our receipt. Duplicate copies of this form are made out; one is signed by the messenger, and the other by the Political Advisor. Both copies are kept on file in the AS H and H Office."

When asked how he would handle official Army mail addressed to the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, Sgt. Jurisch replied, "The same way."

Mail at the AS H and H office is stamped with an incoming or outgoing date-time stamp and then placed in either one of three sections of boxes in a section for incoming registered, in a section for incoming unregistered, or in a section for outgoing mail--one which it ultimately is dispatched.

C. Office of the U.S. Military Advisor

Miss Lucy Lewis, mail clerk at US FOLAB, Frankfurt, was interviewed on 23 April. Miss Lewis, who, throughout the interview was most uncooperative, evasive, and generally unpleasant, eventually consented to tell this Agent that mail is delivered to and collected at FOLAB, Frankfurt, by any one of twenty-one State Department couriers, whose headquarters is at the American Embassy, Paris. These couriers arrive in Frankfurt on a regular schedule but appear sometimes once a week, sometimes four times a week.

Miss Lewis declared that occasionally AS H and H, Frankfurt, brought mail to her for delivery by diplomatic courier. Perhaps, she added, the AM also brought mail to FOLAB; she wasn't sure from what offices the Army mail sometimes came.

When mail from a U.S. military agency is brought to FOLAB for transmission, Miss Lewis continued, it is signed for and stamped, inspection number entered on a State Department mail invoice. It is then packed. If the mail is addressed to a military unit in the Balkans it is placed within a sealed, registered pouch addressed to the American Embassy, (Paris). If it is addressed to a unit in Europe it is placed in a registered pouch addressed to the American Embassy, Moscow. However, mail addressed to Moscow is placed within a pouch labeled, "Office

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Item F, See Investigation of U.S. Postal Activities in the Frankfurt Area,
dated 23 June 1946.

of the Director of Political Affairs, OSMA, Berlin, and taken by courier
to Berlin.

FRANK P. DENHART
Special Agent, CIB

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W. H. Snowden

Worm City Station
15 June 1947

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Investigation in Worm City Communications with offices
of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow.

RE : Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the USSR area.

1. ALL INFO.

On 26 April 1947 this Agent visited APO 742, located at Worm,
Russia, and interviewed Lt. R. Jensen, C-in-C of APO 742 for the past two
months.

Lt. Jensen stated that APO 742 is a branch of APO 741, that
APO 742 has no communication section, and that all incoming and outgoing
APO mail for Russia is cleared through APO 741. Because of Lt. Jensen's
declaration, this Agent saw no reason for further inquiry.

2. ALL INFO.

In company with Lt. Jensen, this Agent drove to APO 741, where
he interviewed Captain Ben F. Goodrich, C-in-C of APO 741 since 20 January
1947, and Sgt. Joseph Anderson, Chief Inspector and an employee of APO 741
since December 1946.

Sgt. Anderson advised that mail received at APO 741 by the fol-
lowing means:

A) By train.

a) From Stockholm at 4:30 a.m. daily.

b) From Copenhagen at 4:30 p.m. daily.

Both trains are furnished with at least two mail guards
from the 24th A.P. Battalion. Arrangements are made
from APO 741 one week by train to meet these trains and
collect the mail.

B) By plane.

Once a day mail is collected at the Copenhagen Air Park,
mail consisting of the Air Mail is placed in a plane per-
mitted to land. There is no bag mail with collection
from APO 741 coming out ships for this mail.

C) By German boat.

Mail sent by German to Amsterdam is collected daily at the
Worm, Russia branch mail station.

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Item 6, For Investigation of U.S. Postal Activities in the RUSSIAN area.
Dated 23 June 1947.

- 1) By British postal personnel. British mail collection delivery made to APO 74th Camp.
- 2) By French postal personnel. Mail is daily exchanged with the French at the U.S.A. at Wiesbaden.
- 3) By APO 74th mail collection. All outgoing mail handled by APO 74th is delivered to APO 74th for transmission.

Sgt. Schneider stated that the means by which mail arrives at APO 74th are the same as the means by which mail departs from APO 74th, that is to say, whatever a collection of mail is made delivery is also collected.

When asked what he did with mail for the Russian element, Sgt. Schneider explained that APO 74th handles no mail for the Russians. "If we get any it would be official mail, and we'd give it to APO for transmission," Sgt. Schneider declared.

This Agent then asked, "What do you do with official Army mail addressed to a United States organization in a foreign country, such as Hungary?"

Sgt. Schneider replied, "We send it to the 24th ITC in Frankfurt."

Upon being asked whether an official place of mail destined for the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, would also go to ITC 24, Sgt. Schneider answered, "Yes. Any mail going to a foreign country, with the exception of England, goes to Frankfurt."

Captain Goodrich, at this point, showed this Agent a Postal Memorandum No. 4, dated 24 March 1947, from European Command, Office of the Adjutant General (see exhibit IV) and declared that APO 74th is governed by this memorandum in the transmission of mail destined for foreign countries.

3. General William Webster (USA) Chief ITC.

General William Webster, Chief of the ITC staff at APO 74th for the past five months, was interviewed on 26 April 1947.

General Webster described the following means by which APO 74th mail is delivered and collected:

- A) Daily meter runs to local units, such as APO 2 and 3, Luxembourg, Torgeloch, etc.
- B) Trucks. The "Wardens" from Frankfurt collect twice daily.

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MEMO 6, BY Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the RUHR area,
dated 23 June 1946.

There is in the baggage car on the stop 1200 station.

1) **Stamps.** Taken daily the air courier on the plane from Zurich
back to and at Frankfurt.

2) **POSTAL, Berlin,** made an orderly case a day to the stop 1200
to collect and deliver mail.

A record of every piece of incoming or outgoing mail is kept. The
registering log contains columns headed by: "Tag, No.", "Transmission", "From",
"To", "T-Box", "T-Box", "T-Box", "T-Box", "T-Box".

A file of signal route delivery lists is also kept for mail dis-
tributed to local message centers. The usual post receipts and post con-
tains receipts are made out and eventually filed for a period of ninety days.

The mail boxes at the stop 1200 are divided into two main sections:
registered and unregistered. Mail for the Russian element in Berlin is
placed in a box labeled, "Russians"; mail for the French element is
placed in a box labeled, "French", etc. Mail addressed to a foreign unit not
in Berlin but in one of the occupied zones is placed in a box labeled, "Out"
(Allied Control Authority).

Captain Webster explained that mail addressed to the Russian element
in Berlin is taken to the Message Center in the Administration, where it is
delivered to the American mail clerk. When asked whether mail addressed to
the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, was delivered to the Message Center of the
Administration, Sgt. Webster replied, "No. All mail addressed to American units
in foreign countries, outside the American zone of occupation, with the excep-
tion of France and England, is handled by diplomatic courier. Mail addressed
to France or England goes to the stop 600 in Frankfurt, from which it goes to
the stop 600 in Berlin."

This Agent then commented that perhaps even now mail clerk, collecting
with current procedure, might place mail destined for the U.S. Military At-
taché, Moscow, in the box labeled, "Russians" and that such mail would
then be delivered to the Russian element. Captain Webster answered that all
the clerks on duty were familiar with current procedure because they were given
a weekly two-hour class on the question.

Captain Webster stated, "One of the stop 1200 for the past two months
admitted there is a possibility that mail addressed to the Military Attaché,
Moscow, or to the AGO in the Berlin corridor, is sometimes sent to the Ad-
ministration or Allied Control Authority message centers. Of course, anything
is a possibility. This has never come to my attention or haven't had any
trouble in this matter. It is understood that anything going out of here
would be handled by RLAH." Captain Webster continued.

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**Item 3, The Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the HPLM area,
dated 25 June 1944.**

1. All-American Postal Service

On 25 April 1944, E. V. Henderson, Chief of the All-American Postal Service, discussed the operations of his Service Center.

Means by which All-American Postal Service mail is collected and delivered:

A) By train:

a) "Morning" from Frankfurt.

b) Evening train.

Carriers are sent to the Postoffice station to collect and deliver mail transported on these two trains.

B) By plane:

A daily run is made to the Tempelhof Air Port, where incoming and outgoing mail is exchanged at the Freight Office. Manifest lists, containing registered items, are signed for by the recipients of the mail.

C) By ship:

Incoming mail for local distribution is delivered by ship to the All-American Postal Service, outgoing mail destined for the ship outside Berlin is brought to the ship.

D) Registered Mail Room:

Mail destined for American consulates or military stations is brought for further transmission to the Registered Mail Room, which, in turn, brings to All-American Postal Service mail for various other stations.

Mr. Henderson stated that mail destined for U.S. agencies in Berlin is taken to the Registered Mail Room and that mail destined for U.S. agencies in the British zone is brought to the ship. Mail for foreign consulates is taken to the All-American Postal Service. While it is understood that mail addressed to the U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, might conceivably be sent to the ship for delivery to the Russians, Mr. Henderson stated, the mail clerk at the ship would likely return such mail.

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The usual kind of records are kept at All-American Postal Service. Mr. Henderson stated, notwithstanding records required by a Division are kept over in the records of the ship. In that group are placed an outgoing list, and each piece of incoming mail is also stamped. Each contains receipt as well as an index for outgoing mail.

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Item 9, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the BUREAU area,
dated 13 June 1966.

Items of AD 100 are divided into two sections, one for registered mail and one for unregistered mail, and these two sections are subdivided into sections for ADI, ADL, ADML, etc.

3. ~~ADL Section, American Embassy, Moscow~~

At the ADL Storage Center this Agent observed four counter windows, behind each of which a desk was situated. The counter windows and desks were for the use of the four mail clerks of the four years, one desk and counter window for each clerk.

Sgt. E. E. Paul, 100-40-0 of the American Element's section of the ADL Storage Center since 26 December 1964, stated that in addition to mail received from offices within the ADL Building incoming mail arrives at his window, twice daily, from MSB Stop 7500 and AD Storage Control Branch, OCEC. When the mail clerks from the MSB and AD 100 bring mail to the ADL Storage Center they leave with any outgoing mail that may be on hand. The same system is followed for one other organization, OCEC (Central Registry of War Crimes and Security Suspects).

Incoming mail is signed for, and mail leaving the ADL Storage Center is also receipted for if it is registered mail.

Sgt. Paul stated that if he received mail addressed to the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, or to a U.S. military attaché in a Balkan country he would send such mail to the MSB for transmission via diplomatic courier. However, Sgt. Paul stated, he could not recall ever having handled mail so addressed.

When asked whether he had a written SOP, memorandum, or directives to guide him in his work at the ADL Storage Center, Sgt. Paul replied that he had no written instructions of any kind. He stated that a SSG, when he relieved, had before departing explained to him the things at the Storage Center should be done.

4. ~~Immigration Bureau, Moscow~~

Miss Mary Brown, Chief Mail Clerk at the Immigration Bureau Center since April of 1964, stated that her Storage Center exchanged mail with MSB Stop 7500, OCEC (Office of Military Government, Berlin Sector) and the office of the Secretary General, ADL. Letters from the Immigration Bureau Storage Center address the mail daily to offices within the building. The frequency of their receipt depending on the amount of incoming mail. Registered mail for the Soviet Union is not handled. Miss Brown stated, but registered mail for the Russian, French, or British Element is received in a bag twice.

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Page 2, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the HUNGARY area.
Dated 23 June 1946.

When Ryan was asked how the mail handling unit connected to the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, or to the U.S. Representative, Mr. Murphy, the reply was, "I'm not certain. The assistant point of contact stated that, 'I've never had any mail of that kind. No person will have foreign connections but not wish to go to a foreign country.'"

When this Agent pointed to a box labeled, "Hungary" and asked, "couldn't you place a piece of mail addressed to the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, in that box?" Ryan responded, "No, not."

7. ~~Political Mail~~

On 25 April 1947 this Agent interviewed Mr. Roger G. Abraham, Communications Officer, US FOLAP, since November 1946.

Mr. Abraham explained that incoming mail arrived at the Political Desk from the following sources:

- A) Diplomatic couriers.
- B) AIR Stop 7300.
- C) Air Message Central Branch.
- D) Army officer messengers.
- E) Security couriers.
- F) APO 700.
- G) International mail.

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Outgoing mail, on the other hand, is transmitted by the following means:

- A) Diplomatic couriers.
- B) AIR Stop 7300 (mail destined for addressees within Germany).
- C) APO 700 (non-classified mail for Washington).
- D) American Overseas Airlines (air mail classified confidential or better and destined for Washington).

Of all the persons thus far interviewed by this Agent, Mr. Abraham was able to give the most elucidating account of the defects in the methods used by Army agencies for transmission of their mail to the Military Attaché, Moscow. A transcript of this Agent's questions and Mr. Abraham's statements follows. Mr. Abraham, having been apprised of what this Agent was seeking, first spoke freely of the general situation:

ABRAHAM: "Fundamentally you are up against a conflict between the routines of three governmental departments--State Department, War, and Navy. Any regulation that purports that War Department agencies are mailing something that is classified will place it in a double cover, the outer bearing no classification. That is a procedure also followed by the Navy Department. This regulation was drafted largely from the point of view of your department's work in Washington and not with the point of view of foreign transmission. When it came to transmitting to Moscow classified

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June 6, 1966 Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the ECHELON area
dated 23 June 1966.

intended placed in double envelopes, the outer bearing no classification, such intended either through the inspection on the part of State Department clerks or on the part of other department clerks in the War and Navy, found its way into international mail channels. The clerks simply dropped it into a post office box or gave it to somebody else who did.

"In some instances we receive mail for military attaches which is addressed only to an APO and which does not bear a classification on the outer envelope. If we don't know where the APO is we simply place it in the APO box. If this APO were here in some foreign country it is possible the clerks might place it in the international mail. The problem is especially grave when one considers agencies like the U.S. military attaches in foreign countries where they rely only on two mail channels--international and diplomatic pouch. If there is a joint Army-Navy office and mail is put in double envelopes, the outer bearing no classification, and then sent to the military mail room to be sent out, the military mail clerk may say it is in the international mail because in his regulations everything that is classified must bear an external classification. Everything that does not bear external classification is treated as unclassified.

"We have already written to the State Department about it. (See Exhibit XIB). It's nothing new, it's been going on all through the War. It happens all the time. I get correspondence about it every couple of years about something going wrong that way. The reason they're not getting it is that everything is being done on the level of the mail room. They need somebody with rank in the War Department to straighten everything out. A joint Army, Navy, and State committee should get together and decide on a standard overall procedure for all the courier services, including the security couriers, State Department couriers, and the Navy couriers. Certainly, the procedure could be standardized.

"Just the other day we had an instance in which a top secret letter originating in ECHELON headquarters in Frankfurt was placed in a double cover and put in a diplomatic pouch at Frankfurt addressed to Berlin. It went to Berlin by courier, and in Berlin it was placed in an unclassified diplomatic pouch, which went to Bonn by air stage and not by courier. There was no actual compromise but a possibility of one."

"Do you mean to say that if diplomatic mail never receives official Army mail, registered or unregistered, addressed to a U.S. agency in a foreign country, and bearing no classification on the outer envelope, do you mean to say that that mail goes to its destination from the diplomatic mail room via international mail?"

ANSWER: "Not necessarily, but it might. It might be due to an error in routing. It would be lumped with all unclassified mail, including personal mail, and treated in whatever way the office is treating unclassified mail. Here in Germany it is particularly important that it not end up in international mail channels."

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MEMO 9, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the USSR area.
Dated 12 June 1947.

"We have this office, here in Berlin, handle unaccompanied mail."

ANSWER: "It doesn't get in in the international mail, but sometimes in the APO. Suppose we received something addressed to an APO address. We don't have our offices of all APO addresses, so we send such mail to the nearest foreign service office, which would place it in the nearest APO if it is unclassified. Since any mail doesn't have classification on the outer envelope it would be placed in the APO."

"We have agreements with the message centers here in GERMANY, with the office of the Naval Advisor, and in general with all the people we do routine business with, that they place the classification on the outer envelope in violation of any regulations or at least a marking on the outer envelope, such as 'Via Officer Courier' or 'For Mail Transmission Only' or some statement that will serve to separate it from the great bulk of mail."

"Any mail going to Moscow should come through this office because we are the only agency for transmitting mail to Moscow. That mail could be in put mail, even classified mail, into the APO and address it to 'The Diplomatic pouch and Mail Section, U.S. Political Advisor's office, APO 742', and mark it 'For Transmission to Moscow, Warsaw, etc.' It would then be sent there in the diplomatic pouch. Without classification on the outer envelope, however, it would go by pouch but not by courier. Classified material originating in the Division should be taken to the American Legation and placed in the diplomatic pouch for transmission by courier to the military attaché. That mail should be marked in some way so that the Legation in Vienna and all subsequent State Department transfer points will recognize it as courier mail. I am sure the Legation in Vienna will exact some classification from them before accepting the mail."

"How do you send 'unaccompanied pouches' to Moscow?"

ANSWER: "They go with a courier, but they are treated by him as baggage. Everything from confidential up is carried in the courier's bag. It is forbidden to let the bag out of his hands. On the train he sleeps in a separate compartment and takes the bag to bed with him."

"Has any action been taken on your letter of 1 February 1947" (See Exhibit IX.)

ANSWER: "As far as I know our people have taken it up with the Army and Navy, but whether they have reached any solution I don't know."

"It's not quite sure about my point. The point is to indicate that if-should any mail bearing no classification on the outer envelope in, according to State Department regulations, placed in Division as international mail, but you also want to indicate that such mail must be placed in international mail channels by State Department mail clerks. These mail clerks are making a mistake."

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Item 6, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in the USSR area.
dated 23 Jan 1947.

ABRAMS: "The mail clerk might say it is the international mail
because it is eligible to be treated as international mail."

"Whether such mail is international mail or is not, if it is
international mail, the clerks are not making a mistake when they place it
in international mail channels."

ABRAMS: "That depends on the local situation in the particular
country. It is different in each place because you can't put out a general
binding regulation for all places. For instance, in Canada the bulk of of-
ficial mail is handled in the ordinary post, even official mail to Washington.
In Canada we know that international mail channels are secure. But, of
course, even there they don't put anything top secret in the international
mail. In a country like France the French post can be used for certain
classifications. The same is true of England. That is why we want to know
the classification of the mail. The only way to guarantee that the envelope
is handled in a proper manner in all the countries is simply to mark on the
envelope the classification and never allow it to be handled to anyone
not cleared to receive mail of that classification."

Having been shown a photostatic copy of an envelope sent by AGO
Moscow to the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow, a piece of mail which fell
into the international mail (See Case No. 7-134, dated 24 January 1947).
Mr. Abrams commented:

"Transmission of this letter would depend upon how it were treated
in to the State Department. I personally would treat it as having to be
handled by courier, but that may be because I am personally steamed up by
this whole business. But at another office it is quite possible that some-
thing registered like this might be treated as courier baggage. But courier
baggage is a hell of a lot better than the international mail. It would be
insured from one place to another and kept track of. And it is known to
concerning. That AGO Moscow should do what it sends a letter like this
is told the Embassy that it contains classified material or mark it 'By
Official Courier' or 'State Department Courier'."

"Now, I don't like to ask you to stick your neck out, but will you
tell me who you think is responsible for the breach of security that has been
occurring in regard to mail originating in the Embassy and destined for the
U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow?"

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ABRAMS: "I would say the War Department is responsible because
any regulation you-g is not sufficiently adaptable to the changing mail
situation in foreign countries, and, furthermore, those AGOs in the Embassy
are under the War Department, not AGO or WFO. The man at the War is al-
ways responsible. He has the authority to make changes, and if he doesn't
do so he is responsible."

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MARK A. KENNEDY
Special Agent, G-2

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Tryin JHC

Wagon City Station
12 June 1947

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SUBJECT: Interactivities in Internal Mail Communications with Office of the U.S. Military Attaché, Moscow.

RE : Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in USSR.

1. ~~ALL~~

Before leaving Frankfurt this Agent was contacted in his room at midnight of 28 April 1947 by the arrival of a civilian billeted in the same room. This civilian identified himself as Mr. Vernon Courts, and upon questioning stated that he was seeking a position in Frankfurt because of the demobilization of APO 887 in Paris, where he had formerly worked. This Agent then took out his notebook and began interrogating Mr. Courts.

Mr. Courts declared that on 31 March 1947, APO 887 was demobilized and that all the records of that APO were now in New York. The unit which is now taking the place of APO 887 is known as the 17th APO, APO 31, or APO which principally serves the American Census Registration in Paris.

Questioning revealed that Courts worked at APO 887 from November of 1945 until 31 March 1947 as a distributor of Paris unit mail. Courts stated that although he worked in the registry section, a Mr. Coffey and a Mr. Elm handled incoming and outgoing registered mail.

Last January, Courts advised, there was at APO 887 a dispute as to who was in charge of the registry section. One day a Lt. Schultz walked into the registry room and said he was in charge of the registry section in one sense, and he wasn't in another sense. Lt. Schultz stated that it looked as if both he and a Lt. Trust were in charge and that anything dealing with finance should be referred to Lt. Trust while anything dealing with claims should be referred to him, Lt. Schultz.

Courts recalled that either a Captain Harford or a Captain May was in charge of APO 887 at that time. Lt. Schultz advised about the 1st of March and he was the officer in charge of APO 31.

Courts stated that every day a mail carrier from the American Embassy, Paris, and an officer from the U.S. Military Attaché, Paris, came to APO 887 to pick up mail. Packages sent to APO 887 from the United States for the State Department. From other countries, Courts thought diplomatic mail came only by courier.

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**Form H, For Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in USSR,
Dated 24 June 1947.**

Since Gault gave this Agent the impression that he knew little about the present organization and procedures followed at APO 58 or even the past methods of handling mail at APO 58, this Agent discontinued seeking the information from Gault.

On 5 May this Agent interviewed Lt. G. H. Moffett, C-in-C of APO 58 since 1 April 1947, and Lieutenants John Trustt and Robert Brown, postal officers in the Paris area since September 1946.

Lt. Moffett stated that mail arrives and is dispatched from APO 58 by the following means:

- A) Daily train from Frankfurt. This train arrives from the 26th APO, Frankfurt, around 7:30 a.m. with mail guarded by two Frankfurt guards. These two guards are relieved, upon their arrival in Paris, by an APO 58 guard, who remains with the mail until a truck from APO 58 arrives at the station and loads the incoming mail. At approximately 5:30 p.m. outgoing mail is brought from APO 58 to the Frankfurt train for onward transmission.
- B) APO 741, an Air Corps APO under the control of APO. If there is a large amount of mail at APO 741 for APO 58, the mail is picked up by an APO 58 truck; otherwise, APO 741 delivers the mail to APO 58 when it makes a run to APO 58 for collection of its own mail.
- C) French Civilian Post. Mail is exchanged with the French Post each afternoon.
- D) Mail is exchanged daily with the 8th British Post Office.
- E) Local agencies send messengers daily to APO 58 to deliver and collect mail.

APO 58 services the following local agencies:

- a) 77th INTC Detachment.
- b) Office of Foreign Liquidation Commission.
- c) American Graves Registration Command.
- d) AAF Detachment at Gely Field. (At present this detachment is serviced largely by APO 741, but when APO 741 is deactivated APO 58 will service the detachment.)
- e) American Embassy, Paris.

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Lt. Trustt explained that official pouch mail prepared by the State Department in the United States is handled through APO channels and arrives direct at APO 58. Notification of the arrival of this mail is given by telephone to the State Department, which sends to APO 58 a man to collect the pouches.

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Page 2, See Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in 1955.
 dated 24 June 1956.

The State Department, however, has decided not to say, at all, whether it would release from the prison Ibrahim, 36, (see page 24) to bring him to the U.S. for questioning.

This Agent brought the subject of official Army mail handling for military attaches in foreign countries. Lt. Frazier stated that any mail going to military attaches anywhere is turned over to the U.S. Military Attache in the American Embassy, Paris. When asked why this was done, Lt. Frazier answered that around the 20th of April he had received a telephone call from a Captain Stiles or a Captain Shaw of the 4th Postal Division in Frankfurt and was told that absolutely no mail for American attaches should be placed in international mail channels. Lt. Frazier also stated that AFO had received no written confirmation of this verbal order.

12. Tracks, at this point, affirmed that mail addressed to American citizens is not considered as AMB or as international mail.

The following conversation then took place:

"Did I understand you to say that all official Army registered or unregistered mail addressed to military attaché is not considered by you as international mail?"

INQUIRY: May mail for the Embassy or for military attention which we receive be delivered to the Military Attache or the Embassy.

What doesn't answer the question. Do you consider such will international will or not?

INQUIRY: "No, we didn't, and not now either because recently we received verbal orders that such mail was not to go into international mail channels."

This Agent then exhibited to Mr. Wright a photostatic copy of an envelope from (WA) A-4-0, Guy Fawcett to the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, which in November of 1944 was placed in international mail channels by the Paris AFM. (See Case No. 7-413, dated 24 January 1947.)

14. Grant immediately stated that this envelope and its contents could not be considered independent, and because the envelope bore no postage. When asked why it was placed in the French Postal System, Mr. Grant answered, "By mistake."

This Agent then showed Mr. Brown a justification of the placing of the envelope by the Postal SD in the aforementioned mail, a justification written by the Postal Service, Assistant District Attorney Brown, dated 22 March 1964. (See Exhibit 10011).

REMARKS: The above information was furnished by [redacted] who stated that he had no further information regarding the same.

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MEMO H, 704 Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in 1944
dated 24 June 1944

The question, "What do you do now with official Army mail, that is, printed mail, addressed to the U.S. consuls or an Allied General Commission in a German country?", was asked by this Agent.

Lt. Truett stated, "I would give it to the Embassy. But I haven't seen any. To have no contact with anyone in the Embassy. The American Embassy has through State Department channels."

Lt. Moffett stated, "I frankly don't know. I have never seen any. But according to the Postal Scheme that mail should go to APO 777."

Lt. Truett, after checking the Postal Scheme, changed his mind and agreed with Lt. Moffett: "Yes, I'd send it to triplex seven. I should have said when you asked your question, 'I'd look it up in the Scheme, and if it isn't in the scheme we'd send it to the Embassy.'"

Lt. Truett then looked again at the photostatic copy of the envelope bearing the Moscow address and consulted page 24, part II of the 1941 Postal Guide. According to Lt. Truett's interpretation of the Postal Guide, official Army mail may not be sent to foreign countries through APO channels free of postage. Lt. Truett reverted to his original opinion: "I would say this letter to Moscow could not be considered as international mail."

This Agent then inquired, "Why does the French Postal System accept international mail which does not bear postage?"

Lt. Truett: "The French accept mail in transit to those countries which will accept mail without postage. The French found out that the Swiss would not accept r.v. mail, so now the French won't accept from us such mail going to Switzerland. However, it may be that mail going to Russia will be accepted by other countries, and the French don't care."

Lt. Truett added, "It is almost impossible to have international, official Army mail originating in Europe because the limitations placed on matter entitled to admission in the international mails free of postage are such as to make this impossible. Only consulates and embassies of certain countries can. We could never find out what we should do with mail that should not be in APO channels."

Lt. Moffett told this Agent privately, "This APO is mostly in the hands of the official mail. I have so many little things that have to be turned out that they keep me always on the run. I came up here from a little APO at Rhine, and this is quite different. I found out things mostly by asking questions. Frankly, before I came nobody gave a damn."

Mr. Ray Gaffney, branch postal clerk in charge of the registry section at APO 30 and in charge of Army postal agencies in Russia since June 1944, was next interviewed.

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Memorandum for Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Paris
Dated 24 June 1947

Mr. Jeffery stated: "When the 24th IFO in Frankfurt was receiving all registered mail originating at an AFO in Germany or Austria, destined for a foreign country, that is to be transmitted at Paris to the French Post Office. There has been some argument about a few countries like Russia-whether the French would take such mail. In the past and now the French have been willing to take it. If the mail has no postage I'd send it back; it must have postage for a foreign country. However, we receive official French mail without postage so I suppose they are willing to accept ours."

AGENT: "What do you do with official Army mail addressed to the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow?"

JEFFERY: "We deliver it to the Military Attache in Paris, whether it has postage or not."

AGENT: "What do you do with official Army mail addressed to, say, the U.S. Representative, A.C.S. Hungary?"

JEFFERY: "I would send it to AFO TTT because that is what is in the address."

Mr. Jeffery was also shown the photostatic copy of the envelope addressed to Moscow. He then declared, "I would send this to the U.S. Military Attache in Paris because I was told by another CID man that the Russians were opening such mail. Lt. Petroch has issued a memorandum which I had around for a long time, but I don't know where it is now."

This Agent observed various mail boxes in the registry room, some for mail addressed to AFM, AFM, local U.S. agencies, one box for British mail, and another for French mail. Mr. Jeffery explained that at AFO JS regular procedures were followed in the receiving of registered mail, that is, the registry numbers of the individual pieces were entered on duplicate copies of the Manifest Registry Dispatch Book and when the mail at the sheet accompanying the mail to its destination was returned to AFO JS it was posted on the carbon copy remaining in the Manifest Registry Dispatch Book.

Mr. Jeffery concluded by saying, "I don't think this international mail system has ever been streamlined yet. Everybody seems to have different interpretations and different systems."

Staff Sgt. Michael Zydenowicz, in charge of the international mail section at AFO JS for two weeks, was also interviewed. Sgt. Zydenowicz explained that he was substituting for the man who is usually in charge of the section and who was then in Portugal.

Sgt. Zydenowicz stated that the international mail section was for nonregistered mail. He pointed out two sections of boxes for such mail, one section for surface mail and the other for air mail. The section

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Item 2, For Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Paris.
Dated 24 June 1947

consisted of boxes labeled for countries throughout the world. Sgt. Zborovsky advised that all airmail mail for foreign countries goes to the 24th St. including special post for French possessions. The only exception in the routing of airmail mail to the 24th St. is mail addressed to England and first class mail addressed to Russia.

Sgt. Zborovsky stated that airmail mail going to Russia would first be sent to the 24th St. in Frankfurt and that air mail going to Russia would be delivered to French Aviation.

2. AMERICAN EMBASSY

On 6 May 1947 this Agent interviewed Mr. Sylvan R. Lough, Communications Officer at the American Embassy, Paris.

Mr. Lough, like Mr. Abraham in Berlin, was aware of past breaches of security in the handling of official Army mail and also present and future possibilities of a recurrence of such breaches, resulting from discrepancies in mailing procedures followed by the Army, Navy, and State Department. Mr. Lough stated: "The Army and Navy have two systems--one for classified mail, and the other for non-classified--whereas the State Department has one mail room for all types. The State Department doesn't have sufficient personnel to assign individuals to handle only classified material. That is the primary reason for the State Department putting the classification of its mail on the outside envelope--so that individuals charged with the responsibility of making pouches will be able to tell in which pouch to place the mail according to the classification on the cover. In this connection recently we had Top Secret Army material that got into an unaccompanied pouch going from Paris to Gineen. (See Exhibit II.)

Mr. Lough described the way by which mail arrives at and departs from the embassy mail room in Paris:

- A) **Couriers.** Mail is delivered to the mail room during working hours and to the cable room on holidays and at night. The courier obtains a signed pouch receipt which he turns in with his report of his trip. The couriers are not allowed to sign for the pouch contents. There are two copies of a pouch contents receipt; the addressee checks the contents of a pouch in the presence of another person, two signatures are placed on the receipt, and the receipt is then returned to the sender, who has had on file the copy of the other receipt.

- B) **Open mail, that is, international mail.**

- C) **Air cargo or air mail, which includes the "special pouch air mail." This is only for military personnel and their families. Classified and other is not permitted for transmission except by courier.**

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Memorandum for the Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in PARIS
Dated 24 June 1947.

- D) APO 51, Paris. Incoming mail comes from APO 51, but outgoing State Department mail does not pass through this APO. We are not authorized to use the APO for outgoing mail.
- E) U.S. Military and Naval Attaches.
- F) All mail originating in this Embassy goes through our file room, and the file room takes it to the mail room.
- G) By the Frankfurt train.

Mail going to Moscow is placed in a pouch sealed here. We give it to the courier, and the courier takes it to Berlin and deposits it in the Berlin mail room for safe keeping until his departure for Moscow. The invoice is inside the pouch.

Mail going to the Balkan countries leaves here every Thursday night by courier. That courier goes to Vienna first and reports at the State Department to Mr. Frank. Then he goes to Budapest, returns to Vienna, and flies to Bucharest; again he returns to Vienna and then departs for Belgrade; having returned to Vienna from Belgrade he flies to Prague, and from Prague he returns to Paris.

Mail for Sofia travels by courier along the following route: Paris-Luxemburg-Berlin-Munich-Istanbul-Sofia. The return trip covers the same cities.

As soon as some agreement is reached by the Army and Navy concerning classified material to be transmitted by diplomatic channels, I will issue instructions to all State Department missions in Europe and Northwest Africa.

I hope, as a result of your investigation, that in Washington they will try to coordinate matters so that as in the field, the Army, Navy, and diplomatic offices, will have the same classification procedure. I have no objection to the Army using any kind of designation (for the outside envelope) and the Navy another—that would make only two designations. Just as they agree on a way.

Mr. Ernst Knack, Administrative Assistant in charge of the Embassy mail room at Paris, was also consulted. Mr. Knack declared that mail from the APOs in the Balkan countries arrived at the Embassy mail room by means of State Department channels. When asked whether any postal units in French ports sent pouches of mail to the Embassy mail room in Paris for further transmission, Mr. Knack replied, "The only in Frankfurt does send mail down here for further transmission by courier service. We pick those places up at the 48 Hour Express. This mail is sent from Germany for other countries. We get

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Case E, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in Russia
dated 26 June 1946

mail from the Russian consulates, some of it registered and some not. They have no other means of getting through. It goes in the hands of mail clerks in the consulate, and it must have become this by a classifying center. If it goes addressed to an APO the location we don't know or keep it in to APO. I have asked APO SOY a number of times for the addresses of the APOs, but I have never gotten them so I turn such material over to the Army. If I think the APO is now one of our officers I send it out by courier post. If we know where an APO is we can send mail to the nearest diplomatic mission to that place. If we don't, we must turn it back to the Army.

"I never put any of that in the open mail. It either goes back to the APO or the AS Exchange Center. The only mail we put in the international mail is purely personal mail. No official mail do we turn over to the French Post Office for forwarding, not because I have any orders to the contrary but because it is a question of security."

This Agent asked Mr. Knack several questions:

"If official Army mail arriving here has no classification on the outside cover are you authorized to place that mail in international mail channels?"

MR. K: "We are authorized, but we haven't been given any instructions one way or the other. The way I look at it is that it's a question of using common sense."

"If official Army mail going to Moscow has no classification on the outside cover do you as a matter of routine place such mail in unaccompanied pouches?"

MR. K: "Yes, I have had a number of misdoings on Army mail not properly marked. It has been that confidential material is not so marked on the outer envelope. We have no means of knowing it's confidential unless there is some marking on the outside. Just registering an article doesn't make it confidential material. The registering of it only is for the purpose of having a record of it going through. I have been trying to get the Army authorities to put some markings on their mail to show that it is confidential material."

"Just what measures have you taken?"

MR. K: "We have called their attention, verbally, to these regulations. They have always said, 'We can't do that, it's against our regulations.'"

"Do I don't think it is against their regulations to place 'TOP SECRET' or 'TOP SECRET' on the outside cover?"

MR. K: "I don't know whether it is or it isn't, but they just won't do it. If they will do the other regulations because they should at least."

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MEMO 2, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in PARIS.
Dated 24 June 1947.

comply with a portion of State Department regulations." We have called the Army personnel here--the Military Attache's office, the Army courier service out of City Field, and the various organizations that were here in town."

"Do you know whether classified material coming from the U.S. Military Attache's office here for further transmission arrives here without any marking on the outside cover to indicate that it should receive safe handling?"

EMACK: "I may mark it now. The American Liaison Service here doesn't, so I mark "U.S." (Safe Mail) on the envelope."

3. Office of the U.S. Military Attache.

Major Thomas W. Sharkey, Executive Officer of the U.S. Military Attache, Paris, and Master Sgt. Marcel Vermette, mail clerk at the same office, were interviewed on 7 May.

Major Sharkey declared, "All our official mail is now handled by the State Department."

Sgt. Vermette described the way mail arrives at and departs from the Office of the U.S. Military Attache:

A) "APO 54. We pick it up daily. We will discontinue this soon because we are no longer authorized to use the APO."

B) "Embassy Mail Room. We take mail to the Embassy Mail Room and also collect ours there."

Sgt. Vermette continued, "This is a check point for all military attache mail. All has who send mail to other HAS in Europe send that mail here."

"When APO 54 brings you mail addressed to the U.S. Military Attache, answer, what do you do with it?"

VERMETTE: "If it is unclassified mail we send it to the Embassy Mail Room and mark on the envelope, 'By French'. For classified mail we register it here and send it out to the Mail Room. We stamp it 'Via Security Service'. Major Sharkey signs his name directly under the stamp."

"How do you know whether this mail is classified or not?"

VERMETTE: "It is addressed here, and we open it. We see how by the inner envelope. Then we put it in another envelope and readdress it to Moscow. Usually it's made up in three envelopes, the outer addressed to the

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Item 2, Re: Investigation of U.S. Postal Agencies in MEXICO
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Mr. Joris, and the second addressed to the destination. Sometimes there is an invoice within the outer envelope and sometimes a destination tag with the classification on it. In the invoice we can see whether it's classified and also on the tag."

"What has handle their mail that way?"

VERGHESE: "Madrid, Lisbon, Helsinki, Bern, and others. I don't recall handling any mail from the AOCs in the British countries addressed to Moscow."

4. Air Mail General Messengers Center (AG MC)

On 7 May, Mr. Edward J. Ryan, Chief of Communications, AG MC, Paris, since 26 March 1947, was interviewed. Mr. Ryan outlined the means by which mail arrives at and leaves AG MC.

- A) "American Embassy Mail Room. An Embassy courier comes here daily. We sometimes give the Embassy mail for transmission.
- B) "AGMC sends a courier daily.
- C) "CFLC sends a courier daily.
- D) "INFCM sends a courier daily.
- E) "British Army Staff exchanges mail here at times.
- F) "French War Office also exchanges mail here at times.
- G) "AFG SA. Our mail clerk exchanges mail at AFG SA.
- H) "One stop (one at Frankfurt) sends up a courier by train once a day. We give him mail to take back.

"We have no plane service at all. We send no messages out to deliver mail to local agencies."

This agent observed various boxes for mail addressed to the local agencies, some labeled, "French Mail", "U.S. Embassy", "French Liaison Office", "French War Office", "British Army Staff", "Radio", etc.

Mr. Ryan explained that the mail room of each recipient agency was prepared for outgoing mail. Incoming mail is placed by the sender in a regularly check. These should not be in a "time file" for any reason, after which time they are placed away for the agency.

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Dated 24 June 1997.

When asked under what direction the AS was operated, Mr. Lynch replied, "any directions about running this message center came from Major Post, who is the Adjutant of the 77th AFCH Detachment. They are all verbal directions."

Further questions were asked of Mr. Lynch:

"Is this an AS?"

LYNCH: "It is what remains of ASB Stop 0600. We still get packages once in a while addressed to ASB Stop 0600. They should be addressed to '77th AFCH Detachment, Paris'. These packages come from ASB Stop 0200, Frankfurt. It has never been officially declared that ASB Stop 0600 was deactivated. So they consider this still Stop 0600."

Question: "Do you sometimes get mail destined for the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow?"

LYNCH: "Sometimes."

"What do you do with it?"

LYNCH: "We sign for it and then sign it over to the Frankfurt courier. That is the only means we have of transmitting it to its destination."

"The American Embassy has couriers going to Moscow."

LYNCH: "Yes, but the American Embassy brings it to us. I can't see the reason. I suppose it is an understanding that if they handle our stuff we'll handle their stuff. So give them mail addressed to a place like the American Embassy, Spain."

Question: "What do you do with mail addressed to the APOs in the Balkan countries?"

LYNCH: "To get mail for Budapest and Belgrade from the American Embassy is a problem. We handle it the same way as the rest of the mail. We sign for it and give it to the Frankfurt courier in the evening. We send the post on. We put no address on the bag so just relay it through. It is already addressed to the Military Attache, Budapest."

"Would you ever take it to the APO for transmission?"

LYNCH: "No."

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"What mail do you take to the APO for further transmission?"

LYNCH: "Official mail going to England that has to be registered."

"Do you take any mail to the French Post Office?"

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APPENDIX III

POSTAL ADDRESS LISTING

1. Army Post Office 777, Vienna, Austria.
2. Adjutant General, Mail and Distribution, Vienna, Austria.
3. Signal Message Service, Stop 6900, Vienna, Austria.
4. American Legation, Vienna, Austria.
5. Signal Message Service, Stop 8400, Munich, Germany.
6. Army Post Office 407A, Munich, Germany.
7. Distribution Center for Munich Military Post Headquarters, Munich, Germany.
8. Military Post Message Center, Munich, Germany.
9. Base Post Office 29, Füssen, Germany.
10. Air Dispatch Letter Service, Rhine-Main Airport, Frankfurt, Germany.
11. Signal Message Service, Stop 6200, Frankfurt, Germany.
12. Base Post Office 24, Army Post Office 157, Frankfurt, Germany.
13. Base Post Office 26, Army Post Office 82, Frankfurt, Germany.
14. Office of the Adjutant General, Postal Branch, Frankfurt, Germany.
15. Adjutant General, Mail and Messenger, Frankfurt, Germany.
16. U.S. Political Advisor, Frankfurt, Germany.
17. Army Post Office 742, Berlin, Germany.
18. Army Post Office 742A, Berlin, Germany.
19. Signal Message Service, Stop 7500, Berlin, Germany.
20. Adjutant General Message Control Branch, Berlin, Germany.
21. Allied Control Authority Message Center, Berlin, Germany.
22. Communications Message Center, Berlin, Germany.
23. U.S. Political Advisor, French Zone, Berlin, Germany.
24. Army Post Office 51, Berlin, Germany.

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APPENDIX II (continued)

- 26. American Embassy, Paris, France.
- 27. Office of the U.S. Military Attaché, Paris, France.
- 28. Adjutant General Message Center, Paris, France.
- 29. United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, Budapest, Hungary.
- 30. United States Delegation, Allied Control Commission, Bulgaria, Sofia, Bulgaria.
- 31. United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Romania, Bucharest, Romania.
- 32. United States Political Mission, Budapest, Hungary.
- 33. United States Political Mission, Sofia, Bulgaria.
- 34. United States Political Mission, Bucharest, Romania.

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ATTACHMENT III

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- I. Message No. 2/23 From AGS Budapest, Hungary, to WASH., dated 22 March 1946, and letter from Captain West, WASH. Staff Police Officer, AGO TTT, dated 24 March 1946.
- II. Letter from Major H. V. Johnson, AGO's AGJ, General, WASH., dated 22 April 1947, subject: Installation of U.S. Mail Bags.
- III. Letter from Capt. E.A. Edwards, War Employment Office, WASH., dated 2 December 1944, subject: Screening of Civilian Employees.
- IV. Postal Memorandum No. 1, HCOH, Office of the Adjutant General, dated 24 March 1947.
- V. WASH. Letter AG JIL-23 SHL, dated 14 April 1947, subject: Non-Electrical Traffic to and from AGS Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania; and the U.S. Legation, Budapest.
- VI. WASH. AG Proposed Letter, dated 25 May 1947, subject: Forwarding Classified Correspondence.
- VII. AGS Ship 6900 From Letter, subject: Return of Receipted Pouch and/or Pouch contents Receipt.
- VIII. WASH. Letter AG JIL-4 AGO, dated 27 December 1944, subject: Security Courier Service.
- IX. WASH. Signal Memorandum JIL-4 dated 23 May 1947, subject: State Department Classified Documents.
- X. Memorandum to Mail Room, Budapest, from Mary Jane Porter, Communications Officer, American Legation, Vienna, dated 26 December 1944.
- XI. Memorandum to Miss Mary Jane Porter from American Legation, Budapest, Hungary, dated 30 December 1944.
- XII. Incoming Posting Slip, dated 26 December 1944, from Lawrence C. Smith, American Consul General, Vienna, to Major Theo. L. Eckhardt, AG SSB.
- XIII. Receipt slip, dated 29 March 1947, prepared by Mary Jane Porter, and signed by H.A. Snider, Major AG, Duty Officer.
- XIV. AGS Ship 607 No. 1, dated 20 August 1944.
- XV. WASH. Messenger Service Instruction No. 21, dated 26 December 1944.
- XVI. Mail up station check, AGS Post Office, Budapest.

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MEMORANDUM (JAN 4)

- XVII. HCOB, Office of the Adjutant General, "Transmission for Record", dated 20 April 1947.
- XVIII. HCOB, Office of the Adjutant General, letter AS G-2 200, dated 23 May 1947, Subject: Official Mail Addressed to U.S. Military Attachments.
- XIX. U.S. Political Advisor, Germany, Dispatch No. 2511 of 1 February 1947.
- XX. Letter from U.S. Embassy, Paris, to U.S. Political Advisor, Frankfurt, Germany, dated 9 April 1947.
- XXI. Immediate Action Letter ASAO-S YII.13, War Department, the Adjutant General's Office, dated 18 March 1947, Subject: Irregularities in Lateral Mail Communications with Office of the U.S. Military Attachments, Moscow.
- XXII. Letter from AOS Bulgaria, dated 18 February 1947, Subject: Security of mail.
- XXIII. First endorsement to USMA, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, letter of 7 March 1947.
- XXIV. USMA Letter AS YII.13 G-2 to Commander in Chief, HCOB, dated 24 April 1947, Subject: Message Traffic to and from the Railways.
- XXV. Directive, USMA, AOS Hungary, dated 4 March 1947, Subject: Mailing and Dispatching Official Documents.
- XXVI. Copy of Officer Courier Stamp and unclassified mail stamp used by USMA, AOS Hungary.
- XXVII. Letter from U.S. Delegation, AOS Bulgaria to Military Attachments, American Embassy, Paris, France, dated 2 May 1947, Subject: Dispatch and subsequent redistribution of Classified Material.

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOVPO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
(430th CIC Detachment)

UNITED STATES FORCES IN AUSTRIA
APO 777 U.S. Army

For Col. Snowden
63
MAR 23 1951

02001067

Vienna City Section
4 April 1947.

SUBJECT: Irregularities in Lateral Mail Communications with
Office of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow.

TO : A.C. of S., G-2, USFA
Attn: Lt. Col. Hoynes

1. Reference is made to Immediate Action letter AGAO-S
311.13, War Department, the Adjutant General's Office, dated 18 March
1947, same Subject, classification SECRET.

2. There is transmitted herewith a diagram outlining the
various transmission routes used in dispatching official correspondence
from Budapest, Hungary; Bucharest, Rumania; and Sofia, Bulgaria to
Moscow, USSR. This diagram also illustrates the various places which
the mail would pass through en route to Moscow, thus outlining all
possible points where mishandling could occur.

3. This Office intends to instigate a complete investiga-
tion, covering every point at which irregularities could possibly
occur. Special Agent Harry J. Pfaltzgraff will conduct the investi-
gations at Budapest, Hungary; Bucharest, Rumania; and Sofia, Bulgaria.
Special Agent Frank P. Dierickx will conduct the investigations at
Munich, Germany; Frankfurt, Germany; Berlin, Germany; and Paris, France.
Both Agents will jointly conduct the investigations at Tulln Air Base,
Austria and pertinent installations in Vienna, Austria.

4. Present methods of handling mail, past methods of handling
mail, present and past personnel assigned to handle mail, persons
responsible for the dispatching and receiving of mail, directives fol-
lowed in handling mail, courier services, modes of transmission of
mail, registry records, receipt records, and all other matters pertinent
to Subject will be thoroughly investigated.

5. At the conclusion of the investigation, a complete re-
port outlining the past and present methods used in the transmission of
mail, discrepancies found, and recommendations for corrective measures
will be submitted.

6. It is estimated that this investigation, together with
final report, will be completed on or about 30 April 1947.

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ON MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOVPO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

FLOYD C. SNOWDEN
Lt. Col. MI
Chief, OIC.

141

~~SECRET~~

1200942

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

~~SECRET~~

LEGEND

A. - Points where mail originated in known cases of irregularities in later mail communications with the Office of the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, USSR.

B. - Points where previous investigations have disclosed irregularities in lateral mail communications with the Office of the Military Attache, Moscow, USSR.


C. - Points of suspected irregularities in lateral mail communications with the Office of the Military Attache, Moscow, USSR.

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOVPO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

142

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Reid 13 0950 27 Oct '46

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
INTRA-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Regraded: SECRET By Authority (FOR USE IN MID ONLY)

FILE NO. OF ACSI Memo 6-59

SUBJECT

Interview With Mr. J. P. Watson

CLASSIFICATION
(IF ANY)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SD-
TOP SECRET CONTROL

A. C. OF S., G-2 DA

390.07 m/a 455

22 Oct 46

TO Chief, Intelligence Group

FROM Eurasian Branch

DATE 22 Oct 46 COMMENT NO. 1
NAME & TEL Col. Park/3507/ate

1. On Thursday, 17 October 1946, Lt. Colonel Robert E. Coffin of this Branch interviewed a Mr. J. P. Watson of the Badger Engineering Company. Mr. Watson had just arrived from the Soviet Union where he had been employed in Orsk as a consulting engineer in the construction of an oil refinery. Mr. Watson made two trips to Moscow, one in June 1946 and the other in September 1946, just prior to his return to the United States via Finland and Sweden. He was interviewed by the American Army Intelligence at the Moscow Embassy during both visits. Mr. Watson came to the Pentagon to report on the method in which the interviews were conducted.

2. Mr. Watson was most unfavorably impressed with the caliber of the Intelligence Officers in Moscow with whom he had contact. He felt "they are like children when dealing with the MVD." Mr. Watson's first contact with American Army Intelligence in Moscow was through Lt. Colonel Gary H. Schumann. Colonel Schumann introduced him and turned him over to Colonel James C. Crockett. Several other American officers had dealings with or interviewed Mr. Watson. However, Colonel Crockett appeared to Mr. Watson to be the guiding influence.

3. Mr. Watson's first unfavorable impression came during his first interview in June 1946 when the interviewing officer said, "Ah, yes, we have already interviewed your Mr. Dooley and Mr. Hamilton and learned many valuable things from them. We hope you can tell us as much." Mr. Watson remarked to the interviewing officer, "You shouldn't tell me what other Americans you have interviewed since all we American engineers are very close to our interpreters, and in a moment of thoughtlessness or drunkenness might happen to remark to our interpreter that so-and-so is supplying information to the American Intelligence." This statement seemed to surprise the officer who apparently had no realization that such a thing could happen, nor did he realize, as Mr. Watson pointed out, that many of the American civilians residing in the Soviet Union do not like each other and in many cases are severe rivals.

4. Mr. Watson's second surprise came when Colonel Crockett phoned Mr. Watson at his room at the Metropole Hotel from the main desk in the Hotel lobby. As Mr. Watson remarked, "If I were ever to be of further value to American Intelligence I could not be seen in the company of Colonel Crockett, who is known throughout Moscow as the head of American Intelligence." Mr. Watson, in the company of Colonel Crockett and several other officers drove from the Metropole to an American Officers' Club which is guarded by Russian soldiers and served by Russian civilians. After a few social pleasantries, they adjourned to a corner of the dining room where the interrogation of Mr. Watson began. Mr. Watson's first and natural reaction was to wonder if there were any hidden microphones concealed in the walls or furnishings nearby. When he inquired about this matter he was told by the American officers that they did not worry about such things.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION (IF ANY)

144

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

CONTINUE ON PAGE

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ON MAY 2 1997

BY CDR USAINSCOM FO/PO

Auth Dem 1 000 D-2 5000

INTRA - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(CONTINUED)

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CLASSIFICATION
(IF ANY)

TO: Comment No. 1 continued FROM DATE COMMENT NO.

5. The next day, Mr. Watson went to the fourth floor of the Embassy to deliver some photographs he had made in the Orsk area. As he was in the act of passing the pictures to an officer, another American officer with his Russian chauffeur walked into the room. Immediately following this, the Officer he was talking to went across the hall to phone a photographer about having the photographs enlarged. In the midst of his phone conversation, he belleted back across the hall, "Oh, Mr. Watson, what size do you think those pictures should be enlarged to?" Mr. Watson's impression was that the officer's voice could have been heard blocks away, thanks to the windows all being open in the June heat. During the June visit Mr. Watson made arrangements to have his films developed by the Intelligence Officers. During the summer in the Orsk area he photographed many forbidden things and finally had twenty rolls of film when he returned to Moscow in December. Upon his arrival on 22 September he immediately went to the Military Attache's office and asked that the pictures be developed. All memory of the June arrangements seemed to have fled the minds of the Intelligence Officers and, although he tried vigorously to have the negatives developed, eventually Mr. Watson took them to a Russian photographic store where they were developed without being censored. (How, he doesn't know.)

6. Mr. Watson's final experience with the Military Attache's Office in Moscow was in September 1946, just prior to his departure for this country when he was taken to the conference room where all non-military people were interviewed. This room is at the back of the Embassy on the fourth floor and faces the Russian Institute across an open area about 150 feet wide. There is a large bay window at the end of the room and the afternoon sun completely flooded the room with light. Mr. Watson, as he sat down, remarked, "Those Russians can see right in here." The answer given by the interviewing officer was, "A lot of people squirm when they first come into this room. We have been meaning to get curtains for that window for months, but we haven't gotten around to it yet."

7. To sum up Mr. Watson's reaction to his treatment by the American Intelligence Officers in Moscow, he feels that as a group they are incompetent because they do not protect their informers from reprisal by the Soviet Government. They do not seem to realize that they destroy the value of any American informant by making said informant subject to strict scrutiny by the Secret Police. As a matter of fact, Mr. Watson feels that they are even jeopardizing the lives of American civilians.

8. It is believed that this matter may be of great interest to the Security Group of the Intelligence Division. Mr. Watson may be contacted by writing:

J. P. Watson

RECEIVED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 May 1981
BY CDR USAINSCOT/JP
AUTHORITY: 1-602 5200-1-R

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

145

cc: Security Group
CLASSIFICATION (IF ANY)

RICHARD PARK, Jr.
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Asian Branch

DRAFT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SD—40702
TOP SECRET CONTROL
A. C. OF S., G-2, DA

IOM

SUBJECT: Contacting and Interviewing Civilian Informants.

TO : Chief, Intelligence Division *Ep*

1. Reference is made to ~~attached IOM~~ ^{IOM} Tab A, dated 22 October 1946,
subject: Interview with Mr. J. P. Watson.

2. Attached as Tab B is a letter ^{classified SECRET} addressed to all Military Attaches
~~suggesting that~~ ^{that} utmost secrecy and discretion be used when interviewing
civilian informants. ~~that~~

3. ^{That Chief Intel Group} Recommendation: ~~That~~ the stencil at signature tab, covering letter
referred to in para 2 above, be signed for dispatch to all Military Attaches.

4. Concurrences:

Chief Attache Br *of*

Chief Security Grp *HMM*

2 Incls

1. Tab A-IOM-Interview with Mr. J. P. Watson
2. Tab B-~~Br~~ letter to MA's

PH 414514

R. F. ~~LEWIS~~
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Intelligence Group

* 3. ^{this subject} ~~The matter of intelligence security in~~
~~interviewing civilian informants~~ ^{is now}
~~included in the orientation of Military~~ ^{inlet} ~~Attaches~~ ^{course and will be}
~~placed on this in the~~
~~future. In addition this subject will~~
~~be included in the Strategic Intelligence~~
~~School.~~

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REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON ~~all~~ MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOWPO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
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~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

SD ~~TOP SECRET CONTROL~~ ^{A7702}
A. C. OF S., G-2, DA

SUBJECT: Interviewing Civilian Informants in Foreign Countries

TO : All Military Attaches & Military Liaison Officer, India

1. Security violations have recently occurred during interviews with civilian employees of American firms in foreign countries. These violations have been brought to the attention of the War Department by individuals who feel that many of the basic principles of intelligence security were violated during their interviews with Military Attache personnel.

2. These interviews, in many instances, have been conducted in public places with very little consideration being given to cover and deception. In several cases names of civilians interviewed have been casually mentioned to ~~others~~ about to be interviewed. This has caused considerable concern to American firms and employees, who are generally willing to give freely very valuable information, provided that they as a source of such information are protected.

3. The safeguarding of sources of information is one of the basic principles of intelligence and is vital to the success of the entire plan for the collection of information. Immediate and continuous action is indicated to insure that all civilian informants are afforded the utmost protection. If a civilian informant or an agent is compromised, such action will invariably reduce or eliminate his usefulness, and in addition endanger his personal well-being. Of equal importance, any compromise of civilian sources through carelessness may well jeopardize the confidence in which the Office of the Military Attache is held by all sources of information. Civilian informants must be exploited, but in order to do this effectively the maximum degree of security consciousness and discretion is required of all attache personnel.

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ON MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FO/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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~~SECRET~~

The above

4. ~~This~~ is especially true in connection with employees of American business firms who are, in varying degrees, risking their position in foreign countries by supplying information to ^{representatives of} the War Department. The value and amount of information which the War Department can obtain from employees of American business firms will depend primarily upon the confidence which such firms and employees have in the War Department's ability to protect their security as sources of information. In this connection it should be borne in mind that there frequently exists a strong rivalry between such firms and that financial loss as well as intense resentment may result if information obtained from one firm is divulged to another.

5. The classified nature of effecting liaison with civilian informants must be kept uppermost in the minds of all attache personnel. All Military Attaches ^{will} ~~should~~ take appropriate measures to acquaint their staff with the above, and ^{to insure} ~~to~~ ^{addition of such} ~~importance~~ liaison procedures ^{as} to conform with essential security requirements.

For the Sec of Intel

Emms

Copies for:
Executive
Security Group
Intelligence Group
Attache Branch
(Strategic Intelligence School
Operational Section, Attache Branch

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

148

~~SECRET~~

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON MAY 2 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
INTRA - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(FOR USE IN MID ONLY)

CLASSIFICATION
(IF ANY)

~~TOP SECRET~~ 40702

~~TOP SECRET CONTROL~~

A. C. OF S., G-2, 25

FILE NO.

Regraded ~~SECRET~~ By Authority
of ACIS Memo 6-59

TO Chief, Intelligence Group

FROM Ch/Plans & Info.
Control Br.

DATE 6 Nov 46 COMMENT NO. 1
NAME & TEL Lt Col Mears/5245/fnl

1. Reference is made to Tab A, IOM dated 22 October 1946, subject: Interview with Mr. J. P. Watson.
2. Attached as Tab B is a letter, classified Secret, addressed to all Military Attaches ordering that utmost secrecy and discretion be used when interviewing civilian informants.
3. This subject is now included in the Military Attache orientation course and will be included in the Strategic Intelligence School.
4. Recommendation: That Chief, Intelligence Group sign the stencil of Tab B at signature tab.
5. Concurrences:
Chief, Attache Branch
Chief, Security Group

2 Incls

1. Tab A, IOM "Interview with Mr. J.P. Watson"
2. Tab B, Stenciled ltr to MAS

P. H. LASH, JR.

Colonel, GSC

Chief, Plans & Information Control
Branch

Regraded ~~SECRET~~ By Authority
of ACIS Memo 6-59

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

149

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION (IF ANY)

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON MAY 2 1997

BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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220146



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MARCH 12
2002

Case Control No. 200200042

Mr. John Young
Cryptome.org
251 W. 89th St., Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

I refer to your letter to the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command dated March 29, 2001, requesting ~~mandatory review and~~ release of a number of documents under the Freedom of Information Act. The enclosed documents originated with the Department of State and were therefore referred to us for appropriate action.

We have determined that all of these documents may be released.

Sincerely,

Margaret P. Grafeld
Director
Office of IRM Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

American Embassy,
Moscow, August 31, 1953.

Dear Alex:

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grinstead, Dir.
() Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify
Date 1/18/02 Exemption

I want to bring to your attention a series of attempts within the past few weeks to approach members of the staff who reside at American House. It is practically certain that these attempts have been made by the same individual, in view of the contents of the notes which have been passed, the available descriptions of the individual, and the fact that the attempts were all made in the same area of Moscow, near American House. All notes are signed "Kalya", the Russian diminutive for Nikolai.

Memoranda were prepared by each of the recipients of the notes, and copies are being enclosed as of further assistance. Translations of these notes were made by Mr. Emory C. SWANK, Second Secretary, in so far as the poor handwriting can be deciphered. It is suggested that you may wish to have the notes subjected to laboratory examination, and the originals are being enclosed. In all instances, the staff members concerned were instructed not to keep the appointments requested, in view of the possibility of provocation or an attempt at penetration. No further action will be taken here unless we are instructed to the contrary.

Sincerely,

/S/ Frank G. Siscoe,
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures:

See list on next page.

Alex T. Prengel, Esquire,
Regional Security Officer,
American Embassy,
Paris.

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Enclosures:

- 1/ Envelope containing originals of notes received by Messrs. Duncan, Blackwell, Bennett and Reynolds.
- 2/ Statement of Mr. Duncan (containing translation of note)
- 3/ Mr. Duncan's description of Agoston.
- 4/ Statement of Mr. Blackwell.
- 5/ Translation of note received by Mr. Blackwell.
- 6/ Statement of Mr. Bennett.
- 7/ Translation of note received by Mr. Bennett.
- 8/ Statement of Mr. Reynolds.
- 9/ Translation of note received by Mr. Reynolds.

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CONFIDENTIAL

47

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL-SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. D. H. Henry
FROM: Mr. Dillard H. Duncan, Jr.
SUBJ: Incident that took place July 30th at approximately 7:50 p.m.

While walking from the American House to the Danish Legation, a Soviet citizen (I can only assume the person was a citizen since he spoke Russian language) asked if I would light his cigarette. As I have done a number of times before on this same thoroughfare, I lit the man's cigarette. While lighting the cigarette this person dropped a small folded piece of paper in the palm of my hand. On the piece of paper a note was written in the Russian language. Translation of the note is as follows:

"IT IS NECESSARY TO MEET TODAY AT 1400 or 2200 AT THE METRO STATION DINAMO NEAR THE TICKET OFFICE. IN YOUR HANDS A RED PENCIL WITH THE WORDS 'MAY I BORROW YOUR PENCIL'."

KOLYA"

I kept walking in the direction of the Danish Legation. After arriving at the Legation I opened the note to see if I could tell what it was about but was unable to do so since I cannot read or speak the local language.

I returned to the American House with friends from the Danish Legation at 2100. Immediately I asked Sgt. Clark of the Air Attache office to translate the note for me. After finding out what the note said, I asked Sgt. Clark to get in touch with Mr. O'Shaughnessy or Mr. Henry and explain the incident. Mr. Henry sent word that I should not leave the American House alone and to be sure and report the incident early this morning.

Attachment - Note

CONFIDENTIAL-SECURITY INFORMATION

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret R. Grafield, Dir.
() Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify
Date 1/8/02 Exemption

7
C O P Y

CONFIDENTIAL

DESCRIPTION OF PERSON (given by William E. Bennett)

WEIGHT: approximately 170 lbs.
AGE: between 40 and 50 years old
HEIGHT: approximately 5 feet 8 inches.
HAIR: black, slightly bald.
DRESS: dark pants, very dirty, no coat, no hat.
BUILD: stocky, slightly chubby face.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(☒) Release (☐) Excise (☐) Deny (☐) Declassify
Date 1/18/02 Exemption _____

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C O P Y

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
() Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify
Date 5/5/02 Exemption

CONFIDENTIAL

of August 21, 1953 from
Embassy, Moscow

TRANSLATION OF NOTE RECEIVED BY WILLIAM REYNOLDS ON
AUGUST 20, 1953, 7:20 P.M.

Gentlemen!!!

I have handed over a series of notes and even
a letter addressed to Mr. Bohlen but have had no answer
whatsoever from you.

Once again I request you for a meeting with some-
one for arranging matters. If you cannot do this,
my position is critical. You will understand that I
have a mission from Berlin. My daily following you
may attract Russian observation. Therefore I urgently
request today at 2200 or tomorrow at 1000 you (one word
unintelligible) a gentleman for a meeting with me at
the taxi stand opposite the main entrance to the Gorki
Park of Culture and Rest. I shall be following you
(two words unintelligible) on the Kropotkinsky Embank-
ment (Note: Street on which American House is located).
If you (two words unintelligible) then show a red light
in the two rooms on the top floor. (Two words unintelli-
gible). I shall be at the stand with the registration
Crocodile N 33.*

My name is

CONFIDENTIAL
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

This sentence in parentheses is an abbreviation

CONFIDENTIAL

C O P Y

4
Enclosure No. 4 to letter
of August 31, 1953 from
AmEmbassy, Moscow

CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT OF WARREN C. BLACKWELL

10 August 1953

On Saturday, 8 August 1953, about 8:30 in the evening, I left the American House to go to the Gorky Park. As I started up the steps on the side of the Crimean Bridge, I saw a man standing next to the wall of the steps. As I passed him, he approached me and said "Letter, please, letter, please". With this, he slipped the attached note into my hands and turned and left. It was dark at this location and I was unable to get any view of him that could help to identify him. He left immediately. I returned to the American House and hid the note and then proceeded to Gorky Park. I turned the note in to Cdr. PALM upon reporting for work Monday a.m.

/s/ Warren C. BLACKWELL

YN 1 USE

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
() Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify
Date 1/18/02 Exemption _____

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51
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SECTION COPY
BRAND

4
Enclosure no. 6 to
of August 31, 1953
American Embassy, Moscow

CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSLATION OF NOTE RECEIVED BY WARREN C. BLACKWELL
ON AUGUST 8, 1953, 6:00 P.M.

Must urgently contact your representative today
at 1400 or 1900 or 2200. I shall be at Dynamo station
near "football" window N 22, shall take with me the
magazine Crocodile N 33. If not today, then daily at
this time.

Kolya.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
() Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify
Date 7/10/92 Exemption _____

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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52

RECORD SECTION COPY
Attache Branch

C O P Y

CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT OF CONNEL BENNETT

10 August 1953

On Sunday 9 August, 1953 at about 2045 while returning from Gorky Park by myself between the subway station and the American House on the side street just off the Main Drive adjacent to the American House, I was stopped by a man between 40 and 45 years old, mostly bald, forehead, ruddy complexioned, stocky built, about 3 feet tall, wearing a blue soiled suit with a blinded red and white striped sport shirt. In Russian he asked me for a light for his cigarette and during the process of giving him a light I cupped my hands protecting the flame from the wind and in so doing he dropped a note in my hand. By the time I had unfolded the paper and realized what had happened he had very hurriedly disappeared up the street.

I came straight back to the American House, contacted Ralph Clark (Art Clark), who reads Russian, and he in turn called Mr. Henry, the First Secretary, who came down to the American House, read the note and told me to write down what had happened. The note with its contents was given to Mr. Henry.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dis /s/ C. E. BENNETT

() Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify

Date 11/18/02 Exemption

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

53

SECRET EDITION COPY

C O P Y

Enclosure no. 2 by letter
of August 21, 1953 from
Embassy, Moscow

CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSLATION OF NOTE RECEIVED BY CONSUL GENERAL
AUGUST 9, 1953, 9:45 P.M.

Urgent contact necessary. Today about 1800
or 2100 - wait at the taxi stand opposite the
central entrance to the Gorki Park of Culture.
In my hands the magazine Crocodile N 33. If
today there is no representative, then I shall
wait tomorrow at the same place about 1000 or
1200 or 1400.

Iolya.

I request you to hand over this note without
fail. If you do not, I shall report to your superior
or to Mr. Bohlen.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret R. Gaffeld, Dir.
(☒) Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify
Date 1/8/87 Exemption

CONFIDENTIAL

3

C O P Y

Enclosure to the letter
of August 31, 1953 from
Ambassador, Moscow.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
() Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify
Date 1/17/02 Exemption _____

CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. REYNOLDS

TO: Mr. O'Shaughnessy

FROM: W. Reynolds

SUBJECT: Incident

On August 20, 1953 at 7:20 p. m., I was stopped by a Russian citizen near Krimski Most and asked for a light for his cigarette. As I lit his cigarette, he dropped a note into my cupped hands.

As I was on my way to the Embassy, I continued the journey by bus. When I arrived at Miss Lee's apartment, I called Mr. Henry and made an appointment for 9:00 in his office.

I showed Mr. Henry the note, which was written in poor script on a plain white envelope. We discussed the matter for some time and he told me to return to the American House before 10:00. He also advised me to report the matter to you in the morning.

At the present time I do not have a complete translation of the note, but from the initial reading, the man wanted me to meet him in front of Gorki Park at 10:00 that evening or 10:00 the following morning to discuss something about Berlin.

The following is a brief description of the man as I observed him while lighting his cigarette: Approximately 5' 7" in height; 160 pounds in weight; brown eyes; brown hair; shaved; clothes seemed about average as he was wearing a tie and the suit was brown striped; on his head he wore a cap. His shoes were the sandal type (brown).

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MARCH 13
2002

Case Control No. 200200531

1110, 1111, 1112
1114, 1115, 1116, 1117


Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

I refer to your letter dated March 29, 2001 to the U.S. Army and Intelligence Command, requesting the release of certain material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552). Five of the relevant documents retrieved in response to your request originated with the Department of State and were therefore referred to us for appropriate action. We received this referral on February 14, 2002.

We have determined that all five documents may be released.

Sincerely,


Margaret P. Grafeld
Director

Office of IRM Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

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S/AL - LThompson:mac
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S/AL 11/15/65

Memorandum of Conversation
INFO....CJCS-1 DJS-1 SJCS-1 J3-2 J5-2 SACSA-4 NMCC-1
SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-5 ASD/PA-1 DIA-15 CSA-2 CNO-2 CSAF-1
CMC-2 FILE-1(48)JH/M

CALL 53337

FOR NMCC/MC

SERVICE

DATE: Nov. 15, 1965
K 16 04 39Z

SUBJECT:

Publication of the Penkovsky Papers

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LINDIS

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large
Department of State

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S/AL (3)	White House	

The Ambassador called at his own request and made the following oral statement:

"Moscow has noted the publication in a number of American newspapers of the so-called "Penkovsky Papers" and a report that these "Papers" are going to be published soon in the USA and in England in the form of a book. Familiarization with the contents of these "Papers" leaves no doubt that they are a crude forgery concocted in the spirit of the worst time of the "cold war." There is attributed to Penkovsky a whole collection of stereotyped, slanderous fabrications about the Soviet Union, its policy and Soviet leaders.

"The authors of this forgery do not even stop before such a monstrous lie as attributing to Soviet leaders the idea of preventive war which has actually been propagated, as is known, by certain circles in the West.

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"At the same time when one becomes acquainted with the contents of the "Penkovsky Papers" it becomes completely clear that they are not simply the product of the imagination of some irresponsible journalist. American and English intelligence services whose agent Penkovsky was, as proved in the course of the trial against him in May 1963, lent their efforts to the fabrication of this forgery and to this entire provocational scheme.

"In this connection the publication in the USA of the above-mentioned forgery and intention to publish it as a book cannot be viewed by us other than pre-meditated action which is in direct contradiction of repeated pronouncements by representatives of the Government of the USA about striving for improvements in Soviet-American relations. The responsibility for the negative consequences of this action for Soviet-American relations, the state of which at present, even without this, leaves much to be desired, will rest on the American side."

I said I would make no official comment until there had been an opportunity to examine his statement. I said, however, I could tell him on a personal basis and off the record, that when the publication of this series was announced, I inquired of our people and was told that we had nothing to do with the publication of this series. I said I understood that the CIA was asked whether they had any objection to publication and that they had replied that they had considered the matter solely from the security point of view and from this point of view, had no objection to publication.

The Ambassador then asked if he could expect an official reply, and I said I presumed that he could.

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INFO: J3-1 J5-2 ASD/1 A-9 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 11 DIA-15 A-2
CSAF-1 CNO-10 CMG-2 SECDEF-7 GC-1 ASD/PA-1 FILE-1 (55)

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Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, at his request, called on Thompson

November 15 to make oral statement re publication Penkovsky Papers along following lines:

Moscow noted publication in American newspapers and in book form so-called "Penkovsky Papers." Knowledge of contents leaves no doubt these "crude forgery concocted in spirit of worst time in 'cold war'". Papers slanderous fabrications Soviet Union, its policy, and Soviet leaders, and authors even attribute to Soviet leaders idea of preventive war which actually propagated by certain circles in West. These papers not simply product imagination of some irresponsible journalist but results efforts American and English intelligence services. Publication in USA of papers "cannot be viewed by us other than premeditated action which is in direct conflict with the repeated pronouncements...by USA about striving for improvements in Soviet-American relations." Any negative consequences this action on US-USSR relations will be U.S. responsibility.

Thompson replied could make no official comment until Soviet statement examined but could inform Dobrynin on personal basis that we had nothing to do with publication.

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ES by *[Signature]* Date

Drafted by:

SOV:WLMorgen:ej 11/15/63

Telegraphic transmission

classification approved by:

Clearances:

SOV - Mr. Toot

S/S - Mr. Miller

MAR - 7 1964

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy MOSCOW

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Subsequently Thompson raised subject orbital missiles. Details
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CSAF-1 CNO-10 CMC-2 SECDEF-7 FILE-1

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INFO RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 168
STATE GRNC
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REF: EMBTEL 1628.

1. PUBLICATION PENKOVSKIY PAPERS FINALLY REVEALED TO SOVIET READERS ON BACK PAGE TODAY'S PRAVDA. ARTICLE BY GOLUBOV TAKES SAME LINE AS EARLIER TASS COMMENTARY BY MEYEVSKY (REFTEL) THAT PAPERS ARE CRUDE "CONCOCTION" OF "PETTY FORGERIES" BY CIA AND ITS UK ASSISTANTS. ARTICLE ASSERTS WYNNE BETRAYED HIS "WARD" AND BRITISH INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS AND OFFERED ESPIONAGE SERVICES AFTER HIS ARREST, CONDEMNED HIS OWN SPY

PAGE TWO RUEHCR 25FD LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
ACTIVITIES DURING TRIAL, AND NOW GONE BACK ON HIS "OATH" NOT TO TAKE PART IN ANY MORE "DIRTY MATTERS". ALSO NOTES WYNNE HAD BEEN HANDED OVER TO BRITISH AUTHORITIES "UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES".

2. AS IN EARLIER TASS ITEM, COMMENTARY IS CAREFUL NOT TO REVEAL TO SOVIET READER ANY FACTUAL CONTENTS OF PAPERS.

3. FROM ARTICLES' TONE OF INDIGNATION AND FACT SOVIETS WERE PROVOKED INTO COMMENTING RATHER THAN IGNORING WHOLE MATTER, PUBLICATION OF PAPERS HAS OBVIOUSLY TOUCHED TENDER NERVES IN MOSCOW.

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FROM: MOSCOW

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ACTION: SECSTATE 1683

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CONFIDENTIAL NOVEMBER 21

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USDAO CX-511

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NSC 1. PENKOVSKY PAPERS NOW ATTACKED IN LOCAL PRESS AND GIVEN AS REASON
INR FOR RESTRICTIONS ON MILATTACHES (REFTEL). CORRESPONDENTS ARE
CIA ALSO RECEIVING INDICATIONS HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION BEING GIVEN
NSA NEXT SOVIET MOVES. WINSTON (MCGRW-HILL) WAS TOLD BY SOVIET
DOD NEWSMAN MATTER BEING DISCUSSED IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND SOME
NIC IN CC ADVOCATING RETALIATION AGAINST US GOVT. INFORMATIONAL
ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING CESSATION AMERIKA DISTRIBUTION OR RESUMPTION
JAMMING VOA. WINSTON STATES SOURCE PREVIOUSLY PASSED INFORMATION
RSR BUT OF MORE MINOR NATURE. WINSTON PLANS REPORT ABOVE NEXT
WEEKS BUSINESS WEEK.

2. ROSENFELD REPORTS THAT SOVIET ACQUAINTANCE WITH "PRETTY
GOOD CONNECTIONS" TELLS HIM POSSIBILITY ROSENFELD EXPULSION
STILL UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. SOURCE SAID FONOFF PRESS
SECTION OBTAINED CC APPROVAL FOR THREAT AGAINST ROSENFELD,
ASSURING CC THIS WOULD ACHIEVE RESULTS. NOW THAT WASHPOST
DEFIED PRESSURE CC CALLING FOR ACTION. SOME UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS
IN FONOFF REPORTEDLY OPPOSING FURTHER ACTION ON GROUND UNFORESEEABLE
CONSEQUENCES AND PAPERS ALREADY DONE THEIR DAMAGE. ROSENFELD
KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH SOURCE. (DEPT PRESUMABLY AWARE POST EDITOR
WIGGIN SAW DOBRYNIN AND EMPHASIZED SERIOUS VIEW POST WOULD
TAKE TOWARD UNJUSTIFIED ACTION AGAINST ROSENFELD. LATTER REPORTS
WIGGIN MAY BE PREPARED RELINQUISH BUREAU IF HE CONCLUDES CAN
ONLY BE CONTINUED ON SOVIET TERMS.

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